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Faith and Philosophy

Volume 29, Issue 4, October 2012

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Displaying: 1-10 of 12 documents


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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Stephen J. Wykstra, Timothy Perrine, Foundations of Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities
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Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowestyle inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to “sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here defend CORNEA against McBrayer’s chief counterexample. We first clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle that we dub “CORE.” We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Alexander R. Pruss, A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
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Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Adam Green, Keith A. Quan, More than Inspired Propositions: Shared Attention and the Religious Text
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The Christian intellectual tradition consistently affirms that God is present in and continues to speak through Scripture. These functions of the Christian Scriptures have been underexamined in contemporary philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Careful attention to the phenomenon of shared attention is instructive for providing an account of these matters, and the shared attention account developed here provides a useful conceptual framework within which to situate recent work on Scripture by scholars such as Kevin Vanhoozer, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Michael Rea.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
James A. Montmarquet, In Search of James’s Middle Path
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William James indicated a “middle path” according to which religious experience yields something like knowledge for the mystic, but not a kind that others, who do not share his experience, are compelled to accept. Such a middle way is initially appealing, but how is it to be developed? Here I suggest three leading ideas—the epistemic analogue of “agent-relative permissions,” the complementary relationship between the Jamesian virtues of bold exploration and sober caution, and the kind of special access the lover may claim with respect to knowledge of his beloved—with an eye to such development. Each is found helpful, but in ascending order of importance.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Wes Morriston, Beginningless Past and Endless Future: Reply to Craig
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In a recent paper, I claimed that if a familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked as advertised, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of pre-determined events. The present paper is my response to objections by William Lane Craig. It argues that neither Craig’s claim that an endless series of events is a merely potential infinite nor his claim that future events don’t exist is successful in blocking my original conclusion.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Michael Rota, Freedom and the Necessity of the Present: A Reply to William Hasker
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In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker’s amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker’s argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
William Hasker, The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to Rota
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My account of free will entails that events of the present moment are “necessary” in the same way that the past is necessary. I argue that Michael Rota’s main objection to this account is unsuccessful. I also argue that Rota’s synchronous account of contingency is inferior to the diachronic account which I favor.
reviews
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Tyron Goldschmidt, The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust and God: A Defense of Holistic Empiricism. By Kai-man Kwan
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
R. T. Mullins, Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo; and Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Joseph J. Lynch, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray
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