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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jc Beall, Jared Henderson

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We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Joseph Jedwab, John A. Keller

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The Doctrine of the Trinity says that there is one God, that there are three divine Persons, and that each divine Person is God. The Logical Problem of the Trinity is that these claims seem logically inconsistent. We argue that any coherent and orthodox solution to the Logical Problem must use the technique of paraphrase: a logically or metaphysically more perspicuous reformulation. If so, discussions of paraphrase deserve more prominence in the literature on the Doctrine of the Trinity. We also show that such explicit discussion has important implications for theorizing about the Trinity.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Robert C. Roberts

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This paper is an initial effort preparatory for a more thorough “theology of joys.” I distinguish joys from other kinds of pleasure and argue that joy can be seen as the form of all the so-called positive emotions (the ones that feel good). So joy is properly treated in the plural: joys come in a variety of kinds. I distinguish canonical (joys with single-term names) from non-canonical joys. The worthiness of joys is primarily a function of their objects—what the joys are about. I look at a few examples of joys that appear in the New Testament and sketch the relation of joys to happiness.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jeroen de Ridder

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Duncan Pritchard has recently ventured to carve out a novel position in the epistemology of religious belief called quasi-fideism. Its core is an application of ideas from Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology to religious belief. Among its many advertised benefits are that it can do justice to two seemingly conflicting ideas about religious belief, to wit: (a) that it is, at least at some level, a matter of ungrounded faith, but also (b) that it can be epistemically rationally grounded. In this paper, I argue that quasi-fideism fails. Its central tenets either have unattractive consequences or are implausible.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Curtis Rutledge

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Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure-of-inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.

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6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Craig Warmke

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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Matthew A. Benton

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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Andrew M. Bailey

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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Michelle Panchuk

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 36 > Issue: 2
Jordan Wessling

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