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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Mark C. Murphy From the Editor
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2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Chan Transformed By Faith
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Appealing to self-interest is a common way of justifying the rationality of religious faith. For instance, Pascal’s wager relies upon the expected value of choosing the life of faith being infinite. Similarly, many contemporary arguments for the rationality of faith turn on whether it is better for an agent to have faith rather than lack it. In this paper, I argue, contra Pascal, that considerations of self-interest do not make choosing faith rational because they fail to take into account the way the self is transformed by faith.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Joshua Cockayne Common Ritual Knowledge
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How can participating in a liturgy allow us to know God? Recent pathbreaking work on the epistemology of liturgy has argued that liturgy allows individuals to gain ritual knowledge of God by coming to know-how to engage God. However, since liturgy (as it is ordinarily practiced) is a group act, I argue that we need to give an account to explain how a group can know God by engaging with liturgy. If group know-how is reducible to instances of individual know-how, then the existing accounts are sufficient for explaining a group’s knowing-how to engage God. However, I argue, there are good reasons to suppose that reductive accounts of group know-how fail. In this paper, I propose a non-reductive account of common ritual knowledge, according to which the group knows-how to engage God in liturgy.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Tyler Paytas Of Providence and Puppet Shows: Divine Hiddenness as Kantian Theodicy
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Although the free-will reply to divine hiddenness is often associated with Kant, the argument typically presented in the literature is not the strongest Kantian response. Kant’s central claim is not that knowledge of God would preclude the possibility of transgression, but rather that it would preclude one’s viewing adherence to the moral law as a genuine sacrifice of self-interest. After explaining why the Kantian reply to hiddenness is superior to standard formulations, I argue that, despite Kant’s general skepticism about theodicy, his insights pertaining to hiddenness also provide the foundation for a new theodicy that merits serious attention.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Adam C. Pelser Temptation, Virtue, and the Character of Christ
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The author of Hebrews writes that Jesus Christ was “tempted as we are, yet without sin” (Hebrews 4:15). Many Christians take the sinlessness of Jesus to imply that he was perfectly virtuous. Yet, susceptibility to the experience of at least some temptations, plausibly including those Jesus experienced, seems incompatible with the possession of perfect virtue. In an attempt to resolve this tension, I argue here that there are good reasons for believing that Jesus, while perfectly sinless, was not fully virtuous at the time of his temptations, but that he grew in virtue through overcoming temptation. If this is right, then Jesus Christ is an exemplar of character formation who is able to “sympathize with our weaknesses” in an important way that Christians have largely overlooked.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Kegan J. Shaw A Plea for the Theist in the Street: A Defense of Liberalism in the Epistemology of Religious Experience
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It can be easy to assume that since the “theist in the street” is unaware of any of the traditional arguments for theism, he or she is not in position to offer independent rational support for believing that God exists. I argue that that is false if we accept with William Alston that “manifestation beliefs” can enjoy rational support on the basis of suitable religious experiences. I make my case by defending the viability of a Moorean-style proof for theism—a proof for the existence of God that parallels in structure G. E. Moore’s famous proof for the existence of the external world. I argue that this shows that even if the theist in the street has nothing to offer for helping to convince the religious sceptic, this needn’t entail that she cannot offer independent rational support in defense of her theistic belief.
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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Andrew Moon Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology, edited by Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Adam Green New Models of Religious Understanding, edited by Fiona Ellis
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Rebecca Stangl The Character Gap: How Good Are We?, by Christian B. Miller
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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 1
Kyla Ebels-Duggan God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, by Mark C. Murphy
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