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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Kai Nielsen Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinians and the End of Philosophy
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The very enterprise of philosophy itself became problematical under Wittgenstein's probing. Rorty, extending Wittgenstein's conception and aligning certain prominent features of Wittgenstein's work with pragmatism, argues that philosophy is only problematic when taken as a disciplinary matrix. Where it is viewed as a non-disciplinary attempt to see how things hang together, it is unproblematic. But Wittgenstein himself in effect argues that philosophy in both senses is problematic even when the synthetic side is taken in a metaphysically innocuous way. This conception is explicated and its underlying rationale is both sympathetically probed and critically inspected. It is l\irther shown that no such seeing how things hang together is articulated in his philosophy of culture and that his cultural commentary finds no grounding in Wittgenstein's powerfully articulated metaphilosophy. The former along with many of Wittgenstein's passionately held attitudes toward life, could be rejected and the latter accepted.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Kuno Lorenz »Sehen«: Wittgensteins Umgang mit der Bildmetapher
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Im Tractatus (T) stehen Bilder auf der Stufe von Sätzen, in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen (PU) auf der Stufe von vielfach verwendbaren Satzkernen. Deshalb den Übergang von T zu PU als Übergang von einem Sprachspiel zu vielen Sprachspielen (=Sprechakten) aufzufassen, ist falsch, weil Bilder in T erklären, in PU hingegen beschreiben. Der Übergang von der Logik (epistemologischen Ebene) zur Grammatik (ontologisehen Ebene) bedeutet in Peirce'scher Terminologie den Übergang von symbolischen Darstellungen (T) zu ikonischen Darstellungen (PU). Was in T sich zeigt wird in PU mit Sprachspielen gezeigt: Sprachspiele sind Peirce'sche Ikonen. Sprachliche Darstellungen können ikonisch (sinnlich) und symbolisch (begrifflich) auftreten, im Hasenbeispiel von PU Teil II als seinen Gegenstand erst konstituierenden Ausruf und als über einen bereits vorliegenden Gegenstand abgegebene Meldung.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Colin Radford On Agreement
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Examining the nuances of verbalised agreements reveals that though not always about judgements, even the simplest involves participants in making judgements about why speakers say what they say, what in so saying they are doing, what this implies or leaves open etc. So conversations involve thinking, reasoning, and although the languages in which they are couched are culturally relative, the reasoning, propositions, logic involved are not. This illuminates why philosophers have been preoccupied with propositions and why they have been inclined to think - wrongly - that all we do in using language is to assent to propositions, i. e. make judgements.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Armin Burkhardt Wittgenstein und die Grenzen der Sagbarkeit
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Wittgensteins Philosophie ist nicht auf die „Überwindung der Metaphysik" hin angelegt, sondem auf diejenige ihrer Überwindung. Insofem ist der Schritt zurück zu Wittgenstein zugleich ein Schritt hinaus über die analytische Philosophie. Beherrschendes Ziel des frühen wie des späten Wittgenstein ist es, den Innenraum des sinnvoll Sagbaren auszumessen und dadurch einen Blick auf das Unsagbare zu erhaschen, d. h. die Grenze des Sinnsi durch minutiöse Beschreibung der physischen Welt der Tatsachen bzw. der sozialen Welt der „Sprachspiele" zu bestimmen. Das eigentlich Wertvolle ist für ihn aber das, was sich nicht „sagen", sondem nur - gleichsam gegen die Regeln der Sprache - in „unsinnigen" Sätzen „zeigen" läßt: Ethik/Ästhetik, Logik/Semantik, Kunst und Religion. Scheinbar paradoxerweise wird der „Unsinn" für Wittgenstein dadurch zum eigentlichen Sinn2. Seine Philosophie zeigt sich als das, was sie immer wieder thematisiert: „Anrennen an die Grenze der Sprache", die in der Verstehbariceit von Metaphern liegt.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Carolyn Black Very Late Wittgenstein on Emotion
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This paper comprises a sketch of Wittgenstein's view of emotion. Addressed especially are his claims in the three books of his philosophical psychology published in the eariy 1980s: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (two volumes) and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Two suggestions are made. First, to understand Wittgenstein's view of emotion one must notice how he sees emotion as, characteristically, linked to its surroundings. Second, the 1980s publications contain some modification of a central theme in Wittgenstein's later philosophy: that inner processes need outward criteria. These suggestions are illustrated, elucidated and supported with textual material on his general account of emotion and then on his particular example of the emotion of fear
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Roberto Poli Ernst Mally's Theory of Properties
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Mally succeeded in developing two theories of properties, passing from the distinction between Sein and Sosein (1904) to the theory of nuclear and extranuclear properties (1912). According to the first one, the Sein of an object depends on the Sosein of the object, whereas the Sein of the Sosein of an object does not depend on the Sein of the object. These Principles allow the distinction between possible and impossible objects (in respect to Sosein) and between real and ideal objects (in respect to Sein). In his second theory, Mally distinguishes between first order properties that determine the object, and higher order properties, like difference or simplicity, ending with the distinction between impossible objects and non-satisfiable objects
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Paul Thom Works for Performance
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The paper criticizes Platonistic accounts of musical works as sound-structures. It rejects their view that the authoring of such works is a kind of 'discovery' (Kivy) or 'selection' (Wolterstorff) or 'indication' (Levinson). Instead, the paper proposes that the authoring of any work for performance consists in the production of a token performance-directive. Works for performance are then defined as the contents of such directives
discussions
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Stephen Davies Replies to Arguments Suggesting that Critics' Strong Evaluations Could not be Soundly Deduced
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9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Graham McFee Davies' Replies. A Response
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10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Stephen Davies A Response to McFee's Response
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11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Ishtiyaque Haji The Unresolved Puzzle About Posthumous Predication
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12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
David-Hillel Ruben A Rejoinder to Professor Haji
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review article
13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Timothy Williamson Parts. A Study in Ontology
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critical notes
14. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Rudolf Haller Tagebücher und Briefe
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15. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Rudolf Haller Wittgenstein's frühe Jahre
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16. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Peter Sullivan Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung/Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Kritische Edition
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17. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Harald Berger Die Gegenwart Ockhams
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18. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Hans Georg Knapp Mathematische Schriften 1842-1843
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19. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Herlinde Pauer-Studer Feministische Philosophie
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errata
20. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 38
Errata
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