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Grazer Philosophische Studien

Essays on Wittgensteinian Themes

Volume 42, 1992
Criss-crossing a Philosophical Landscape

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Displaying: 1-13 of 13 documents


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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Joachim Schulte The Happy Man
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The question of who or what the happy man mentioned in Wittgenstein's Tractatus really is leads to a discussion of connected issues, e.g. the question of the Schopenhauerian origins of certain key notions of Wittgenstein's early philosophy, the import of the concept of a world-soul (with its Goethian overtones), the topic of solipsism, and the puzzling question of what is involved in the self's identification with the world.
2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Michael V. Wedin Trouble in Paradise?: On the Alleged Incoherence of the Tractatus
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It is argued that Wittgenstein did not abandon his tractarian position because he was of the opinion that the Tractatus suffered from an intemal incoherence inherited from the incompatibility of the thesis of mutual independence of elementary propositions (MI) and the picture theory of the proposition (PIC) or an incoherent notion of the elementary proposition itself. In the way suggested, TLP provides no opportunity for such concems to arise, for the inner sub-surface structure of a proposition cannot cause conflict with MI. It rather was the sub-surface nature of elementary propositions itself - a feature fundamental to the Tractatus as a whole - Wittgenstein came to be dissatisfied with and gave up in favour of a new notion of elementary proposition.
3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Göran Sundholm The General Form of the Operation in Wittgenstein's Tractatus
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The paper offers an interpretation of thesis 6.01. The treatment touches upon variables, identity, elementary propositions, internal relations. Klammerausdrücke, and operations. Wittenstein's notations are found not to cover the particular form of definition by induction that is used at 6 and 6.01. It is concluded that Wittgenstein's ability to design of a formal system of logic does not match his outstanding logico-philosophical insight.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Rudolf Haller Wittgenstein In Between: A Fragment
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Wittgenstein's attitude toward philosophy and philosophical problems is examined with the result that - in spite of his own strong criticism of his earlier work - the aim of philosophy remains the same throughout his life: clarity for its own sake. Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy is sketched as non-naturalistic and anti-systematic with the recommendation of being unbiased as the only remedy for falling again into the old traps. The criticism of the Russell-Frege view of existential quantification and generalization included in the "Big Typescript" is outlined as well as the position toward verification Wittgenstein maintained in between his beginning to work in philosophy anew and his first attempt of systematizing the results in the "Big Typescript".
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
David Pears Wittgenstein's Concept of Showing
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Starting from an analysis of Wittgenstein's reasons for placing all true-seeming sentences about the relation between language and the world in the class of utterances that lack a truth-value and can only communicate in the privileged way, the doctrine of showing is investigated in Wittgenstein's later writings. In contrast to the view that the concept of showing simply disappeared with the abandonment of the picture theory of the sentence it is argued that much of his erarly doctrine of showing survives in Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Gordon Baker Some Remarks on 'Language' and 'Grammar'
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To clarify Wittgenstein's status as an analytic philosopher, we must study his use of the expressions 'language', 'grammar', etc. We tend to take 'language' as an abstract mass-noun and to generalize quite specific remarks. We overlook the possibility of taking 'our grammar' to refer to our particular description of the use of words rather than to what we describe. Preserving the ambiguity of 'Sprache' between language and speech calls for a neutral translation, e.g. 'what we say'. Wittgenstein's 'descriptions of the grammar of our language' are more varied and purpose-specific than usually recognized.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Jacques Bouveresse Wittgenstein, Anti-Realism and Mathematical Propositions
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Wittgenstein is generally supposed to have abandoned in the 1930's a realistic conception of the meaning of mathematical propositions, founded on the idea of tmth-conditions which could in certain cases transcend any possibility of verification, for a realistic one, where the idea of truth-conditions is replaced by that of conditions of justification of assertability. It is argued that for Wittgenstein mathematical propositions, which are, as he says, "grammatical" propositions, have a meaning and a role which differ to a much greater degree from those of ordinary propositions than either platonistic realism or intuitionistic anti-realism would admit, and that is the tendency to assimilate the mathematical proposition to an ordinary descriptive proposition which confers on it an appearance of meaning independent of the possibility of proving it, and not, as Dummett would say, that it is a decision concerning the kind of meaning it has which gives it the status of a proposition describing a determinate objective reality.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Rosaria Egidi Meaning and Actions in Wittgenstein's Late Perspective
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The paper aims at analyzing Wittgenstein's arguments on voluntary action as they are developed in Part II of PI in Z and eventually in RPPI-II. Special attention is paid to the scrutiny of arguments which could be characterized as the pars destruens and the pars construens of Wittgenstein's grammar of action. The first one consists in the usage of the distinction between dispositions and states to get rid of the "misleading parallels" which undermine the explicative claims of scientific psychology; the second lies in the elaboration of a "conceptual" analysis of the phenomena of mental life which would constitute an adequate instrument to locate voluntary actions, and "creative acts" in general, in Wittgenstein's plan for a treatment of psychological concepts.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Georg Henrik von Wright The Troubled History of Part II of the Investigations
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The typescripts from which both parts of Wittgenstein's Investigations were printed are now lost. Of the TS for Part I there exists a second copy, but not so of the TS for Part II. There is, however, a manuscript in Wittgenstein's hand which contains the whole of the printed Part II - and some additional material. A comparision of this MS with the printed text reveals some interesting discrepancies. They are noted in the paper. Moreover, a detailed comparision is made in a Postscript between the printed Preface of the Investigations and another, obviously earlier, version of it. Both versions are dated "Cambridge, January 1945" - but the printed one was probably not prepared until two years later.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Eike von Savigny I Don't Know What I Want
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In the Philosophical Investigations and later writings, Wittenstein views "I know" utterances which embed egocentric psychological clauses as affirming contextually defined authority positions rather than as knowledge claims. This view is consistent with Brian McGuinness's analysis of conscious wants in terms of their subjects. A's knowledge of mental facts about B is a capacity (Gilbert Ryle, John Watling) which is responsible for A's being prepared for B's behaviour (as accounted for by those mental facts); for one and the same person this capacity would be idle except for cases where she plays a double role.
11. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Aldo Giorgio Gargani Ethics and Aesthetics in the Definition of the Self. Freud and Wittgenstein
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Beginning with an analysis of the notion of repetition as an essential factor shaping linguistic, logical, mathematical and scientific procedures some parallels are drawn between Psychoanalysis and Wittgensteinian Philosophy. The view is put forward that in the case of Freud's concept of neurosis as well as in Wittgenstein's concept of rule-following there is not just a monotonous and unvarying replay of one and the same content but rather a steady modification. Thus generating new moments again and again both in Wittgenstein's procedure of philosophical investigation and in Freudian analysis the aesthetical becomes an important aspect. Finally ethical moments are considered in comparing suppression with Wittgenstein's statements on superficial philosophical theorizing.
12. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
Peter Simons Existential Propositions
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By considering a wide and expressly classified range of examples from natural and logical languages, the attempt is made to isolate from other concomitants the features of existential sentences which make them existential. One such concomitant is the imputation of singularity. There are many ways to say something exists, and their relationships are charted. It is denied that there is anything in reality called existence, or any special existential facts.
13. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 42
List of Publications by Brian McGuinness
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