Browse by:



Displaying: 1-20 of 120 documents


1. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Scott M. Campbell

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

2. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Ian Alexander Moore Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Among the many words Heidegger explores in order to elucidate his primary matter for thought, one would not likely expect Schmerz (“pain”) to play a prominent role. And yet, in a selection of notes recently published in a limited German edition under the title Uber den Schmerz (On Pain), Heidegger goes so far as to claim that pain is beyng itself. In this paper I analyze Heidegger’s ontological treatment of pain and his etymology of its Greek counterpart, asking whether he does not ultimately anesthetize his readers to pain’s most rending effects.
Bookmark and Share

3. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Richard Polt Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The discovery of a 1932 typewriter apparently signed by Heidegger raises questions about its authenticity and purpose, and prompts us to reconsider the validity of Heidegger’s portrayal of typewriters as devices that alienate writing from the hand and exemplify the modern oblivion of being.
Bookmark and Share

4. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
David Kleinberg-Levin

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Heidegger’s key word Ereignis is frequently translated as “event,” “event of being,” or “event of appropriation.” No ordinary event in the realm of beings, it is an event in which the meaning of being is recognized in difference from beings. In the history of philosophy, this insight into being set in motion the inception of a philosophical discourse within which we are still thinking. Inspired and guided by his philosophy of history, Heidegger hoped our own reflections on being could likewise appropriate and set in motion preparations for another inception, another experience and understanding of what it means for something to be. Whereas, for the early Greek philosophers, their insight was an experience of awe and wonder, and perhaps also dread, for us of today that insight can set in motion a more “inward” turn, a process that puts in question who we are as human beings and who we want to become, and stirs us to acknowledge our responsibility for being in response to a time when being is under assault.
Bookmark and Share

5. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Yuval Adler

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A leitmotif of Being and Time is the attempt to reverse the classical priority of actuality over possibility: instead of understanding the possible in terms of the actual – as “arising out of the actual and returning to it” – Heidegger insists on grasping possibility as the primordial notion. Nowhere is it more evident than in his complex treatment of death and dying. Death is exactly that possibility which offers nothing actual in terms of which to grasp it; death only is in our ever being-toward it. I focus on Heidegger’s characterization of being-toward-death as rooted in, and a concretion of, Dasein’s being-toward-itself. This approach yields an interpretation of the notorious “possibility of impossibility” formulation that is diametrically opposed to the so-called “world-collapse” interpretations. I then explore why, and in what sense, Dasein’s being-toward-itself needs a concretion and draw conclusions about the organization of Being and Time as whole.
Bookmark and Share

6. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Erik Kuravsky Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
One of Heidegger’s main targets of criticism in History of the Concept of Time is Husserl’s theory of intentionality. This criticism, however, has roots in Heidegger’s earliest thinking over the course of his student years and pertains to what Ernst Tugendhat called the problem of encounter as such. In this article I present how the critical appropriation of Rickert’s and Lask’s ideas shaped a unique interpretation of the subject’s existence in the early stages of Heidegger’s career, contributing to the (dis)solution of the encounter problem and anticipating an independent version of phenomenology more than a decade before the publication of Being and Time. These alternative sources of influence illuminate Heidegger’s own path, which is significantly different from Husserl’s from the very start. In particular, I show in the article how Heidegger’s critical appropriation of Neo-Kantian sources allows him already during the 1910s to see the derivative status of the theoretical subject-object dichotomy and to realize the need to investigate living subjectivity in its embeddedness in the world.
Bookmark and Share

symposium: the human being

7. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Kevin Aho, Jill Drouillard, Orcid-ID Jesus Adrian Escudero, Orcid-ID Tricia Glazebrook, Orcid-ID Roisin Lally, Orcid-ID Iain Thomson Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

book reviews

8. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
Yuchen Liang

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
9. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12
James Emery

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

10. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 12

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

11. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Scott M. Campbell Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

12. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

13. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share

reciprocative rejoinders

14. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Morganna Lambeth Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Translators of Heidegger’s interpretations of other thinkers face a challenge: they must contend not only with Heidegger’s distinctive choice of words, but also the terminology of his subject, whether it be Aristotle, Kant, or Schelling. The response by and large has been to focus on Heidegger’s turns of phrase, at the expense of the thinker he interprets. In this paper, I challenge this practice, using Heidegger’s interpretive works on Kant as a test case. If we overlook the terms of the author Heidegger interprets, we miss a major source of Heidegger’s phrasing, and lose the connotations that he invokes by using these terms. Further, such translations reinforce the damaging assumption that Heidegger’s interpretations venture far off-topic. I argue that when Heidegger references Kantian turns of phrase, these terms should be translated to match the standard English translation of Kant, and show how following this method of translation deepens our understanding of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. In the appendix, I provide two passages exemplifying this method of translation.
Bookmark and Share
15. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Richard Polt Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
16. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Harri Mäcklin Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Immersive art has been one of biggest trends in the artworld for the past few years. Yet, so far there has been little philosophical discussion on the nature and value of this immersive trend. In this article, I show how Heidegger’s meditations on art can provide a robust assessment of immersive art. On the one hand, immersive art can be taken to culminate in Heidegger’s views on the “machinational” character of modern art, where artworks turn into calculative experience machines, geared to provide “lived experiences” rather than experi­ences of truth. On the other hand, Heidegger’s thought also lends itself to a more positive assessment, where immersive art undermines machination from within and provides experiences of wonder, which are irreducible to and uncontrollable by calculative thinking.
Bookmark and Share
17. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Jussi Backman Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
18. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
John J. Preston Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.
Bookmark and Share
19. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
Lee Braver Orcid-ID

view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Bookmark and Share
20. Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual: Volume > 11
David Liakos Orcid-ID

abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay contributes to research on, and develops a critique of, the later Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between modernity and a future beyond or after the modern age. It is argued that Heidegger does not engage in a reactionary rejection of modernity, since he is methodologically opposed to pure negation. Rather, as the example of his reading of Van Gogh demonstrates, Heidegger uses suggestive poetic hints from modern culture to transcend modernity from within into a “postmodern” and ontologically pluralistic future. The author argues, however, that a more livable, plausible, and politically hopeful response to, and reformation of, the modern age is found in Gadamer’s work. Gadamerian hermeneutics permits a rehabilitation of modern culture and thought (for example, the tradition of humanism) by charitably and sensitively disclosing overlooked insights and resources that enable us to continue living within, without moving beyond, the modern age.
Bookmark and Share