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Displaying: 1-7 of 7 documents

1. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
James R. Mensch Temporality and the Alterity of Space
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How do we relate animate to inanimate temporality? Animate temporality is teleological. Our present actions are determined by the future that we want to accomplish. The determining factor for inanimate objects, however, is what happened in the past. In the material world, the past determines what happens in the present. The paradox, then, is that of time supporting two different directions. How is this possible? The claim of my paper is that this paradox arises from trying to think of time apart from space. Space, I argue, provides the common framework that unifies the temporality of the animate and inanimate.
2. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Joseph Arel Intimacy and the Possibility for Self-Knowledge in Hegel's Dialectic of Recognition
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The achievement of self-consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology hinges on establishing a relationship with another self-conscious being. How this is accomplished, and even that it is accomplished in Hegel’s text, are topics of dispute and misunderstanding in the literature. I show how Hegel’s Phenomenology argues for this, first, by comparing Hegel’s analysis of lord and bondsman to Sartre’s analysis of intimacy. Second, I focus on two interpretive challenges. First, I argue that the staking of life comes from an other-oriented epistemological relation, and not simply from an immediate concern with dominating the other. Second, contrary to many interpretations which see the bondsman’s development arising out of an isolated activity merely between himself and the products of his labor, I argue that the slave’s ability to gain knowledge of himself as a self is only possible by establishing a relationship with the lord. This point is essential because, if readings of the bondsman’s development as isolated from the lord are correct, then Hegel has in fact not succeeded in showing that self-consciousness only develops out of intersubjective recognition.
3. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Michael Rohlf The Rationality of Induction in Kant (and Hume)
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This paper argues that Kant agrees with the substance of Hume’s critique of induction but without following Hume in characterizing induction as non-rational. I begin in part one by situating the problem of induction within the context of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, and by comparing Hume’s view that inductive inferences are based on custom or habit with Kant’s view that they are based on reason’s assumption that nature is systematic. Part two examines Kant’s view of the mental process by which reason leads us to assume that nature is systematic—a process that involves, I argue, reflecting on conditions of experience and then extending this reflection to an unconditioned idea. Part three then turns to addressing why and in what sense Kant thinks that we are justified in assuming that nature is systematic. Finally, in part four I flesh out my interpretation by arguing that it makes sense of Kant’s description of reason’s principle of the systematicity of nature as both transcendental and regulative.
4. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Kate Padgett Walsh A Hegelian Critique of Desire-Based Reasons
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This paper approaches Humean accounts of desire from a perspective relatively unexplored in contemporary moral theory, namely Hegel’s ethical thought. I contend that Hegel’s treatment of desire is, ultimately, somewhat more Humean than Hegel himself recognized. But Hegel also goes further than contemporary Humeans in recognizing the sociality of the normative domain, and this difference has important implications for the Humean thesis of desire-based reasons (DBR). I develop a Hegelian critique of DBR and conclude by outlining a distinctively Hegelian approach to understanding the normative import of desire.
5. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Mark E. Jonas Fichte, Freedom, and Dogmatism
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In the first introduction of The Science of Knowledge, Fichte claims that there are two legitimate philosophical systems: dogmatism and idealism. He then asserts that only idealism allows individuals to retain their concept of personal freedom, whereas dogmatism requires that individuals give up that concept. I argue that on his own grounds Fichte is incorrect on this point. After a close examination of his theory, I attempt to demonstrate the possibility of a non-idealistic libertarian using Fichte’s explanation of self-positing as the foundation for her libertarianism. I hope to show that Fichte’s defense for the necessarily free act of self-positing is legitimate not only for his idealist system, but also for at least one non-idealistic system as well. The act of self-positing is indeed the only legitimate foundation for freedom, but that does not entail that freedom can only found in idealism.
6. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Ezequiel L. Posesorski Friedrich Schlegel's Break wth Fichte and the Historical Transformation of Critical Philosophy
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In 1796, the lack of historicity in Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre was one of the issues that provoked Friedrich Schlegel’s criticism of the Grundsatz tradition and paved the way for his early-romantic approach to philosophy. Schlegel argues that the critical development of Fichte’s approach demands its transcendental historization, i.e., a philosophical explanation of the temporal, evolutionary process whereby reason has reached Fichte’s self-conscious standpoint. The full understanding of this aspect of Schlegel’s break with Fichte demands a systematic discussion of a major, though still partially reconstructed, aspect of his thought during those years that preceded the new standpoint of the Vorlesungen über die Transzendentalphilosophie of 1800–1801: Schlegel’s critically historicized approach to philosophy. This paper reconstructs this path of Schlegel to early romanticism, and points to one of his virtually neglected sources: the early logical-historical thought of August Hülsen, between 1799 and 1800 a collaborator of Schlegel in the early-romantic journal Athenäum.
7. Idealistic Studies: Volume > 43 > Issue: 3
Volume 43 Index
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