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1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Hans Goller Mortal Body, Immortal Mind: Does the Brain Really Produce Consciousness?
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Neuroscientists keep telling us that the brain produces consciousness and consciousness does not survive brain death because it ceases when brain activityceases. Research findings on near-death-experiences during cardiac arrest contradict this widely held conviction. They raise perplexing questions with regardto our current understanding of the relationship between consciousness and brain functions. Reports on veridical perceptions during out-of-body experiences suggest that consciousness may be experienced independently of a functioning brain and that self-consciousness may continue even after the termination of brain activity. Data on studies of near-death-experiences could be an incentive to develop alternative theories of the body-mind relation as seen in contemporary neuroscience.
2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Leslie Armour Morality and The Three-fold Existence of God
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Arguments about the existence of a being who is infinite and perfect involve claims about a being who must appear in all the orders and dimensions of reality.Anything else implies finitude. Ideas about goodness seem inseparable from arguments about the existence of God and Kant’s claim that such arguments ultimately belong to moral theology seems plausible. The claim that we can rely on the postulates of pure practical reason is stronger than many suppose. But one must show that a being who is infinite and perfect is even possible, and any such being must be present in the physical world as well as in what Pascal called the orders of the intellect and morality (which he called the order of charity). Indeed, locating God in the various orders without creating conflicts is problematic. Such arguments are necessarily difficult and sometimes self-defeating but I argue in this paper that there is a promising path.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Yann Schmitt Hume on Miracles: The Issue of Question—Begging
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Hume’s chapter “Of Miracles” has been widely discussed, and one issue is that Hume seems to simply beg the question. Hume has a strong but implicit naturalist bias when he argues against the existence of reliable testimony for miracles. In this article, I explain that Hume begs the question, despite what he says about the possibility of miracles occurring. The main point is that he never describes a violation of the laws of nature that could not be explained by scientific theories.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Anna Tomaszewska McDowell and Perceptual Reasons
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John McDowell claims that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs. Perceptual reasons, according to the author of Mind and World, can be identifiedwith passively “taken in” facts. Concepts figure in the acts of acquiring perceptual reasons, even though the acts themselves do not consist in judgments. Thus,on my reading, McDowell’s account of the acquisition of reasons can be likened to Descartes’ account of the acquisition of ideas, rather than to Kant’s theory ofjudgment as an act by means of which one’s cognition comes to be endowed with objective validity. However, unlike Descartes, McDowell does not acknowledgethe skeptical challenge which his conception of the acquisition of reasons might face. He contends that perception is factive without arguing for the backgroundassumption (about a “perfect match” between mind and world) on which it rests. Hence, as I suggest in my article, the McDowellian claim that perception provides reasons for empirical beliefs is not sufficiently warranted.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Mark McLeod-Harrison Relaxed Naturalism and Caring About the Truth
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Can our caring about truth be rooted in “relaxed” naturalism? I argue that it cannot. In order to care about truth we need the universe to be capable of providingnon-adventitious good, which relaxed naturalism cannot do. I use Michael Lynch’s work as a springboard to showing this claim.
reviews and notices
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Józef Bremer Hans Werhahn., Das Vorschreiten der Säkularisierung [The Progression of Secularization]
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7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Konrad Werner Józef Bremer., Wprowadzenie do filozofii umysłu [Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind]
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8. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Tomasz Szubart Marcin Miłkowski and Robert Poczobut., Przewodnik po filozofii umysłu [Companion to the Philosophy of Mind]
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9. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Roman Darowski, S.J. In memoriam Piotr Lenartowicz SJ (1934–2012)
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10. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Andrzej Gielarowski The 9th Polish Congress of Philosophy (Gliwice–Katowice–Wisła, 17–21 September, 2012)—report
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