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Displaying: 1-10 of 14 documents


articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Richard Cross Duns Scotus on Eternity and Timelessness
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Scotus consistently holds that eternity is to be understood as timelessness. In his early Lectura, he criticizes Aquinas’ account of eternity on the grounds that (1) it entails collapsing past and future into the present, and (2) it entails a B-theory of time, according to which past, present and future are all ontologically on a par with each other. Scotus later comes to accept something like Aquinas’ account of God’s timelessness and the B-theory of time which it entails. Scotus also offers a refutation of his earlier argument that Aquinas’ account of eternity entails collapsing past and future into the present.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
John Sanders Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God
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This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply foreknowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how God’s foreknowledge is accessed according to simple foreknowledge. These two versions are then utilized to examine seven different areas of divine providence to assess the utility of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF affords no greater providential control than PK.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Steven D. Crain Divine Action in a World Chaos: An Evaluation of John Polkinghorne’s Model of Special Divine Action
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John Polkinghorne, formerly a physicist and now an Anglican priest and theologian, has made a significant contribution to the current dialogue between Christian theology and the natural sciences. I examine here his reflection on what is commonly called the problem of special divine action in the world. Polkinghorne argues that God acts in the world via a “topdown” or “downward” mode of causation that exploits the indeterministic openness of chaotic systems without requiring that God violate natural laws. In response, I argue: (1) that divine intervention in response to human sin is theologically, as well as scientifically unobjectionable; and (2) that the belief that God is the transcendent creator of the world renders the “causal joint” between God and the world metaphysical in nature, thus obviating the need to uncover a physical feature of the world that God exploits in order to act in the world.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Bernard D. Katz, Elmar J. Kremer The Cosmological Argument Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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We formulate a version of the Cosmological Argument that deploys an epistemic principle of explanation in place of the traditional Principle of Sufficient Reason. The epistemic principle asserts that if there is a possible explanation of a fact, and some proposition is entailed by that explanation and by every other possible explanation of that fact, it is reasonable to accept that proposition. We try to show that there is a possible explanation of the fact that there are contingent beings and that any possible explanation of this fact presupposes that there is a necessary being. We conclude that it is reasonable to believe that there is a necessary being.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
James K. A. Smith The Art of Christian Atheism: Faith and Philosophy in Early Heidegger
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In his early work, Martin Heidegger argues for a rigorous methodological atheism in philosophy, which is not opposed to religious faith but only to the impact of faith when one is philosophizing. For the young Heidegger, the philosopher, even though possibly a religious person, must be an atheist when doing philosophy. Christian philosophy, then, is a round square. In this essay, I unpack Heidegger’s methodological considerations and attempt to draw parallels with other traditions which argue for the possibility of a Christian philosophy but at root concede Heidegger’s atheism. In conclusion, I propose that it is precisely Heidegger’s work which points to the inescapabiIity of and opens the door to religious philosophy.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Lynn D. Cates Berkeley on the Work of the Six Days
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In the Three Dialogues, Hylas challenges Philonous to give a plausible account of the mosaic account of creation in subjective idealistic terms. Strangely, when faced with two alternative strategies, Berkeley chooses the less viable option and explicates the mosaic account of creation in terms of perceptibility. I shall show that Berkeley’s account of creation trivializes the affair, if it does not fail outright.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
E. Feser Has Trinitarianism Been Shown to Be Coherent?
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Macnamara, La Palme Reyes, and Reyes have recently claimed to have shown decisively that the doctrine of the Trinity is internally consistent. They claim, furthermore, that their account does not commit them to any exotic emendations of standard logical theory. The paper demonstrates that they have established neither of these claims. In particular, it is argued that the set of statements they show to be consistent in fact expresses Sabellianism, not Trinitarianism; and that they can avoid this result only via commitment to the (questionable) doctrine of relative identity.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Gordon Knight Universalism and the Greater Good: A Response to Talbott
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Thomas Talbott has recently argued in this journal that the three propositions 1) God wills universal salvation 2) God has the power to produce universal salvation and 3) some persons are not saved are inconsistent. I contend that this claim is only true if God has no overriding purposes that would place restrictions on the means God uses to achieve God’s ends. One possible example of such an overriding purpose would be God’s aim to produce the most good. I end by suggesting that while God’s purpose of universal salvation does render the achievement of this end probable, it is by no means necessary.
book reviews
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Andrew J. Dell’Orio The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 14 > Issue: 1
Mark McLeod Our Knowledge of God: Essays on Natural and Philosophical Theology
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