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1. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Die Herausgeber, Vorwort
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2. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
The editors, Preface
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3. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Karel Lambert, Set Theory and Definite Descriptions: Four Solutions in Search of a Common Problem
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This paper offers an explanation of the maj or traditions in the logical treatment of definite descriptions as reactions to paradoxical naive definite descriptiontheory. The explanation closely parallels that of various set theories as reactions to paradoxical naive set theory. Indeed, naive set theory is derivable from naive definite description theory given an appropriate definition of set abstracts in terms of definite descriptions.
4. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Dirk Greimann, "No Entity Without Identity":: A Reductionist Dogma?
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Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to show that the latter dogma must be abandoned, too. In section 1, the reductionist methodology underlying Quine's prescript "No Entity without Identity" is reconstructed in detail. In section 2 and 3, this methodology is criticized on the ground that Quine's individuation of sets offendsagainst the reductive Criteria of adequacy for individuations that are presupposed by his criticism of the ontological recognition of intensional objects. Finally, in section 4 an alternative holistic conception of individuation is outlined.
5. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
J.P. Moreland, Issues and Options in Individuation
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Construed metaphysically, the problem of individuation is the problem of offering an ontological assay of two entities that share all their pure properties in common so as to offer an account of what makes them distinct particulars. This article provides a survey of the major contemporary attempts to answer this problem. To accomplish this goal, the most important contemporary advocates of each solution is analyzed: the trope nominalism of Keith Campbell, the realism of D. M. Armstrong, the Leibnizian essence view of Alvin Plantinga, and the bare particular position of Gustav Bergmann. As a secondary purpose, the article provides a brief critique of the first three solutions and a brief defense of the fourth.
6. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Gregg A. Ten Elshof, A Defense of Moderate Haecceitism
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The identity of indiscernibles is false. Robert Adams and others have argued that if the identity of indiscernibles is false, then primitive thisness must be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world (i.e. haecceitism is true). Moreover, it has been suggested that if haecceitism is true, then essentialism is false - that accounting for individuation by means of haecceities precludes a thing's having essential qualitative properties. I will argue that this suggestion is misguided. In so doing, I will be defending what Adams has labeled 'moderate haecceitism'.After working through some preliminary issues, I will attempt (in section I) to motivate haecceitism. I will begin by reviewing Adams' arguments against the doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles. Next, I will examine altemative accounts of individuation which concede the falsity of that doctrine. I will reject these accounts and conclude that primitive thisness has an essential role to play in any satisfying account of individuation. In section II , I will surface the alleged tension between haecceitism and essentialism. In section III , I will suggest that Adams' moderate haecceitism avoids the tension surfaced in section II. Finally, in section IV, I will raise a difficulty for Adams' view and suggest a different understanding of the nature of haecceities. I will argue that the alleged tension between haecceitism and essentialism rests on a conflation of the metaphysical problem of individuation either with the epistemological problem which goes by the same name or with problems involving the unity of a thing. I will conclude with a few brief comments about the significance of moderate haecceitism for modal epistemology.
7. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Matthias Steup, Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma
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I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this version of foundationalism against Sellars's famous anti-foundationalist dilemma, according to which sense-experiential states can't be justifiers ifthey lack propositional content, and can't terminate the justificatory regress if they have propositional content. I argue that the latter of these two claims is false. A-states can play the role of justifiers because they have propositional content, and they can terminate the justificatory regress because they themselves are capable of neither being true or false, nor being justified or unjustified.
8. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Mylan Engel, Jr., Intemalism, the Gettier Problem, and Metaepistemological Skepticism
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When it comes to second-order knowledge (i.e. knowing that one knows), internalists typically contend that when we know that p, we can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing it. Gettier considerations are employed to challenge this internalistic contention and to make out a prima facie case for internalistic metaepistemological skepticism, the thesis that no one ever intemalistically knows that one internalistically knows that p. In particular, I argue that at the metaepistemological second-order level, the Gettier problem generates three distinct problems which, taken together, seriously undermine the possibility of anyone possessing second-order internalistic knowledge.
9. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Robert A. Imlay, The Skeptical Argument from Error: A Diagnosis and a Refutation
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I seek to show that the skeptical argument from error turns crucially on the following assumption: because Bill1 with the same degree of evidence as Bill2 failed merely by virtue of John's1 absence to know that John1 would be at the party, then Bill2 must have got things right by coincidence if he got them right at all, as to the actual attendance of John2. And so he does not have knowledge. But the conclusion that coincidence entered here is a non-sequitur.
10. Grazer Philosophische Studien: Volume > 60
Friedrich Christoph Dörge, Illokutionäre Akte und Konventionalität
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The Speech act models of Searle and Bach/Hamish mistakenly reconstruct Austin's concept of "illocutionary act". In Austin's view, "illocutionary acts" are not pure acts of communication but social acts achieved by communicative behavior. Following Searle's "Speech Acts" and Strawson's "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" today's speech act theory looks upon illocutionary acts as pure acts of communication, involving "conventionality" (in a certain sense) only as part of speaker's meaning. However, following Austin, to perform an illocutionary act is to bring about conventional consequences which are not adequately dealt with in the speech act models of Searle and Bach/Hamish.