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articles
1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
David Vander Laan The Paradox of the End without End
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In much of Christian thought humans are taken to have an ultimate end, understood as the highest attainable good. Christians also anticipate “the life everlasting.” Together these ideas generate a paradox. If the end can be reached in a finite amount of time, some longer-lasting state will be better still, so the purported end is not the highest good after all. But if the end is to possess some good forever, then it will never be reached. So it seems an everlasting being cannot have an ultimate end—a conclusion that apparently makes human life pointless. How can the paradox be solved?
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Brian Leftow Presentism, Atemporality, and Time’s Way
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After defining presentism, I consider four arguments that presentism and divine atemporality are incompatible. I identify an assumption common to the four, ask what reason there is to consider it true, and argue against it.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Daniel J. McKaughan Faith Through the Dark of Night: What Perseverance Amidst Doubt Can Teach Us about the Nature and Value of Religious Faith
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Faith plays a valuable role in sustaining relationships through various kinds of challenges, including through evidentially unfavorable circumstances and periods of significant doubt. But if, as is widely assumed, both faith in God and faith that God exists require belief that God exists, and if one’s beliefs are properly responsive to one’s evidence, the capacity for faith to persevere amidst significant and well-grounded doubt will be fairly limited. Taking Mother Teresa as an exemplar of Christian faith and exploring the close connection between faith and faithfulness in the context of committed covenantal relationships, I set out a view of Relational Faith that does not assume that faith requires belief and allows wide room for honestly wrestling with doubt from within the Judeo-Christian tradition.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Hamid Vahid Religious Diversity: The Cognitive Penetrability of Religious Perception
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Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious diversity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main aim is to highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious experience as a major source of such problems. I conclude by examining the consequences of cognitive penetration for the reliability of the monotheistic doxastic practice.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Nikolaus Breiner Punishment and Satisfaction In Aquinas’s Account of the Atonement: A Reply to Stump
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According to Eleonore Stump, Thomas Aquinas rejects a “popular” (roughly, penal substitutionary) account of the atonement. For Stump’s Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction or punishment for human sin, and the function of satisfaction is remedial, not juridical or penal. Naturally, then, Aquinas does not, on this reading, see Christ’s passion as having saving effect in virtue of Christ substitutionally bearing the punishment for human sin that divine justice requires. I argue that Stump is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice does require satisfaction; satisfaction involves punishment ( poena) and has a penal function; and one way Christ’s death has saving effect is in virtue of his satisfying that requirement on people’s behalf. Christ saves by “paying our debt,” bearing in the place of humans the penalty or punishment required by divine justice. My argument implies that Aquinas’s account of satisfaction in the atonement significantly resembles key aspects of Stump’s “popular account”—and of the Penal Substitution Theory it represents.
book reviews
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
James G. Hanink Resurrection and Moral Imagination, by Sarah Bachelard
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7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Anna Marmodoro Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, by Michael Gorman
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8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Almeida Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, edited by John A. Keller
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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 2
Jill Hernandez The God Relationship: The Ethics for Inquiry about the Divine, by Paul K. Moser
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articles
10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 35 > Issue: 1
Thomas Metcalf Fine-Tuning the Multiverse
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I present and defend an “indexical” version of the Fine-Tuning Argument. I begin by outlining the dialectic between the Fine-Tuning Argument, the Multiverse Objection, and the This-Universe Reply. Next, I sketch an indexical fine-tuning argument and defend it from two new objections. Then, I show that such an argument is immune to the Multiverse Objection. I explain how a further augmentation to the argument allows it to avoid an objection I call the “Indifference Objection.” I conclude that my indexical version of the Fine-Tuning Argument is no less cogent than the standard version, and yet it is immune to the Multiverse Objection.