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1. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Marcin Podbielski A Note from the Editor
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2. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Paul Kabay Nonetheism: A Non-atheistic Account of a Non-existent God: A Non-atheistic Account of a Non-existent God
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I briefly defend a view I call nonetheism: the claim that God is a non-existent item. I develop a defense that might be acceptable to a theist, but I also note that arguments for atheism would also support this claim. As such, nonetheism is a form of theism that is actually supported by the case for atheism. I begin by showing that it is possible for there to be a non-existent object—that such an idea is coherent. I then argue that a non-existent item is actual and follow this with a defense of the coherency of claiming that God is a non-existent object. The paper concludes by demonstrating that the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo entailsthe non-existence of God and so any evidence in support of creation from nothing is evidence in support of nonetheism.
3. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Paul Kucharski Speaking Rationally About the Good: Karol Wojtyła on Being and the Normative Order
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In this paper, I explain and defend Karol Wojtyła’s claim that “if we wish to speak rationally about good and evil, we have to return to the philosophyof being. If we do not set out from such ‘realist’ presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.” I begin by outlining Wojtyła’s existential understanding of the good,according to which the good for x is found in those ends that complete the being that is lacking in x, or that enhance its existence in keeping with its nature.(Here Wojtyła is drawing from, and building upon, Thomas Aquinas’s account of goodness and being.) Then I explain how Wojtyła moves from an existentialunderstanding of the good to the thesis that “exemplarism is the very heart of the normative order.” Finally, using representative thinkers from both the Continentaland Analytic traditions, I defend Wojtyła’s claim that when we divorce goodness from being we end up in a moral vacuum, in a kind of nihilism wherethe good signifies nothing other than the rationalized articulation of one’s subjective needs, desires, or wishes. In such a state, the only means for resolving moraldisagreements is through the consensus of the majority or the forceful rule of the strongest will.
4. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Leland Harper Epistemic Deism Revisited
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In 2013 I wrote a paper entitled “A Deistic Discussion of Murphy and Tracy’s Accounts of God’s Limited Activity in the Natural World,” in which I criticized the views of Nancey Murphy and Thomas Tracy, labeling their views as something that I called “epistemic deism.” Since the publication of that paper another,similar, view by Bradley Monton was brought to my attention, one called “noninterventionist special divine action theory.” I take this paper as an opportunityto accomplish several goals. First, I take it as an opportunity to clarify and correct some of my previous claims. Secondly, I present and analyze Monton’sview. And, finally, I discuss the similarities that Monton’s view holds with those of Murphy’s and Tracy’s and discuss how they all can be reduced to being partof the same family of ontological views which are, ultimately, implausible.
5. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Francis Jonbäck How to Be a Very Friendly Atheist Indeed
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Friendly atheists hold atheism to be true, and believe that theists may be rational when holding theism to be true. Theists may be rational, they claim, either because they lack the evidence for atheism, or because they are mistaken regarding the evidential force of the arguments for theism. Both these reasons canbe interpreted as suggesting that theists are making a mistake, and perhaps even that they are blameworthy for having made that mistake. In this paper, I arguethat friendly atheists might even say that the most intellectually oriented theists are rational and blameless for holding theism to be true. I give two reasons forthis. The first reason is based on the denial of doxastic voluntarism regarding at least some of our beliefs. Theists might not have voluntary control with respect totheir belief that God exists. The second reason is based on a meta-epistemological consideration. Often, we choose our epistemology by looking at paradigm examples of knowledge. Growing up in a theistic context might lead one to regard the belief that God exists as a paradigm example of knowledge, and a theist could be considered perfectly rational and blameless for doing so, even though they may be aware of reasonable arguments for atheism. With these odifications, I suggest that Friendly Atheism is very friendly indeed.
6. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Józef Bremer Mental Disorder or Creative Gift? The Cognitive Scientific Approach to Synesthesia
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In cases where one sense-modality is stimulated by another, we speak of synesthesia, i.e., of a subjective experience of multiple distinct sensations as being quite literally conjoined. The term “synesthesia” is derived indirectly from the Greek words “syn,” meaning “together,” and “aisthesis,” meaning “sensation.” This article focuses on the question of whether synesthesia is in fact a mental disorder or a creative gift. Both the commonsense views that have emerged in recent times, and neurological research, demonstrate that our knowledge of this relatively uncommon phenomenon is slowly but constantly expanding. Proper experimental research conducted with the right sorts of synesthete, and philosophically and scientifically nuanced conceptual studies of synesthesia, can all be helpful when seeking answers to the question posed above, while also confirming general claims about the extent to which our perceptions are reallysubjective. Most synesthetes see themselves as gifted, and claim that this “conjoining of the senses” enriches the quality of their lives.
book reviews
7. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Roman Darowski Jakub Gorczyca: Zarys etyki fundamentalnej; Być dla drugiego
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8. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Marek Lechniak Jason Stanley: Know How
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9. Forum Philosophicum: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Note about Forum Philosophicum
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