Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

The article discusses the problems of constructing a scientific picture of the world in a technogenic civilization at the stage of its globalization. The interdependence of science, technology and society generates a number of issues of a socio-humanitarian and, in particular, ideological nature. Interdisciplinary forms of organization of sciences contribute to the development of borderline methodologies. These methodologies integrate the achievements and problems of specific disciplines into a certain overall picture. The ambitions of this worldview include space (near, far), planetary nature with all geo – shells, as well as the biosphere, technosphere, sociosphere, anthroposphere. In the course of communicative interactions, scientists have developed methodological principles for constructing a picture of the world. These principles claim to be universal: integrity, consistency, coherence, structurality, evolution/involution, complexity, self-organization, human dimension. However, epistemic and communicative difficulties accompany the construction of a general scientific picture of the world. There are methodological, experimental, linguistic, cognitive barriers between disciplines. Also, the unevenness of their development is strong. Competition between disciplines and reductionist programs are often caused by social reasons – politicization, ideologization and commercialization of big science. Philosophy seeks to connect the idea of a scientific picture of the world with a change in self-consciousness and a person’s place in the world. The prospect of intellectual synthesis fluctuates between the transdisciplinary form of organization of collective scientific thinking and the ideological imperialism of individual philosophical and scientific programs.

The philosophical understanding of scientific creativity cannot be limited to the analysis of cognitive abilities or ways of solving problems. It is always anthropologically-laden, based on a historically specific image image of a human being that acquires knowledge. The problem of creativity also articulates a well-known paradox of novelty: the new does not arise from the old, since it is significantly different from it, but it cannot arise from nothing, because then it remains incomprehensible. Paul Feyerabend criticizes such a “mysterianic” concept of scientific creativity, which emphasizes its emergent character, i.e. its suddenness and inexplicability. The distance between subject and object, man and nature, knowledge and reality in this case remains insurmountable. To solve this problem, it is necessary to place creativity in the space between the uniqueness of the creative personality and the mechanisms of social recognition. This, in turn, requires rethinking of the ontological content of creativity, as well as the concept of “labor” with reference to its treatment by Karl Marx’ rethinking of it as the production of not only material goods, but also of the person itself. Moreover, creativity does not just form a person: it is a way of cultivating the entire social space. An unexpected move is provided by an appeal to a new social group – the precariat, which in science gives a lesson in openness to novelty and theoretical freedom. As a result, a deeper understanding of the social base of creativity arises, and a new strategy for the interaction of the scientific community with extra-paradigm groups and marginal individuals is being built.

The article is a reply to Ilya T. Kasavin’s “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the phenomenon of the scientific precariat. A systematic analysis of the relations between the scientific precariat and the academic community as a dialectical opposition of the individual and the collective is undertaken. The method of critical analysis is aimed at rethinking the stable ideas that have developed in science about the collectivity of scientific work. The concepts of labor and employment in science are considered. It is concluded that the global development of digital technologies has led to the disappearance of the boundaries between physical and intellectual labor, against which there is an elevation of creative activity. The availability of information on the Internet, opening up incredible opportunities for research, destroys the monopoly of professional scientific communities on the possession of scientific knowledge. Scientific precarious loudly declare themselves in the public space, demonstrating the boldness and unusual nature of the ideas expressed. Inspired seekers of scientific truth embark on a free voyage through the vastness of the unknown. Traditional scientific communications, while retaining their significance, are enriched with new, non-standard ideas of precarious scientists who, ignoring rules and hierarchies, bring the creative spirit of freedom into modern science. However, the activities of such scientists may have an ambiguous assessment: a precarious scientist completely loses touch with the existing methods and approaches of classical science, and flight from work standards instead of expanding the horizons of scientific creativity turns into new problems caused by “multi-task” and instability of the labor activity of a “free” scientist. Despite the fact that in the conditions of the development of modern society and technology, the opposition of the pair of individual and collective is leveled, many scientists need common structures that determine the development of science, which at the present stage of the development of scientific knowledge are rather represented not by a social organization, but by an intellectual, linguistic and methodological unity focused on the creative development of the world.

This article is a part of the discussion of Ilya Kasavin’s article “Creativity as a social phenomenon” and is devoted to the analysis of creativity in the era of digitalization. The author discusses creativity in computer programs and the actions of assistant robots. They can be creative because they are able to find new solutions to various problems. The Go program used new strategies that human players had never played before; another program predicted the crystal structure of various substances that had not yet been studied experimentally. The concept of implicit knowledge is used to answer the question about the specifics of creativity. H. Collins singled out three types of tacit knowledge: relative, somatic and collective. The first is associated with the acquirement of various procedures – like cooking, the second – various skills related to body control, such as swimming or cycling, the third – social and cultural rules. Only the third type of tacit knowledge is associated with creativity. Programs and assistant robots can master relative and somatic implicit knowledge. They are not able to work with collective implicit knowledge. Creativity cannot be digitized. At the same time, digitalization forms important social prerequisites for the development of creativity. Currently, a new social group is being formed – the precariat. This is a marginal group; its representatives are not very firmly included in social structures. It is possible to single out the scientific precariat. With the help of digital technologies, it forms new ways, mechanisms, strategies and tools for solving various problems, form new ideas that expand our collective tacit knowledge.

In this reply to the article by I.T. Kasavin “Creativity as a social phenomenon” the authors discuss the possibilities of the scientific precariat as a free creative class, which having entered the scientific community, will give it a new creative potential. The authors express some doubts that such a merger will preserve precariat's special creative spirit. The article draws attention to the diversity in understanding the nature, goals and values of creativity. The specificity of understanding creativity in the scientific community is due to its rational and methodological guidelines, while the precariat is part of postmodern society, and its creative potential stems from a break with traditional rationalistic methodology. However, as long as peer review remains in the hands of the exclusively institutionalized scientific community, there is a high probability that the creativity of the precariat will be marginalized, and becoming part of the scientific community, the precariat will be forced to accept its epistemic values and lose the creative potential that is expected from them. The authors refer to P. Feyerabend’s theory of creativity, in which he rejects the subject-centered model of scientific creativity. According to Feyerabend, creativity is intersubjective in nature and grows organically from the sociocultural environment of the subject. The scientist creates following a cultural instinct, but the subject does not disappear from the creative process, since the cultural instinct is refracted through his individual style. If creativity is a reflection of the spirit of times, the precariat is the best way to embody it. In conclusion, a way for overcoming the social is outlined and, in a broad sense, the methodological problematic nature of the unification of the scientific community and the precariat, which the authors see in the general democratization and pluralism of society.

This paper is a part of the discussion about creativity and the scientific precariat, initiated by I.T. Kasavin’s article. Proceeding from his proposal to revise the ideology of creativity in science through the desire of certain precariat groups for independence and freedom, the author questions the nowadays perspectives for the scientific precariat. This paper discusses the varieties of the precariat (or related to it phenomena), such as freelancing and digital nomadism. The author considers a number of advantages (independence, freedom) and disadvantages of precarization (lack of stability, uncertainty, lack of social guarantees, etc.). The author questions whether scientists can be seriously considered as candidates for the precariat and how widespread the scientific precariat is in contemporary society. It is pointed out that the collective nature of modern science and its institutionalization impose certain obligations on scientists, which sometimes confront their individual internal aspirations, including the desire for freedom. The tension between the institutional conditions for the existence of science and the personal motives of scientists, noted once by M. Weber, lead to a decrease in personal autonomy, the emergence of a “world of specialists” and make it difficult to realize scientists’ aspirations for independence and freedom. On the one hand, a number of current trends (such as academic mobility) can be viewed as a kind of precarization in science. On the other hand, the status of an independent researcher without research and educational affiliation hinders scientists’ social recognition and financial returns. The author admits that representatives of “garage science”, some public intellectuals, science, communicators, etc. can be attributed to the scientific precariat; however, in general, the scientific precariat is not a common trend. At the same time, modern postscience and post-normal science potentially make this phenomenon quite legitimate.

The author starts from the contemporary image of “post-normal science”, which implies the openness of science to policy (S. Funtovicz and J. Ravetz). She considers the idea of post-normal science as a normative basis for the scientists’ demand for the politicization of science, as a conceptual condition for grasping crises and the role of scientific expertise in their resolution, and as a designation of a special phenomenon of contemporary science with the ambiguous status of a scientist-expert. Based on the analysis of the concept, the author emphasizes the problem of combining scientific validity and political relevance, inherent in post-normal science. The elements of this problem are the danger of including science in politics, the violation of objectivity and the lack of demarcating scientific and non-scientific knowledge. The author argues that the solution of the problem becomes possible if the political relevance of science is interpreted as interaction, and scientific validity as objectivity are revealed through attention to the concept of “knowing-how”.

The article questions the concept of post-normal science and emphasizes that despite the declarative detachment from social practice and freedom from politics, de facto science has always been social. On the one hand, the scientific community has always been aristocratic. The “classical ethos” of science presupposes openness and equality on conditions that require enormous efforts and self-sacrifice, this equality is beyond the norm, because a “normal” scientist is, as K. Popper noted, mediocrity. On the other hand, scientists at all times have taken an active social position, and the development of science has always been closely intertwined with social practices and the political process, as is well shown by T. Porter, L. Pinto, S. Shapin and S. Schaffer. From this point of view, science has always been post-normal – the “solutions” are always “urgent”, and the corresponding “stakes” are invariably “high”. However, the aristocracy of the scientific ethos and the declarative isolation of the scientific community from policy and politics are of fundamental importance for the reproduction of science, which practically cannot, but is morally obliged to remain outside of them. To help practice, the scientist must be impractical; to create a norm, a scientist must be abnormal.

The existing variants of the classification of sciences differentiate and correlate the types of cognitive practices on various grounds. At the same time, the attention of epistemologists is usually concentrated on the instrumental logical and methodological functions of the proposed classifications, which guide scientists in the holistic cognitive space of rational cognition (by subject, by epistemological preferences, by methods, etc.). As for the sociocultural dimensions of scientific and cognitive activity, they (as long as they are taken into account) mostly correlate with the typological features of research practices only slightly. Meanwhile, science as a whole is undergoing significant changes today, affecting, among other things, the status and methodological functions of its socio-cultural parameters, which significantly change the configuration of the cognitive space of scientific and cognitive activity. The article attempts to demonstrate the features of the problematization of contemporary science’s philosophical and methodological foundations. When discussing these issues, it is fundamentally important to consider how a scientist realizes his methodological tools and the socio-cultural status of scientific and cognitive activity. According to the author, these problematics are stepping into the center of today’s philosophical and methodological reflection on science, forcing us to take a fresh look at the meaning (target bases) of science as a holistic cognitive phenomenon, accordingly, the typological features of its cognitive practices.

The paper considers three main models of temporal consciousness proposed in grappling with the “paradox of temporal awareness”. They are based on the notion that there is a basic element of perception in the form of some “mental frame” or “apparent present” which, while effective for describing some perceptual features, does not fully reflect our phenomenal experience. It is argued that a two-level model based on the separation of the “specious present” and “current present” is best correlated with higher-order theories of consciousness and should act as a basis for further development of the temporal model of consciousness.

The article analyzes an important concept of contemporary virtue epistemology – the concept of intellectual vice, that is a trait of intellectual character that hinders responsible research. The purpose of this article is to formulate a hypothesis that, today, in the modern culture, a significant part of epistemic vices are implicit attitudes. The first part of the article explores the concept of implicit attitude, examines examples of implicit attitudes that have become widespread in the research literature: implicit sexism and racism. The second part of the article shows that in cases of implicitly biased behavior there is a manifestation of epistemic vice, and that the “motivational” theory based on Zagzebski’s ideas cannot explain the manifestation of intellectual vice in cases of implicit bias. In the third section of the article, it is demonstrated that implicit attitudes can be traits of the agent’s character (like moral vices that are not recognized by the subject herself): they can be acquired, rooted in the personality, and can be corrected. The fourth paragraph of the article analyses the conditions under which intellectual vices can be explicit attitudes. It is possible if the agent is a diabolical being (guided by evil as a goal), has egoistic vices (applies different criteria of vice to himself and to others), or is irrational. In the final section, it is shown that the spread of critical thinking in modern society should lead to the transition of intellectual vices from explicit attitudes to implicit ones. The conclusion is made about the theoretical and practical significance of the hypothesis under discussion. From a theoretical point of view, it allows us to explain why intellectual vices are widespread and difficult to eradicate, to place vices as character traits between the local (situational) and global levels, to apply to the concept of epistemic vice all the research concerning implicit attitudes, to develop a theory of epistemic responsibility. In practical terms, this hypothesis can be used to analyze the manifestations of implicit vices in various spheres.

Epistemic authority, according to L. Zagzebski’s theory, is essentially based on deliberative or first-personal reasons, which originate from epistemic admiration. In what follows, I shortly reconstruct her theory and try to defend it against two critical arguments. The first argument calls attention to circular relation of epistemic autonomy and authority. In order to determine the authoritative person for me, I always have to possess epistemic autonomy, which is understood as knowledge in the given domain. Thus I myself have to have authority in the given domain in order to invest authority. I try to show that the investment of trust is based upon autonomy interpreted as an ability to exercise epistemic actions, accompanied by normative foreknowledge, that allows us to assess epistemic abilities and invest our trust without having sufficient propositional knowledge. The second argument insists on theoretical control for authoritative evidence and testimony. That contradicts preemptive character and content-independence inherent to authoritative testimony. Hence, this argument entirely misses the point of epistemic authority. Instead, as I argue, one can control epistemic authority by future reflexion on its conscientiousness and epistemic exercise as well as on origins of my admiration for authority. As a consequence, the trust invested in authority can be withdrawn and redistributed.

The article presents the results of the study of young scientists (early career researchers) and their role in the functioning of research teams and the academic system. It shows why this topic has not only applied relevance connected with the theoretical justification of science policy but also concerns fundamental issues of philosophy of science. The nature of the structural organization of scientific teams and the scientific community as a whole is discussed. It is argued that science shares with other social institutions a socio-epistemic hierarchy, involving the division of participants into more and less experienced ones, performing certain functions in accordance with the available amount of knowledge and skills. It is shown that this hierarchy is supported by the system of division of labor in science, but does not lead to the formation of a rigid structure, which is reflected in the mismatch of social and cognitive hierarchies of research teams. It is also shown that the contribution of young scientists to the overall scientific result can not only be great due to the appearance of young geniuses. Scientific youth performs a number of cognitive and social functions that are system-forming and are not duplicated at other levels of the scientific hierarchy. These functions may undergo changes depending on the general state of both a separate research area and the scientific system as a whole. This makes the research of scientific youth promising for studying the transformations of science as a social institution and a cultural and historical phenomenon, in particular, for analyzing scientific communications that constitute the scientific community as a collective subject of scientific knowledge, and changes in scientific ethos.

The focus of the paper is a discussion around one of the versions of scientific realism – ontic structural realism (OSR), which has gained popularity due to the development of quantum field theory. According to OSR, individual objects do not exist as ontological primitives. The ontology of objects and their properties is replaced by the ontology of structures and relations. The paper discusses the arguments of the proponents of OSR, describing it as the only way to preserve scientific realism in general relativity and in quantum physics, which are reduced to mathematical structures with different symmetries. Five possible variants of the ontological relationship between structures and objects are analyzed in detail. Particular attention is paid to the eliminative and non-eliminative versions of OSR. If the former in principle excludes any existence of objects, then in the latter, objects receive their secondary existence due to relations, and their identity is reduced to nodes in the structures of relations. The main objections to OSR and the answers of its proponents are analyzed. It is shown that references to quantum physics are both its strengths and weaknesses of OSR, since they often superficially refer to the formalism of the theory, not accepting one or another of its interpretation. The paper argues the thesis that the extreme eliminative OSR, despite all its advantages (it removes a few objections to scientific realism and offers a good explanation of modern physical theories), has several serious limitations. The best way out of the situation may be the development of the non-eliminative versions of OSR. In conclusion, it provides a critical analysis of one of these versions – moderate OSR of M. Esfeld and V. Lam, who believe that structures should have causal properties, something resembling a disposition.

Within the framework of a new interdisciplinary scientific scientific field – epistemological urbanism – the authors develop the idea of the human right to their city and show the epistemological nature of this right, which is explained by the fact that it is conditioned by the processes of cognition and scientific communication. Three main provisions are substantiated. Firstly, the city is an intelligent system. “The right to your city” is a specific right to scientific and intellectual production and consumption. Such a right is not realized in every locality designated as a city, but only where there are conditions for intellectual dynamics – where art, education and science are developing. Secondly, the intellectual system of the city has autonomy. Each city has its own intellectual resource. Realizing the right to their city, citizens are involved in the activity of the city's scientific and intellectual autonomy. In other words, a city where there are opportunities to realize the “right to the city” generates an autonomous scientific school or a set of scientific schools. Thirdly, cities (we are talking only about those cities where the right to their own city is realizable) how research centers form a scientific network. Not a scientific consortium with common ideas and goals, but a network based on the principles of proliferation. The authors insist on the decentralization of science not for the purpose of its enclavization, but for the purpose of developing the potential, multi-vector and intellectual self-realization of urban communities themselves. It is shown that the development of science as a whole (at the global or state levels) can be ensured by the heterogeneity of science itself (in this case, due to the development of urban universities): integration and differentiation give rise to an integration scientific and communicative process.

This article examines the fundamental ontological significance that the category of perception has in philosophy of G.W. Leibniz, and establishes the connection between the category of perception and modern panpsychism. There is a problem of definition of protopsychic properties in modern panpsychism. The problem is expressed not only in the absence of such a definition, but also in the absence of a good strategy for finding possible candidates for the role of protopsychic property. To solve this problem, the author considers the status of the monad as the center of perception in Leibniz’s monadology, as well as the question of the relation of different monads to each other. Based on Leibniz’s ideas, the following modifications for modern panpsychism have been proposed, among others. First, it was proposed that protopsychic properties be viewed as properties that represent all reality in some vague way, preventing the emergence of high-level psychic properties. Second, it was proposed that mental properties be viewed not as a combination of protopsychic properties, but as state of protopsychic properties. This means that to form high-level mental properties, protopsychic properties must not only form some system, but must also be partially blocked. The author also considers the question of whether it is possible to borrow the proposed ideas in modern panpsychism. The problem for this is the ontological differences between modern naturalistic panpsychism and Leibniz’s classical panpsychism. The article proposes three different strategies for dealing with this problem related to three interpretations of Leibniz’s philosophy. First, it is possible to limit ourselves to considering physics as a set of structural phenomena derived from the activity of monads. Second, it is possible to try to show that there is some other, non-causal, type of relationship between the monads. Third, it is possible to consider this system as naturalistic pantheism and assume that God is a mediator and a common non-spatial coordinate system through which the monads agree with each other.

The article critically examines the project of the Hong Kong philosopher Yuk Hui to create organological and cosmotechnical epistemology. To open up the prospect of a “new epistemology” of this kind, Hui carries out a historical and rational reconstruction of the 250-year movement of European thought – from German idealism to second-order cybernetics. In all these theories and approaches, he reveals the key role of the recursive-contingent ligament. But what has happened in recent decades that prompted the author to reassemble Wiener’s non-trivial cybernetic machines and propose a cosmotechnical strategy for moving towards a “new epistemology”? How justified is it that, in constructing his axiocosmotechnics, he turns to the philosophy of the East, ancient and modern? The author of the article attempts to provide answers to these and other questions.

In this paper, we would like to argue in support of the productiveness of epistemological investigations at the interface of the semantics and pragmatics of natural language and the analysis of perception. We begin with a short overview the history of convergence of these two areas of research. Leibniz is the center of this historical discussion. We identify the general problems that arise when language meets perception and discuss some recent research in the semantics of pictures. We arrive at the following conclusions. First, the reference of a singular term and the perception of its denotation involve the same relation between the conceptual and what is immediately given in perception. The specifics of perception make up a part of a singular term’s pragmatics determining the conditions of a semantic interpretation. Secondly, phenomena with minimal conceptual content arise whenever the update of the conceptual content of linguistic expressions (or the update of their theoretical component) is faster than the update of the sensory material of perception. In the realm of language, these phenomena are related to the appearance of singular terms that become the result of acts of naming singular objects. The semantic and the pragmatic analysis of language identifies the relevant phenomena by revealing the universal formal structures and mechanism within language and its use. The result is an isolation of sensory data from conceptual schemes. Their place is taken by the empirical conditions of perception.

Novels like Fight Club or American Psycho are said to be instances of unreliable narration: the first person narrator presents an evidently distorted picture of the fictional world. The film adaptations of these novels are likewise said to involve unreliable narration. I resist this extension of the term ‘unreliable narration’ to film. My argument for this rests on the observation that unreliable narration requires a personal narrator while film typically involves an impersonal narrator (corresponding to the camera viewpoint). The kind of ambiguous story-telling that we find in literary fiction with unreliable narrators, where for certain descriptions it is unclear whether what we’re told is an accurate account of what’s happening in the story world or not, can instead be achieved by conventionalized filmmaking techniques for reporting the contents of mental states, like the point of view shot, but especially the more ambiguous blended perspective shot.

This paper comments on Emar Maier’s “Unreliability and point of view in filmic narration”. It is suggested that, without having discourse representations that include embedding operators, films can be unreliable in the broad sense of having propositional contents that depart from inferable, realistic scenarios. Second, films and embedded shots in film can convey agent-centered information without being composed of point-of-view shots. The reason is that the discourse representation can include information about discourse referents that identifies a depicted individual as a counterpart of the experiencer.