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Displaying: 1-10 of 1613 documents


articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Brandon Warmke, God’s Standing to Forgive
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It is generally thought that we cannot forgive people for things they do to others. I cannot forgive you for lying to your mother, for instance. I lack standing to do so. But many people believe that God can forgive us for things we do to others. How is this possible? This is the question I wish to explore. Call it the problem of divine standing. I begin by cataloging the various ways one can have standing to forgive a wrongdoer. I then provide two solutions to the problem of divine standing.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Claire Brown Peterson, Humility in the Deficient
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Contemporary treatments of humility typically treat humility as a virtue that is reserved for the accomplished. I argue that paradigmatic humility can also be possessed by the deficient, and I provide an extended example of such humility. I further argue that attending to such a case helps us to appreciate the way in which the humble have released both the desire for superiority and the aversion to inferiority. Accordingly, when necessary, the humble will exhibit an extremely low concern with their own status relative to that of others.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
John Ross Churchill, Determinism and Divine Blame
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Theological determinism is, at first glance, difficult to square with the typical Christian commitment to the appropriateness of divine blame. How, we may wonder, can it be appropriate for God to blame someone for something that was determined to occur by God in the first place? In this paper, I try to clarify this challenge to Christian theological determinism, arguing that its most cogent version includes specific commitments about what is involved when God blames wrongdoers. I then argue that these commitments are not essential to divine blame, and that there are plausible alternative accounts of such blame that would not court similar challenges. I end with a case for the intelligibility of divine blame within theological determinism, in light of its possible similarity in relevant respects to certain instances of intelligible human blame.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Andrew Moon, Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology, Skeptical Theism, and Debunking Arguments
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Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology has been used to respond to many debunking arguments against theistic belief. However, critics have claimed that Plantinga’s religious epistemology conflicts with skeptical theism, a view often used in response to the problem of evil. If they are correct, then a common way of responding to debunking arguments conflicts with a common way of responding to the problem of evil. In this paper, I examine the critics’ claims and argue that they are right. I then present two revised versions of Plantinga’s argument for his religious epistemology. I call the first a religion-based argument and the second an intention-based argument. Both are compatible with skeptical theism, and both can be used to respond to debunking arguments. They apply only to theistic beliefs of actual persons who have what I call doxastically valuable relationships with God—valuable relationships the goods of which entail the belief that God exists.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Eleanor Helms, On Climacus’s “Against Reason” Thesis: A Challenge to Westphal
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I object to Merold Westphal’s characterization in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith (2014) of faith as “against reason.” I argue that Kierkegaard scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard does, affirming and perpetuating a broader antagonism in our own cultural climate. I suggest that the view of faith as “transforming vision” developed by M. Jamie Ferreira and others makes better sense of the different facets of faith pointed out by Westphal and the strengths of his account (especially faith as a passion) while avoiding conceptual and practical problems with the account Westphal has recently offered.
book reviews
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Michael Pace, Evidentialism and the Will to Believe, by Scott F. Aikin
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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Mary Leng, God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism, by William Lane Craig
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 4
Emily Kelahan, The Will to Reason: Theodicy and Freedom in Descartes, by C. P. Ragland
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articles
9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Pavel Butakov, The Eucharistic Conquest of Time
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Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds.
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 34 > Issue: 3
Jada Twedt Strabbing, Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation
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I argue that divine forgiveness is God’s openness to reconciliation with us, the wrongdoers, with respect to our wrongdoing. The main advantage of this view is that it explains the power of divine forgiveness to reconcile us to God when we repent. As I show, this view also fits well with the parable of the prodigal son, which is commonly taken to illustrate divine forgiveness, and it accounts for the close connection between divine forgiveness and Christ’s atonement. Finally, I demonstrate that this view is particularly well-suited, although not committed, to the idea that God forgives us without our repentance.