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Faith and Philosophy

Volume 4, Issue 4, October 1987
Philosophy from a Christian Perspective

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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents

1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Christopher Menzel Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics
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In a previous paper, Thomas V. Morris and I sketched a view on which abstract objects, in particular, properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs), are created by God no less than contingent, concrete objects. In this paper r suggest a way of extending this account to cover mathematical objects as well. Drawing on some recent work in logic and metaphysics, I also develop a more detailed account of the structure of PRPs in answer to the paradoxes that arise on a naive understanding of the structure ofthe abstract universe.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Del Ratzsch Nomo(theo)logical Necessity
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The issues of just what laws of nature are and what makes statements law-like have been more discussed than advanced. After exploring the general area and uncovering some difficulties which, I suspect, make the case even knottier than generally imagined, I argue that certain resources available only to the theist---in particular, counterfactuals of God’s freedom---may provide the materials needed for constructing solutions.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Alvin Plantinga Justification and Theism
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The question is: how should a theist think of justification or positive epistemic status? The answer I suggest is: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S only if S’s faculties are functioning properly (i.e., functioning in the way God intended them to) in producing B, and only if S’s cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which her faculties are designed; and under those conditions the more firmly S is inclined to accept B, the more positive epistemic status it has for her. I conclude by making some qualifications and applications and exmaining some objections.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Richard Otte A Theistic Conception of Probability
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Although the doctrines of theism are rich enough to support a distinctively theistic conception of probability, historically there has been little discussion of probability from a theistic perspective. In this article I investigate how a theist might view epistemic probability. A unique conception of probability naturally follows from ideas central to theism, and it is argued that this conception of probability avoids many problems associated with other interpretations of probability.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Robert Merrihew Adams Vocation
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Is there a way in which we can have obligations that do not follow from general ethical principles in conjunction with non-normative facts about our situation in the world? I argue for an affirmative answer to this question, based on a divine command theory of vocation. I explore the structure of such a theory, deriving from Kierkegaard the idea that a vocation will normally be closely connected with one’s selfhood, and that it may override other prima facie obligations. Epistemological issues about vocation are also discussed.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Nicholas Wolterstorff Why Animals Don’t Speak
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In this paper I ask what it is for one’s performance of some locutionary action to count-as one's performance of some illocutionary action, After looking at the so-called institutional analysis and finding it unsatisfactory, I offer a normative analysis: To perform an illocutionary action is to acquire a certain normative standing, or status. I go on to ask how such acquisition comes about by way of making sounds or inscribing marks. If my analysis is correct, it follows that only those creatures who can acquire rights and responsibilities can speak---that is, perform illocutionary actions. It is my contention that animals cannot.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Marilyn McCord Adams Duns Scotus on the Goodness of God
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Over the past thirty years, analytical philosophers of religion have confronted the problem of evil in the guise of the atheistic argument from evil against the existence of God. Many have met it from the posture of defense, constructing logically possible morally sufficient reasons for divine permission of evils from the materials of religion-neutral value-theory. At best, such defenses vindicate divine goodness along the dimension “producer of global goods,” while neglecting the religiously more relevant dimension of His goodness to individual suffering creatures. My methodological recommendation is that we Christian philosophers shift away from defense and concentrate on formulating what we really believe about the goodness of God and how He is solving the problem of evil. If successful, our accounts would not only exhibit how divine permission of evils is logically consistent with His goodness to creatures, but also advertise Him as a character worthy of worship. Failures would pinpoint more precisely where and how evil is a problem for us. I illustrate this method by examining Duns Scotus’ many-faceted conception of divine goodness and measure its power to explain the compossibility of God and evil.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 4
Index: Volume 4, 1987
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