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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Edgar Morscher Brentano and His Place in Austrian Philosophy
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The first part of this paper summarizes what I take to be the most important doctrines of Brentano's philosophy. The second part investigates the possible meanings of the term 'Austrian philosophy'. The third part attempts to say something about Brentano's place in Austrian philosophy — whatever that may be --, while the fourth part focuses on a problem in which I am especially interested. The paper closes with a proposal for what the expression 'Austrian philosophy' could mean.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
George Katkov The World in Which Brentano Believed He Lived
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The first part of this paper gives a summary of some philosophical discoveries of Brentano which affected his outlook on the world in which he lived. The other, lesser part, contains reminiscences of how the philosophical thinking of the man affected his behaviour to the world around him.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Stephan Körner Über Brentanos Reismus und die extensionale Logik
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Nach einem kurzen, kritischen Bericht über die Gründe, die Brentano zur Ablehnung der mathematischen Logik bewogen, wird gezeigt, daß seine (spätere) Analyse der logischen Urteilsformen sich in einem finiten Untersystem der exakten Prädikatenlogik interpretieren läßt. Es wird sodann ausgeführt, daß dieses logische System auch zur Formulierung seiner Relationstheorie geeignet ist - sofern man von der Kontinualrelation absieht. Dieser wird aber durch eine Erweiterung der Prädikatenlogik durch inexakte Prädikate genügegetan. Schließlich wird erklärt, wie Brentanos Auffassung der logischen Modalitäten als Urteilsmodi in diesem logischen System ausgedrückt werden kann. Eine kurze Nachbemerkung gilt dem Verständnis zwischen Brentanos Ontologie und der von ihr angeregten logischen Theorie.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Burnham Terrell Quantification and Brentano's Logic
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Brentano's innovations in logical theory are considered in the context of his descriptive psychology, with its distinction between differences in quality and in object of mental phenomena. Objections are raised to interpretations that depend on a parallel between Urteil and assertion of a proposition. A more appropriate parallel is drawn between the assertion as subject to description in a metalanguage and the Urteil as secondary object in inner perception. This parallel is then applied so as to suggest a reinterpretation of substitutional quantification, rendering the substitutional interpretation immune to problems that often arise as to the relation between substitutional range and referential range.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Klaus Hedwig Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano
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Im Ausgang vom historischen Scholastikbild Brentanos wird nach den Quellen und Interpretationshinsichten gefragt, die für Brentanos frühe und späte Fassung des Intentionalen leitend waren. Dabei zeigt sich, daß die Voraussetzung der Intentionalität in der aristotelischen Sachproblematik der Wahrnehmung liegt (De an. 424 al7), die Brentano mit dem scholastischen Begriff obiective interpretiert, einem Terminus, den Brentano von der Neuscholastik, aber auch von Descartes und dem spätmittelalterlichen Konzeptualismus her kannte. Es ist nun entscheidend, daß in dieser Terminologie nur ein sehr eingeschränkter Aspekt der scholastischen Intentionalität thematisch ist, der in seiner internen Problematik den Ansatzpunkt für alle späteren Reinterpretationen abgibt.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Dagfinn Føllesdal Brentano and Husserl on Intentional Objects and Perception
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The article is a comparative critical discussion of the views of Brentano and Husserl on intentional objects and on perception. Brentano's views on intentional objects are first discussed, with special attention to the problems connected with the status of the intentional objects. It is then argued that Husserl overcomes these problems by help of his notion of noema. Similarly, in the case of perception, Brentano's notion of physical phenomena is argued to be less satisfactory than Husserl's notion of hyle, whose role in Husserl's theory of perception is briefly sketched.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Herbert Spiegelberg On the Significance of the Correspondence Between Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl
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This correspondence, still unpublished, extends over fourty years. Its significance is both biographical and philosophical. Biographically it shows Brentano's tolerant friendship for his emancipated student and Husserl's unwavering veneration for his only philosophical teacher. The philosophical issues taken up are Euclidean axiomatics, Husserl's departure from Brentano in the Logical Investigations by distinguishing two types of logic as the way out from psychologism, and the possibility of negative presentations, but not Husserl's new phenomenology. Few agreements are reached, but the dissents were clarified.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Izydora Dąmbska François Brentano et la Pensee philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École
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La pensée de Brentano a exercé une durable influence sur la Philosophie en Pologne surtout grâce à Casimir Twardowski, disciple de Brentano et lui-même fondateur d'une importante école philosophique, proche en son ésprit de la philosophie analytique. Twardowski tout en développant certaines idées de Brentano parvenait dans diverses questions aux solutions opposées à Celles de son maître. L'article cherche à préciser les résultats de cette continuation et de cette opposition dans l'oeuvre de Twardowski et de ses disciples tels que Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowksi, e.a.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Intentionality of Thought versus Intentionality of Desire
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The work of Brentano's English contemporary J. E. McTaggart is in several ways profitable for Brentano scholars to study: I here cosider his views on the nature and classification of mental states. In McTaggart's account the characteristic of being a 'cognition', one that some but not all 'cogitations' have, corresponds to Brentano's notion of Anerkennen; quite unlike Brentano, he holds that contrariety obtains only between the contents of judgments, not between contrary acts of affirming and denying; like Brentano however he recognizes contrariety in the realm of emotion and feeling, e.g. between love and hate, pleasure and pain. He regards feelings and emotions as mere colourings of cogitations, and thinks that their relation to an object (intentionality, as Brentano would say) comes about merely from their cogitative aspect. This view is attractively simple; but by considering McTaggart's own view of emotions' being in respect of characteristics of their objects, we can find serious ground to reject it.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 5
Elizabeth Anscombe Will and Emotion
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This paper considers and criticizes Brentano's contention of the identity in kind between wül and emotion.