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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Donald Davidson Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action
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The central propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and meaning are interdependent; it is therefore fruitless to analyse one or two of them in terms of the others. A method is outlined in this paper that yields a theory for interpreting speech, a measure of degree of belief, and a measure of desirability. The method combines in a novel way features of Bayesean decision theory, and a Quinean approach to radical interpretation.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Harold Morick A Confirmation Criterion of Synonymy
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Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Reinhard Kleinknecht Quasianalyse und Qualitätsklassen
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Es geht um Carnaps Konstitution der Qualitätsklassen (qual) mittels der Methode der Quasianalyse. Diese Konstitutionsmethode hat Carnap in seinem Werk Der logische Außau der Welt verwendet. Es wird gezeigt, daß Carnaps Qualitätsdefinition sowohl an technischen als auch an grundsätzlichen Mängeln scheitert. Des weiteren werden Verbesserungsvorschläge der Camapschen Methode, die von Brockhaus, Goodman, Moulines und Eberle gemacht worden sind, untersucht und als inadäquat nachgewiesen.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Gerald Vision Fictional Objects
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Problems concerning identity in possible worlds and the view that proper names are rigid designators pose no threat to the doctrine that names of fictional characters (fictional names) are referential. Some philosophers, notably Saul Kripke and David Kaplan, have held otherwise; but a close examination of their arguments discovers fatal flaws in them. Furthermore, the most readily available proposals for the alternative functions of fictional names — that is, proposals in which fictional names are not referential — are open to objections of a principled kind. This raises serious doubts that any such alternative could work.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Petra von Morstein Kripke, Wittgenstein, and the Privat Language Argument
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"Agreement" is the key notion in Wittgenstein's explanation of the possibility of public language. Agreement in judgements constitutes the justification for asserting agreement in definitions. The determinates of rules are empirical; rules as determinables are transcendental. Rules are on the limit of public language, and not within it. Wittgenstein's skeptical solutions to skepticism about language and about the given are transcendentalistic. His skeptical solutions in other areas are conventionalistic. Skepticism about mental phenomena is not solved because of a systematic rule-gap for the application of non-dispositional psychological concepts.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Margaret M. Rooney What Do We Hope For?: Some Puzzles Involving Propositional Hoping
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In at least some cases of future directed propositional hoping, facts about the hoper become puzzling if one supposes that the object of hoping is a future tensed proposition. These facts are easily explained by the alternative suppostion that the hoper accepts a future tensed proposition but bears the hopingattitude toward a disjunctively tensed proposition. Parallel remarks apply to past directed and present directed prepositional hoping. Thus, at least some instances of hoping have as their objects disjunctively tensed rather than purely tensed propositions. Propositional remembering may possibly resemblepropositional hoping in this respect.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Ernest Sosa Varieties of Causation
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According to nomological accounts of causation causal connections among events or states must be mediated by contingent laws of nature. Three types of causal connection are cited and discussed in opposition to such nomological accounts: (a) material causation (as when a zygote is generated by the union of an ovum and a sperm); (b) consequentialist causation (as when an apple is chromatically colored as a result of being red); (c) inclusive causation (as when a board is on a stump in consequence of its having been placed there by a carpenter). These are all source-consequence relations or result-yielding relations and they are all cases of necessitation, each with its own distinguishing features.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Wulf Rehder Versuche zu einer Theorie von Gedankenexperimenten
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9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Paul Oppenheimer, Ralf Meerbote The Certainty of Skepticism
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Carrier in a recent paper urges for consideration an argument for skepticism which is based on premises one of which in turn is to be defended by yet another principle (the "Janus Principle" of the text). We feel that the latter principle and the way Carrier wants to use it to defend his skeptical argument will find adherents, but we show that this argument rests on an interesting equivocation quite beyond repair even if we accept the "Janus Principle".
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 11
Augustin Riska Knowledge by Acquaintance Reconsidered
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A propositional interpretation of knowledge by acquaintance seems more promising than the nonpropositional one, endorsed by Russell. According to the propositional interpretation, to be acquainted with an object means to attend (pay attention) to individuating features of the object. For the actual, direct acquaintance with an object, a subject's perception of the object and his attending to the individuating features of it (just as the fact that these features do belonge to the object in question) are the essential factors. Proper names of objects and subject's memory images referring to objects of acquaintance may be viewed as their special individuating features (in spite of being attached to these objects "externally"). For the dispositional (non-actual) notion of acquaintance, a relativization of time must be added, together with the subject's ability to attend to the individuating features of the object under proper conditions (when the object of previous acquaintance is presented or represented to the subject). Although the conditional formulas expressing these situations contribute to the explication of the concept of knowledge by acquaintance, their truth-status remains open and contingent upon the ways of solving the problem of individuation (identification).