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articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Laura Frances Callahan On the Problem of Paradise
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Benton, Hawthorne, and Isaacs (BHI) claim that evil must be evidence against God’s existence, because the absence of evil would be (presumably excellent) evidence for it. Their argument is obviously valid on standard Bayesian epistemology. But in addition to raising a few reasons one might doubt its premise, I here highlight the rather misleading meaning, in BHI’s argument, of evil’s being evidence against God. BHI seek to establish that if one learned simply “that there was evil,” perhaps via an oracle, one would gain evidence of some strength or other against God. But when we commonly observe that there is evil in the world, we learn a stronger proposition. And determining the evidential impact of that stronger proposition is not so easy. The interesting questions about the evidential impact of even a general awareness of evil in the world remain open.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Daniel Howard-Snyder Does Faith Entail Belief?
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Does faith that p entail belief that p? If faith that p is identical with belief that p, it does. But it isn’t. Even so, faith that p might be necessarily partly constituted by belief that p, or at least entail it. Of course, even if faith that p entails belief that p, it does not follow that faith that p is necessarily partly constituted by belief that p. Still, showing that faith that p entails belief that p would be a significant step in that direction. Can we take that step? In this essay, I assess, and reject, seven reasons to think we can. Along the way, I discuss having faith in a person, being a person of faith, believing something by faith, and believing a person.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Gordon Graham Nature, Kant, and God
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This paper draws on some lines of thought in Kant’s Critique of Judgment to construct an aesthetic counterpart to the moral argument for the existence of God that Kant formulates in the Critique of Practical Reason. The paper offers this aesthetic version as a theistic way of explaining how the natural world can be thought valuable independently of human desires and purposes. It further argues that such an argument must commend itself to anyone who is as deeply committed to the preservation of nature as to the promotion of justice.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
John Ross Churchill Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility
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Many Christian philosophers hold that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism, a thesis known as incompatibilism. But there are good reasons for resisting this trend. To illustrate this, I first examine an innovative recent case for incompatibilism by a Christian philosopher, one that depends crucially on the claim that intuitions favor incompatibilism. I argue that the case is flawed in ways that should keep us from accepting its conclusions. I then argue for a shift in the way that this issue is often approached, namely, that Christian philosophers should deemphasize the role of intuitions in illuminating this topic, and take pragmatic considerations concerning orthodoxy and potential empirical discoveries to favor a kind of agnosticism about the compatibility of determinism and responsibility.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Arthur J. Cunningham Where Hasker’s Anti-Molinist Argument Goes Wrong
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This paper is a response to William Hasker’s “bring about” argument (1999, reiterated in 2011) against the Molinist theory of divine providence. Hasker’s argument rests on his claim that God’s middle knowledge must be regarded as part of the world’s past history; the primary Molinist response has been to resist this claim. This paper argues that even if this claim about middle knowledge is granted, the intended reductio does not go through. In particular, Hasker’s claim about middle knowledge is shown to undermine his proof of the “power entailment principle.” The paper closes with a critical examination of ideas about free will and the past history of the world that might be supposed to support Hasker’s conviction that Molinism is incompatible with a libertarian view of free will.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
W. Matthews Grant The Privation Solution: A Reply to Furlong
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Peter Furlong has recently raised an objection to my defense of Aquinas’s approach to explaining how God could cause all creaturely actions without causing sin. In this short paper, I argue that the objection fails.
book reviews
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Simon Kittle Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, by John Martin Fischer
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Allison Krile Thornton Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, ed. David Palmer
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Josef Quitterer Free Will in Philosophical Theology, by Kevin Timpe
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 2
Angus Menuge Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism, by Erik J. Wielenberg
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