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Displaying: 1-10 of 14 documents


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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Paul K. Moser JESUS AND PHILOSOPHY: ON THE QUESTIONS WE ASK
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What, if anything, has Jesus to do with philosophy? Although widely neglected, this question calls for attention from anyone interested in philosophy,whether Christian or non-Christian. This paper clarifies how philosophy fares under the teaching of Jesus. In particular, it contends that Jesus’slove (agape) commands have important implications for how philosophy is to be done, specifically, for what questions may be pursued. The paper,accordingly, distinguishes two relevant modes of being human: a discussion mode and an obedience mode. Philosophy done under the authority ofJesus’s love commands must transcend a discussion mode to realize an obedience mode of human conduct. So, under Jesus’s teachings, we no longer have business as usual in philosophy. The discipline of philosophy then takes on a purpose foreign to philosophy as we know it, even as practiced by Christian philosophers. Under the authority of Jesus, philosophy becomes agape-oriented ministry in the church of Jesus and thus reflective of Jesus himself. In this respect, Jesus is Lord of philosophy.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
John D. Caputo METHODOLOGICAL POSTMODERNISM: ON MEROLD WESTPHAL’S OVERCOMING ONTO-THEOLOGY
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I characterize Merold Westphal’s synthesis of Christian faith and postmodern philosophy as an “epistemological” or “methodological,” postmodernism, one that sees postmodern thought as describing certain limits upon human understanding while leaving open the question of how things are in the nature of things, that is, how things are understood by God. Postmodernism (unless it waxes dogmatic) is not denying God, but only that we are God. In a characteristically postmodern way, Westphal has found it useful to limit knowledge in order to make room for faith, in the tradition of Kant, where these limits are historical and linguistic rather than ahistorical and apriori. In the second half of this paper, I advance the notion that postmodernism cuts deeper than epistemology and makes questionable certain features of the self and God.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Merold Westphal Reply to Jack Caputo
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I first thank Jack Caputo for his superb summary of my position, then call attention to sin as an epistemological category in Aquinas, the (largely undeveloped) resource for a Pauline hermeneutics of suspicion. There follow clarifications of my understanding of Derrida‘s atheism and of my suggestion that he is a natural law theorist. Finally, I argue that my own position of a faith that cannot convert itself into sight a) places no a priori constraints on what we can say about God, however traditional or bizarre, but only on the metaclaims we make about our beliefs, and b) that we do not become more radical by diminishing the substantive content of our belief.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Justin Thacker Lyotard and the Christian Metanarrative: A Rejoinder to Smith and Westphal
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Recently, James Smith and Merold Westphal have sought to reconcile Christianity with Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern – “incredulitytowards metanarratives” – by claiming that Christianity is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense. This paper argues that their understanding of theLyotardian metanarrative is too restrictive, and that the term specifically includes Christianity within its scope. Despite this, though, there is a meansby which Christianity and Lyotard can be brought closer together. That method is to understand Lyotard’s refusal of metanarratives as being tosome extent provisional. Combining this idea with Lyotard’s notion of the differend allows Christianity and Lyotardian postmodernism to be found, ifnot in agreement, at least to coexist.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Patrick Toner Divine Judgment and the Nature of Time
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Many Christians believe that persons who, at the moment of death, are in rebellion from God, are damned, while those in right relationship with Godare saved. This is what, for instance, the Catholic teaching regarding the fate of those who die in mortal sin amounts to. In this paper, I argue that this “last moment view” is incompatible with a popular theory of time known as eternalism, according to which all times are equally real. If that’s right, then those who accept the last moment view are committed to an alternative theory of time known as presentism.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
J. L. Schellenberg ON REASONABLE NONBELIEF AND PERFECT LOVE: REPLIES TO HENRY AND LEHE
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Some Christian philosophers wonder whether a God really would oppose reasonable nonbelief. Others think the answer to the problem of reasonable nonbelief is that there isn’t any. Between them, Douglas V. Henry and Robert T. Lehe cover all of this ground in their recent responses to my work on Divine hiddenness. Here I give my answers to their arguments.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Michael C. Rea NATURALISM AND ONTOLOGY: A REPLY TO DALE JACQUETTE
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In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I argued that there is an important sense in which naturalism’s current status asmethodological orthodoxy is without rational foundation, and I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear—realism about material objects and materialism. In a review recently published in Faith and Philosophy, Dale Jacquette alleges (among other things) that my arguments in World Without Design are directed mainly against strawmen and that I have neglected to discuss at least one formulation of naturalism that straightforwardly addresses my main objections. In this reply, I show that these and other objections raised by Jacquette are unsound and, in fact, rest on egregious misrepresentations of the book.
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
William Lane Craig IS “CRAIG’S CONTENTIOUS SUGGESTION” REALLY SO IMPLAUSIBLE?
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Raymond Van Arragon considers my my suggestion that most of those who never have the opportunity to accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer from transworld damnation, and he offers four different interpretations of that notion. He argues that at least three of these interpretations are such that on them the suggestion becomes implausible. I maintain that once my suggestion is properly understood, then, despite Van Arragon’s misgivings, it ought not to be thought implausible even on the first two, boldest interpretations he offers.
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Hugh Rice ZAGZEBSKI ON THE ARROW OF TIME
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Linda Zagzebski has recently argued that there is a conflict between a common view of the asymmetry of time and various other metaphysical hypotheses. She identifies conflicts in the case of the modal arrow of time and in the case of the causal arrow of time. In the case of the modal arrow I argue that on one view there is no conflict and that on another the principle should be abandoned that there are entailments between propositions about the past and the future. In the case of the causal arrow I argue that the conflict can be avoided by the adoption of a suitable closure principle.
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 22 > Issue: 3
Gregory E. Ganssle METAPHYSICS, ETHICS AND PERSONHOOD: A RESPONSE TO KEVIN CORCORAN
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In a recent issue of this journal, Kevin Corcoran has argued that the metaphysical theory one holds to about the nature of human persons is irrelevant to the sort of ethical questions that occupy bioethicists as well as the general public. Specifically, he argues that whether one holds a constitution view of human persons, an animalist view, or a substance dualist view, the real work in one’s ethical reasoning is done by certain moral principles rather than by metaphysical ones. I raise objections to his analysis and propose that it is a combination of ethical principles and metaphysical principles that does the work in our judgements about the morality of abortion and other actions.