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editorial
1. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Valentin Bazhanov В.А. Бажанов
Dilemma of Psychologism and Anti-psychologism
Дилемма психологизма и антипсихологизма

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The article deals with the dramatic opposition of psychologism and anti-psychologism. Due to the evident success of classical branches of mathematical logic in XX century psychologism was eliminated for its conceptual insufficiency. However, nonclassical logics and recent neuroscience vigorous development have contributed to the renaissance of psychologism. Author makes an attempt to analyze the reasons for the revival of psychologism and some prospects for keeping its leading position among the other modern cognitive science conceptions. Author claims that the revival of psychologism is closely connected with current neuropsychological studies. The ontogenetic mechanisms of acquisition of socio-cultural experiences by defining the general principles of the construction and configuration of neural circuits of the brain are responsible for the shaping of psychological organization and the nature of the cognitive activity. An analysis of the epigenetic landscape of different people and cultures makes it possible to use the notion of social psychologism. This notion is aimed to reflect some cognitive qualities in their connection with the epigenetic features of certain social communities.
panel discussion
2. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Vladimir Filatov В.П. Филатов
Thought Experiments and a priori Knowledge
Мысленные эксперименты и априорное познание

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Thought experiments are traditionally associated with physics. In this science we can find a lot of wonderful examples of this method, especially in periods of scientific revolutions. But in the last decade in physics thought experiments are becoming increasingly rare, but in the social sciences and philosophy, they are widely used. What gives thought experiments, what is their value for scientific knowledge? Is it possible to use them to obtain new knowledge or they are just visual or paradoxical illustrations of any problems? The key issue, which I propose to discuss is the possibility to get with the help of thought experiments a priori knowledge. I will try to prove that it was impossible, that thought experiments have other functions in cognition.
3. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Igor Nevvazhay И.Д. Невважай
On Gnoseological and Ontological Meaning of Thought Experiment
О гносеологической и онтологической функциях мысленного эксперимента

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Author discusses the possibility of thought experiment to produce a priori knowledge. Author analyzes some arguments which come from the critics of a priori. In this paper he examines the ontological and epistemological role of thought experiment in natural science and humanities. Author claims that the concept of 'apriorism' should be considered as a crucial point for classical understanding of cognition, especially within the empiricism and rationalism tradition. However, nowadays 'apriorism' loses its epistemological meaning within some modern epistemological traditions.
4. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Andrei Paramonov A. А. Парамонов
Discovering Patterns
Обретение формы

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Author treats an issue on getting a new knowledge from thought experiments. A history of the notion of thought experiment is presented in a few words. Author considers a concept of instinctive knowledge, which Ernst Mach used in his investigations of the thought experiments. He puts a question on about the cultural conditionality of “instinctive knowledge". In conclusion author makes a conjecture on the method of thought experiment as a tool for selection of the new knowledge patterns of the world.
5. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Daria Drozdova Д.Н. Дроздова
Thought Experiment more geometric
Мысленный эксперимент more geometrico

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Thought experiments can be used in various ways. A part of them seems to have a special epistemic value: they can give us a new, unknown information about reality. One of the most famous thought experiments of that kind is the thought experiment of Galileo which demonstrates that two bodies of the same kind should fall with the same speed. However, an analysis of this argument shows that it is based on several ontological presuppositions. Therefore it's not the thought experiment itself that has a significance, but its correspondence to real experience.
6. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Irina Griftsova И.Н. Грифцова
Thought Experiment and Logic
Мысленный эксперимент и логика

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This paper considers the article by V.P. Filatov from the perspective of the role played by logic in a thought experiment. It is shown that this role depends on the way reasoning ant its correlation with logical inference are interpreted. It is suggested to view a model developed within informal logic as the most relevant to the role V.P. Filatov assigns to a thought experiment (turning the layer of implicit knowledge into explicit).
7. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Vladimir Filatov B. П. Филатов
Reply to Critics
Ответ оппонентам

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Author sums up the discussion of the “Thought experiments and a priori knowledge" Vladimir Filatov supports the idea of the necessity of special consideration of the thought experiments problem in social sciences and human studies. Nevertheless, he rejects the “elimination thesis" and insists on the structural affinity between thought and real experiments.
epistemology and cognition
8. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Alexander Ruser А. Рузер
Towards the Unity of Science Again?: Reductionist Thinking and it's Consequence for a Social Philosophy of Science
Назад к единству науки?

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At first glance the Idea of the “Unity of Science" seems to be of interest for historians of science only. However, given the expectations especially social scientists face today, to provide simple answers and feasible solutions to pressing social problems a revival of the idea is not unlikely. In particular “reductionist" ideas, aiming to adopt theoretical and methodological insight from the natural sciences thrive. This puts not only the project but also the very idea of a social philosophy of science in jeopardy. For, in consequence two of its main pillars, (1) considering the social and historic circumstance of knowledge production and (2) the need for developing a philosophy of the social sciences are equally rendered irrelevant. This contribution focuses on the fundamental flaws and shortcomings of such reductionist models, argues in favor of the disunity of science and thus defends the idea of a social philosophy of science.
language and mind
9. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Alexey Chenyak А.З. Черняк
Semantics of Proper Names as a Philosophical Problem
Семантика собственных имен как философская проблема

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Standard semantics of proper names assigns them the function of reference to individual things. This presupposes that to understand the meaning of a proper name is to understand what it denotes in the context of its referential use. But unambiguous identification of the referent of a proper name in its normal (referential) use looks like an unsolvable problem. Senses associated with referential uses of such names don't allow ascribing them singular referents in their contexts; and what concerns contexts themselves, they either don't contain proper referents at all or contain more than one, thus being referentially ambiguous. Some philosophers of language believe that the main problem for the standard semantics of proper names is that they assign them referents of wrong kind: that these, for instance, should be rather abstract entities, i.e. sets, than individual things. In this paper I try to argue that the choice of an alternative semantics for proper names does not solve the main problem with their meanings, i.e. that of their referential ambiguity. On the one hand even in the most transparent contexts there is always available an alternative referent to be assigned to the proper name's use along with some standard or default one; the fact that we prefer some standard interpretation (when we actually do) over alternative ones reflects at best that certain semantic theories contribute more substantially to ordinary communication in comparison with others. This does not yet imply that they better explain meanings of proper names. On the other hand there is also no good explanation of a phenomenon of reference to a particular thing as such: we still don't understand how a name may become referring to one and the same particular thing in many different situations for many different agents of its use etc., and how the thing may literally become a bearer of a name.
10. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science: Volume > 49 > Issue: 3
Dmitry Ivanov Д.В. Иванов
Enactivism and the Problem of Consciousness
Энактивизм и проблема сознания

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The paper deals with the enactivist approach to the problem of consciousness. The problem of consciousness is the problem of naturalistic explanation of phenomenal aspects of our experience. According to classical cognitive science, we can explain all mental states as functional, representational states. Many philosophers disagree with this view. They demonstrate that phenomenal qualities of conscious states cannot be understood in terms of mental representations. Contemporary debates about the nature of phenomenal qualities are the debates between representationalists and anti-representationalists. The arguments proposed by anti-representationalists demonstrate the insufficiency of classical representational approach. But it doesn't mean that we should accept the existence of qualia - special nonrepresentational phenomenal properties. It is possible to defend representationalism by reconsidering the nature of mental representations. This article examines the transformation of the concept of mental representation in cognitive science over the last few decades. It demonstrates that the notion of representation in action discussed in enactivist theories can help us to provide the foundation for naturalistic understanding of conscious experience.