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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Stephen J. Wykstra, Timothy Perrine Foundations of Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities
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Some skeptical theists use Wykstra’s CORNEA constraint to undercut Rowestyle inductive arguments from evil. Many critics of skeptical theism accept CORNEA, but argue that Rowe-style arguments meet its constraint. But Justin McBrayer argues that CORNEA is itself mistaken. It is, he claims, akin to “sensitivity” or “truth-tracking” constraints like those of Robert Nozick; but counterexamples show that inductive evidence is often insensitive. We here defend CORNEA against McBrayer’s chief counterexample. We first clarify CORNEA, distinguishing it from a deeper underlying principle that we dub “CORE.” We then give both principles a probabilistic construal, and show how, on this construal, the counterexample fails.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Alexander R. Pruss A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense
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Plantinga’s Free Will Defense is an argument that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world containing significant creaturely free will and no wrongdoings. I will argue that if standard Molinism is true, there is a pair of worlds w1 and w2 each of which contains a significantly free creature who never chooses wrongly, and that are such that, necessarily, at least one of these worlds is a world that God can actualize.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Adam Green, Keith A. Quan More than Inspired Propositions: Shared Attention and the Religious Text
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The Christian intellectual tradition consistently affirms that God is present in and continues to speak through Scripture. These functions of the Christian Scriptures have been underexamined in contemporary philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Careful attention to the phenomenon of shared attention is instructive for providing an account of these matters, and the shared attention account developed here provides a useful conceptual framework within which to situate recent work on Scripture by scholars such as Kevin Vanhoozer, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Michael Rea.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
James A. Montmarquet In Search of James’s Middle Path
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William James indicated a “middle path” according to which religious experience yields something like knowledge for the mystic, but not a kind that others, who do not share his experience, are compelled to accept. Such a middle way is initially appealing, but how is it to be developed? Here I suggest three leading ideas—the epistemic analogue of “agent-relative permissions,” the complementary relationship between the Jamesian virtues of bold exploration and sober caution, and the kind of special access the lover may claim with respect to knowledge of his beloved—with an eye to such development. Each is found helpful, but in ascending order of importance.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Wes Morriston Beginningless Past and Endless Future: Reply to Craig
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In a recent paper, I claimed that if a familiar line of argument against the possibility of a beginningless series of events worked as advertised, it would work just as well against the possibility of an endless series of pre-determined events. The present paper is my response to objections by William Lane Craig. It argues that neither Craig’s claim that an endless series of events is a merely potential infinite nor his claim that future events don’t exist is successful in blocking my original conclusion.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Michael Rota Freedom and the Necessity of the Present: A Reply to William Hasker
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In a recent paper, William Hasker has responded to a paper of mine criticizing his argument for theological incompatibilism. In his response, Hasker makes a small but important amendment to his account of freedom. Here I argue that Hasker’s amended account of freedom is false, that there is a plausible alternative account of freedom, and that the plausibility of this alternative account shows that Hasker’s argument for theological incompatibilism relies on a dubious premise.
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
William Hasker The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to Rota
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My account of free will entails that events of the present moment are “necessary” in the same way that the past is necessary. I argue that Michael Rota’s main objection to this account is unsuccessful. I also argue that Rota’s synchronous account of contingency is inferior to the diachronic account which I favor.
reviews
8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Tyron Goldschmidt The Rainbow of Experiences, Critical Trust and God: A Defense of Holistic Empiricism. By Kai-man Kwan
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
R. T. Mullins Inquiring About God: Selected Essays, Volume, 1 by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo; and Practices of Belief: Selected Essays, Volume 2, by Nicholas Wolterstorff, edited by Terence Cuneo
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Joseph J. Lynch Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal Suffering, by Michael Murray
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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
Richard E. Creel Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility, by Anastasia Philippa Scrutton
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12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 4
R. Douglas Geivett The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil, by Brian Davies
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13. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Thomas P. Flint From the Editor
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articles
14. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
W. Matthews Grant Divine Simplicity, Contingent Truths, and Extrinsic Models of Divine Knowing
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A well-known objection to divine simplicity holds that the doctrine is incompatible with God’s contingent knowledge. I set out the objection and reject two problematic solutions. I then argue that the objection is best answered by adopting an “extrinsic model of divine knowing” according to which God’s contingent knowledge, which varies across worlds, does not involve any intrinsic variation in God. Solutions along these lines have been suggested by others. This paper advances the discussion by developing and offering partial defenses of three such models.
15. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Katherin A. Rogers The Divine Controller Argument for Incompatibilism
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Incompatibilists hold that, in order for you to be responsible, your choices must come from yourself; thus, determinism is incompatible with responsibility. One way of defending this claim is the Controller Argument: You are not responsible if your choices are caused by a controller, and natural determinism is relevantly similar to such control, therefore . . . Q.E.D. Compatibilists dispute both of these premises, insisting upon a relevant dissimilarity, or allowing, in a tollens move, that since we can be determined and responsible, we can be controlled and responsible. Positing a divine controller strengthens the argument against these two responses.
16. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Lydia Jaeger Against Physicalism-plus-God: How Creation Accounts for Divine Action in Nature’s World
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It is often assumed that contemporary physics is more hospitable to divine action (and human freedom) than classical mechanics. The article criticizes this assumption on the grounds of both physics and theology. Most currently discussed models of divine action do not challenge the physicalist assumption that physics provides a true and complete description of nature’s causal web. Thus they resemble physicalism-plus-God. Taking up suggestions from Herman Dooyeweerd and Henri Blocher, I propose an alternative framework for divine action in the world. It takes creation as the starting-point to understand the world and leads to a non-reductionist, multidimensional picture of reality.
17. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow Time Travel and the Trinity
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I have used a time travel story to model the “Latin” version of the Trinity. William Hasker’s “A Leftovian Trinity?” criticizes my arguments. This piece replies.
18. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
William Hasker Dancers, Rugby Players, and Trinitarian Persons
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Brian Leftow has replied to the objections I raised against his trinitarian views in “A Leftovian Trinity?.” I explain why I don’t find his replies persuasive, and add some additional points based on his recent response.
19. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Brian Leftow On Hasker on Leftow on Hasker on Leftow
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William Hasker has rejected my rejection of his criticisms of my “Latin” account of the Trinity. I now reject his rejection.
20. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 29 > Issue: 3
Stephen R. Palmquist To Tell the Truth on Kant and Christianity: Will the Real Affirmative Interpreter Please Stand Up!
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After reviewing the history of the “affirmative” approach to interpreting Kant’s Religion, I offer four responses to the symposium papers in the previous issue of Faith and Philosophy. First, incorrectly identifying Kant’s two “experiments” leads to misunderstandings of his affirmation of Christianity. Second, Kant’s Critical Religion expounds a thoroughgoing interpretation of these experiments, and was not primarily an attempt to confirm the architectonic introduced in Kant’s System of Perspectives. Third, the surprise positions defended by most symposium contributors render the “affirmative” label virtually meaningless. Finally, if Kant is read as constructing perspectival philosophy, not theology, the compatibility of his positions with Christianity stands.