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1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Jovana Davidovic When Should the Military Get Involved in Politics?
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Commonly the military stays out of politics, and for good reason. Federal law regulates political activity for active duty military rather strictly because the consequences of having a military that is partisan can be devastating, as history has shown us repeatedly. In this paper, I argue that the current rules of political neutrality are too broad and that there are times when our military leaders ought to engage in political debate so as to serve the same aims that justify having strict political neutrality rules in the first place: namely building civilian-military trust, and promoting troop cohesion and morale.
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2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
James Stacey Taylor The Myth of Semiotic Arguments in Democratic Theory and How This Exposes Problems with Peer Review
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In a recent series or books and articles Jason Brennan and Peter M. Jaworski (writing both together and separately) have developed criticisms of what they term “semiotic” arguments. They hold that these arguments are widely used both to criticize markets in certain goods, to defend democracy, and criticize epistocracy. Their work on semiotics is now widely (and approvingly) cited. In this paper I argue that there is no reason to believe that any defenders of democracy or critics of epistocracy have offered semiotic arguments for their positions. I then explain how the operation of academic incentives has led to this being overlooked by both Brennan and Jaworski and their critics. I conclude with suggestions for how to revise peer review so that such errors are less likely to be made in the future.
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3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Matan Shelomi Pain, Suffering, and Euthanasia in Insects
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While unnecessarily killing or injuring an insect is arguably wrong, euthanasia of an accidentally injured insect raises anew issues of whether insects can experience pain. The question takes renewed significance due to increasing insect farming for food and feed and concerns over farmed insect welfare. For euthanasia of a damaged insect to be justifiable, the damage must be sensed as a noxious stimulus (nociception) that the insect consciously experiences as pain. This pain must then lead to suffering or frustrated desire, with the possibility of the animal preferring death to continued existence. A failure at any of these points would deem euthanasia moot. The neurological, behavioral, and evolutionary evidence so far suggests the concept of euthanasia does not apply to insects.
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4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar The Sabermetrics of State Medical School Admissions
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In this paper, I argue that medical school admissions should be limited to statistically relevant factors. My argument rests primarily on three assumptions. A state professional school should maximize production. If a state professional school should maximize production, then it should maximize production per student. If a state professional school should maximize production per student, then, within the optimum budget, a state medical school should maximize quality-adjusted medical services per graduate. I put forth a tentative equation for ranking applicants as a way of maximizing quality-adjusted medical services per graduate. This way of ranking is cheaper than the way admissions is currently done. Hence, the proposal is practically as well as theoretically appealing.
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5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Raja Halwani The Palestinian Right of Return
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The paper argues that individual Palestinians have a right of return to historic Palestine in virtue of being members of the Palestinian people that continues to have occupancy rights in historic Palestine. More specifically, the paper argues that the Palestinians were, when Israel was founded, a people with occupancy rights to their lands, that they continue to be a people to this day, and that their occupancy right has not been alienated, forfeited, or prescripted. The paper then argues that individual Palestinians have the right of occupancy in virtue of being members of the Palestinian people. Because the right has been blocked by Israel since 1948, the right of return is the right of individual Palestinians to be allowed to return to their homeland and exercise their occupancy rights there.
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symposium on forgiveness
6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
John Kleinig Forgiveness and Unconditionality
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If forgiveness is to be seen as a virtuous act, it must satisfy certain conditions. For many, those conditions are construed narrowly and must involve some change of heart on the part of the wrongdoer who is to be forgiven: remorse, apology, a willingness to provide recompense, and so forth. Such an account is usually characterized as one of conditional forgiveness. Others construe the conditions differently—not eschewing remorse and apology, but neither always requiring it—and see those conditions as those relevant to exercises of generosity, love, mercy, gifting and grace. Such an account is usually characterized as one of unconditional forgiveness. The present essay attempts to remove some of the resistance to unconditional forgiveness.
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7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Derek R. Brookes Moral Grounds for Forgiveness
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In this paper, I argue that forgiveness is a morally appropriate response only when it is grounded in the wrongdoer’s demonstration of genuine remorse, their offer of a sincere apology, and, where appropriate, acts of recompense and behavioral change. I then respond to John Kleinig’s suggestion (in his paper “Forgiveness and Unconditionality”) that when an apology is not forthcoming, there are at least three additional grounds that, when motivated by virtues such as love and compassion, could nevertheless render “unconditional forgiveness” a morally laudable option. I argue that such grounds could indeed constitute or result in laudable responses to wrongdoing, but only if they are not conceived of or described in terms of forgiveness.
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8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
John Kleinig Defending Unconditional Forgiveness: A Reply to Brookes
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My differences with Derek Brookes reflect an alternative understanding of what forgiveness is intended to achieve, and how it achieves it. I express some skepticism about his account of wrongdoing as an expression of contempt, of wrongdoing posing an ongoing threat, of resentment as a protective shield, and apology/remorse as the only morally acceptable means for removing such a threat. I remain unconvinced that forgiveness in the absence of an apology is likely to evidence condonation or a failure of self-respect. In emphasizing that forgiveness is a morally discretionary gift, I depart from the idea that it must somehow be earned (by apology, etc.) to be morally laudable. Its character as forgiveness is therefore not morally impugned if not made dependent on the wrongdoer’s repentance.
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9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Derek R. Brookes Forgiveness as Conditional: A Reply to Kleinig
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In my paper “Moral Grounds for Forgiveness,” I argued that forgiveness is morally appropriate only when a sincere apology is received, thus ruling out the three grounds for unconditional forgiveness suggested by John Kleinig in his paper “Forgiveness and Unconditionality.” In response to his reply “Defending Unconditional Forgiveness,” I argue here that my terminology, once clarified, does not undermine my construal of resentment; that conditional forgiveness is just as discretionary as unconditional forgiveness; and that what we choose to take into account when we forgive must be a morally appropriate grounding for that particular end, but that only a sincere apology could satisfy this condition. I end by conceding that the three grounds suggested by Kleinig nevertheless play an essential role in the process of (conditional) forgiveness insofar as they facilitate a willingness to forgive and an openness toward accepting an apology.
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book review
10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Mike W. Martin Cognitive-Behavior Interventions for Self-Defeating Thoughts: Helping Clients to Overcome the Tyranny of "I Can’t"
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about the contributors
11. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
About the Contributors
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