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symposium on trump and conflicts of interest
1. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Elliot D. Cohen, Introduction
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2. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Michael Davis, Trumping Conflicts of Interest
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As President, Donald Trumps faces two sorts of conflict of interest. The first are conflicts of interest other Presidents also faced, though Trump’s are “writ large.” These seem—as a practical matter—unavoidable now, hard to escape, not to be much changed by disclosure, and not even much subject to management. The other sort of conflict of interest seems to be without resolution even in principle while Trump remains both President and the person he is. These conflicts of interest are the product of the same life that made him President. He cannot be both chief executive of a republic (as his oath of office requires him to be) and the royal autocratic central to his business brand.
3. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Aaron Quinn, Fake News, False Beliefs, and the Need for Truth in Journalism
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Many of U.S. President Donald Trump’s business interests—and those of his family and close associates—either conflict or could conflict with his position as the country’s top elected official. Despite concerns about the vitality of the journalism industry, these actual or potential conflicts have been reported in great detail across a number of journalism platforms. More concerning, however, are the partisan news organizations on both the right and left that deliberately sow social discord by exciting deeply polarized political tensions among the U.S. populous. Often described as “fake” news, these organizations produce reports that seem designed to create outrage among audiences instead of enlightenment. This paper draws upon social epistemology and information ethics to offer a truth-based ethos for journalism to help overcome this pernicious form of exploitation.
4. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Stephen Kershnar, Does the Emolument Rule Exist for the President?
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In this article, I argue that with regard to the President, the Emoluments Clause (EC) is not law. I argue for this on the basis of two premises. First, if something is a law, then it has a legal remedy. Second, EC does not have a legal remedy. This premise rests on one or more of the following assumptions: EC does not apply to the President; if EC were to apply to the President, it does not provide a remedy; or, if EC were to apply to the President and have a remedy, it is not law because it is vague. The conclusion that EC does not apply to the President has a practical upshot. As a practical matter, President Trump’s worldwide business tentacles and his refusal to put his business assets into a blind trust does not violate EC and, arguably, does not violate federal conflict-of-interest law.
5. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Fritz Allhoff, Jonathan Milgrim, Conflicts of Interest, Emoluments, and the Presidency
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The past presidential election reinvigorated interest in the applicability of conflict of interest legislation to the executive branch. In § 2, we survey various approaches to conflicts of interest, paying particular attention to 18 U.S.C. § 208. Under 18 U.S.C. § 202, this conflict of interest statute is straightforwardly inapplicable to the President. We then explore the normative foundations of such an exemption in § 3. While these sections are ultimately lenient, we go on to consider the Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution in § 4. In §§ 5–6, we apply the Emoluments Clause to the presidency, arguing that it complements conflict-of-interest regimes with regards to foreign affairs, but with more substantial restrictions.
symposium of refugees, libertarianism, and welfare rights
6. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba, Libertarianism and Refugees
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7. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Jan Narveson, Libertarianism and the Refugees Problem
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8. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
James P. Sterba, Response to Narveson on the Refugees Problem
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articles
9. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Clifton Perry, Confrontation and Its Discontents
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the criminal’s constitutional right of confrontation is not abridged when the defendant is not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine each and every witness offering evidence for the government. This rather surprising contention is investigated through an analysis of the Court’s arguments in light of certain philosophical principles.
10. International Journal of Applied Philosophy: Volume > 31 > Issue: 1
Michael Wreen, Relativism and Comparative Moral Judgments
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On relativism, it has been argued, certain comparative moral judgments are impossible. Judgments which compare two moral codes, judgments which compare one’s own moral code with another, judgments which, on the basis of a comparison with one’s own code, condemn specific moral practices permitted or required by other codes, judgments which speak of moral progress or reform—all are nonsensical or impossible, the argument alleges. Although commonly conflated, arguments for these distinct but related theses are first distinguished, then exposed, and last subjected to critical scrutiny. While seemingly powerful, all are found wanting.