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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Carl Gustav Hempel Schlick und Neurath: Fundierung versus Kohärenz in der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis
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Schlick schreibt der empirischen Erkenntnis ein unerschütterliches Fundament zu: es bestehe aus "Konstatierungen", d.h. Aussagen, die unmittelbar Erfahrenes ausdrücken und durch die alle empirischen Aussagen hypothetisch-deduktiv überprüfbar sein müssen. Neuraths Auffassung dagegen war diese: (1) Aussagen können logisch nicht durch Vergleich mit "Erfahrungstatsachen" beurteüt werden, sondern nur durch Prüfung ihres Zusammenpassens mit anderen, bereits akzeptierten Aussagen; (2) der Empkismus verlangt, daß die letzteren "Protokollsätze" enthalten müssen, die (etwa von experimentierenden Wissenschaftlern) dkekt akzeptiert wurden; (3) jeder akzeptierte Satz, selbst ein Protokollsatz, ist revisionsfähig: es gibt kein festes Fundament der Erkenntnis.Beide Denker vermischen den semantischen Begriff der Wahrheit mit dem epistemologischen Begriff der Akzeptierbarkeit von Sätzen. Schlicks Einwand, Neuraths "Kohärenztheorie" identifiziere die Wahrheit eines Hypothesensystems mit logischer Widerspruchsfreiheit, übersieht Neuraths empiristische Bedingung (2), die der Akzeptierbarkeit implizit kausale Bedingungen auferlegt. Ähnlich haben Schlicks Konstatierungen einen kausalen Aspekt: hier liegt der empiristische Charakter beider Auffassungen. Neuraths Grundideen wurden in der neueren soziologisch-pragmatischen Wendung der Wissenschaftstheorie weitergeführt.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Rudolf Haller Zwei Arten der Erfahrungsbegründung
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Die Grundlagen der Erfahrung können auf zwei Arten "begründet" werden, entweder durch Rechtfertigung einer Begründungskette, deren Anfangs- und Endglieder nicht-abgeleitete Urteüe sind, also fundamentalistisch oder antifundamentalistisch, z.B. durch Kohärenz der Urteile. Der dezisionistische Standpunkt Neuraths verschiebt allerdings nur die Begründung und hebt sie nicht auf.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Max Black Verificationism Revisited: A Conversation
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The original version of the Principle of Verifiabüity (PV), formulated as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" (Schlick, quoting Wittgenstein), can be criticised as ungrammatical. Schlick's claim that it was a "truism" reflecting commonsense and scientific practice is refuted by PV's paradoxical consequences. Its users faüed to distinguish between operational and situational readings, the latter of which invokes a mythology of comparison with "facts". Wittgenstein rightly described PV as a "rule of thumb" of limited usefulness.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Keith Lehrer Schlick and Neurath: Meaning and Truth
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Schlick and Neurath shared a common assumption, what I call the verification theory of truth, as well as the verification of meaning. It is the claim that the truth of a sentence is the method of it's verification. For Neurath, the method of scientific verification must be interpersonal, and, therefore, private experience is precluded. This leads hmi to the doctrme that there is no truth beyond intersubjective agreement. Schlick, on the contrary, regarded it as obvious that certain sentences, even if they were not sentences in a conventional language, were confirmations or Konstatierungen verified by the private experiences they described. These sentences, which Schlick called basic contrasted with the protocol sentences of Neurath m that the truth of the former is determined by private experience and that of latter by interpersonal test. It is argued that once one distinguishes between the facts that make a sentence true and the meaning of a sentence one need not accept either the position of Schlick or that of Neurath. One may hold that the meaning of a sentence is interpersonal even if the fact described by a sentence is a personal experience. This theory yields a form of falliblism according to which the best method of verification of a sentence need not eliminate all possibüity of error.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Risto Hilpinen Schlick on the Foundations of Knowledge
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This paper outlines the main features of the conception of empirical knowledge presented by Moritz Schlick in his paper 'Über das Fundament der Erkenntnis', and contains a detaüed analysis of Schlick's concept of "Konstatierung". It is argued that in spite of its basically foundationalist appearance, Schlick's theory resembles in important respects contemporary coherence theories of knowledge.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Marx W. Wartofsky Positivism and Politics: The Vienna Circle as a Social Movement
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What I want to focus on in this paper is the question of the connection between the positivism of the Vienna Circle — the "scientific conception of the world" — and politics. The Vienna Circle will be considered first ''als soziale Bewegung'' and second from the point of view of "Sozialforschung". The paper is a case study in the problem of the relation of a theory to practice, and more particularly, of the relation of a technical epistemological and methodological theory of science to social practice. The critical assessment of the nature of the Vienna Circle as a social movement starts from the consideration of the views of Otto Neurath; and concludes with some theses about the failure of this social movement precisely as it relates to the logical positivist and logical empiricist theory of science, and to its scientific conception of the world.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Werner Leinfellner Schlicks kognitive Erkenntnistheorie als Wissenschaftstheorie
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Es wird gezeigt, daß Schlicks physikalischer Denkansatz in der Erkenntnislehre sich wesentlich vom sprachanalytischen Denkansatz in der analytischen Wissenschafts- und Erkenntnistheorie unterscheidet. In der Schlickschen Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie fällt, für gewisse implizit definierte Strukturen, der Gegensatz von analytisch und synthetisch weg, wodurch Schlick in schärfsten Gegensatz sowohl zur Kantischen Wissenschaftsphüosophie, wie auch zu der des Wiener Kreises gerät. Auch die anthropologische Fundierung von Schlicks Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie unterscheidet diese wesentlich von der des Wiener Kreises. Schlick hat ein originelles eigenes Bild der Wissenschaften und eüie eigene Wissenschaftstheorie geschaffen, die im weitesten Umfange in der phliosophischen Tradition steht und diese sogar entscheidend umgewandelt hat.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Henri Lauener Neurath's Protocol Sentences and Schlick's "Konstatierungen" versus Quine's Observation Sentences
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The relation between theory and reality is an important problem for phüosophy of science. Positivists or logical empkicists of the Vienna Circle have tried to solve it by postulating several types of so-called basic statements induced by immediate experience or observation. According to Neurath protocol sentences are distinguished from other synthetic sentences only m virtue of their syntactical form. Since consistency is a relation concerning sentences only, not a sentence and any immediate experience,he contends that there remains an unbridgeable gap between observationstatements and observation itself and consequently he adopts a coherentist strategy of corroboration, which Schlick, as a thorough empiricist, wants to avoid. For that purpose he introduces the notion of "Konstatierung". Such ascertainments play a decisive role as endpoints in the corroboration of theories insofar as they serve to verify predictions which express expected ascertainments. In spite of the fact that they are synthetic wc recognize their truth when grasping their meaning and, therefore, error is precluded in their case, while protocol sentences remain mere hypotheses. Quine attempts to overcome the weaknesses of all prior positions by proposing a purely behavioristic definition of 'observation sentence' which avoids the pitfalls of former sense-data theories as well as the ones of cultural relativism or irrationalism. Considering science to be a bridge linking together our sensory stimuli he comes to the view that empirical support of a theory is a consequence of the logical relation between the theory formulation and the observation categoricals derivable from it. He considers the ideological and epistemological neutrality of his conception as one of its main merits. Its feasibility depends, however, on the question whether, by his behavioristic method, he effectively can explain how linguistic expressions acquire their meanings.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Roderick M. Chisholm Schlick on the Foundations of Knowing
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Schlick held that our knowledge is founded upon certain contingent apprehensions which he described as follows: "I grasp their meaning at the same time that I grasp their truth." He cites as an example the apprehension expressed by "Yellow here now." When such apprehensions are expressed in syntactically well-formed sentences, they can be seen to have certain psychological states as their objects - and therefore to be similar in all essential respects to what members of the Brentano school had called "inner perceptions."
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 16/17
Brian McGuinness Wittgenstein on Probability: A Contribution to Vienna Circle Discussions
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Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability.