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Displaying: 1-10 of 16 documents


1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Herbert Spiegelberg Zwei Briefe von Edmund Husserl an Franz Brentano über Logik
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2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
E. Husserl Hochverehrter Herr Professor!
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3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Georg Kreisel The Motto of 'Philosophical Investigations' and the Philosophy of Proofs and Rules
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Ausgangspunkt dieses Artikels ist die Einsicht, die auch von Wittgenstein und der "schweigenden Mehrheit" geteilt wird, daß die meisten sogenannten fundamentalen Begriffe und Probleme der Philosophie erkenntnistheoretisch unrentabel sind, insbesondere der Begriff der Gültigkeit (von Beweis- und Rechenregeln) und seine traditionelle Problematik. Im Gegensatz zu Wittgenstein wird diese Einsicht aber nicht auf "Sinnlosigkeit", d.h. Präzisionsunfähigkeitjener Problematik, sondern auf ihre Oberflächl d.h. unangemessene Allgemeinheit, zurückgeführt.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Barry Smith An Essay in Formal Ontology
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As conceived by analytic philosophers ontology consists in the application of the methods of mathematical logic to the analysis of ontological discourse. As conceived by realist philosophers such as Meinong and the early Husserl, Reinach and Ingarden, it consists in the investigation of the forms of entities of various types. The suggestion is that formal methods be employed by phenomenological ontologists, and that phenomenological insights may contribute to the construction of adequate formal-ontological languages. The paper sketches an account of what might be involved in this new discipline, an account which is illustrated in application to the formal-ontological problems raised by negative states of affairs.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Ryszard Zuber Analyticity and Genericness
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A definition of an analytic, a contradictory and a generic sentence, based on the notion of presupposition, is proposed. A sentence is analytic iff it presupposes itself, is contradictory iff it presupposes its own negation, and is generic iff its presuppositions are analytic. A difference is made between an analytic and a necessarily true sentence, and between a contradictory and a necessarily false sentence. There are sentences which are both analytic and contradictory- they are never true and never false. Analytic sentences can have non-trivial consequences, but they are not asserted but presupposed. This fact permits to avoid some classical difficulties with the definition of analytic sentences. A paralleHsm between analytic and generic sentences is indicated.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Karel Lambert The Place of the Intentional in the Explanation of Behavior: A Brief Survey
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This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Ralf Meerbote Radical Failure
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This paper contains a development of the consequences of a form of skepticism closely akin to traditional fallibilism. It is contended that fallibilism properly understood is compatible with actual possession of knowledge and with rationally continuing claims to such possession. In order to justify this contention, the notion of a K—game as a species of game played in accordance with rules is developed, first leaning on Brians Skyrms' notion of a rational dialectic and then on independent grounds. The notion of knowledge which emerges from this is compatible with some but not all of the analyses of knowledge which have recently been put forward.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Saul Traiger Some Remarks on Lehrer and Richard's 'Remembering Without Knowing'
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This paper examines the four counterexamples offered by Lehrer and Richard in 'Remembering Without Knowing'. The analysis which Lehrer and Richard's purported counterexamples attempt to discredit is that remembering p requires knowing that p and believing that p. The counterexamples are considered individually and all are rejected as counterexamples to knowing as a necessary condition of remembering.
review articles
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Jonathan Barnes Matthias Schirn (Hrsg.): Studien Zu Frege / Studies On Frege: Fregean Studies
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10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 6
Karel Berka Gottlob Frege: Nachgelassene Schriften und wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel. 2. Band: Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel. Hrsg., bearbeitet, eingeleitet und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Gottfried Gabriel, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel, Christian Thiel und Albert Veraart: Zwei Beiträge Zur Frege-Forschung
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