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articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Richard Cross Duns Scotus on Divine Immensity
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In a recent article, Hud Hudson analyses divine omnipresence in terms of a spatial property, ubiquitous entension, neither reducible to nor derivative from any other divine attribute. Hudson’s view is an alternative to the predominant view in recent philosophical theology, in which omnipresence is reduced to omnipotence. I show that Duns Scotus adopts a view that conforms very closely to Hudson’s account, and show how he argues against the derivative view, which he finds in Aquinas. Hudson claims that ubiquitous entension helps dissolve the mystery of causal interactions between God and creatures. Scotus argues against this claim. He also argues against the view taken by Hudson that entension entails materiality. While fundamentally agreeing with Hudson’s basic position, then, Scotus nevertheless provides challenges both for Hudson and his opponents.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Martin Pickup The Trinity and Extended Simples
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In this paper, I will offer an analogy between the Trinity and extended simples that supports a Latin approach to the Trinity. The theoretical tools developed to discuss and debate extended simples in the literature of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I argue, can help us make useful conceptual distinctions in attempts to understand what it could be for God to be Triune. Furthermore, the analogy between extended simples and the Trinity might surprise some who find one of these at least plausibly possible and the other incoherent.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Joshua Mugg The Quietest Challenge to the Axiology of God: A Cognitive Approach to Counterpossibles
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Guy Kahane asks an axiological question: what value would (or does) God’s existence bestow on the world? Supposing God’s existence is a matter of necessity, this axiological question faces a problem because answering it will require assessing the truth-value of counterpossibles. I argue that Kahane, Paul Moser, and Richard Davis and Paul Franks fail in their attempts to render the axiological question substantive. I then offer my own solution by bringing work in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind to bear on the possibility of assessing counterpossibles. I argue that humans can engage in counterpossible reasoning by “accepting” or “supposing” that the antecedent is true and “screening out” those beliefs that would result in contradictions when combined in inferences with the acceptance or supposition. These screened out propositions are not treated as false, but are ignored. I offer a three-valued logic for counterpossible reasoning. I conclude by outlining some implications for the axiological question.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Alexander R. Pruss An Open Infinite Future is Impossible
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According to the Open Futurist there are no true undetermined contingent propositions about the future. I shall argue on probabilistic grounds that there are some statements about infinite futures that Open Futurism cannot handle. The Open Futurist’s best bet is to reject an infinite future, but a Christian philosopher cannot take that bet, and hence should reject Open Futurism.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Jeff Speaks Perfect Being Theology and Modal Truth
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In “The Method of Perfect Being Theology,” I argued that the attempt to derive the divine attributes from the principle that God is the greatest possible being faces substantial challenges. Here I clarify and defend the argument of that paper in response to the objections of Brian Leftow in “Perfection and Possibility,” and consider the question of whether we might use perfect being reasoning to establish the possibility of certain hypotheses about God.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
James Cain On the Geachian Theory of the Trinity And Incarnation: A Reply to Jedwab
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Contemporary accounts of the Trinity and Incarnation sometimes employ aspects of Peter Geach’s theory of relative identity. Geach’s theory provides an account not merely of identity predicates, but also proper names and restricted quantification. In a previous work I developed an account of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation incorporating these three aspects of Geach’s theory and tried to show how each might contribute to our understanding of the doctrines. Joseph Jedwab has recently argued that my account—or any that employs Geach’s treatment of restricted quantifiers—leads to serious doctrinal errors. I reply to his criticisms.
book reviews
7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Ryan W. Davis Reasons, Rights, and Values, by Robert Audi
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
James M. Arcadi An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, by Thomas H. McCall
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Katherin Rogers The End of the Timeless God, by R. T. Mullins
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 33 > Issue: 4
Chris Tucker The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, by J. L. Schellenberg
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