The article gives a generalized view of the historical epistemology and highlights its main problems: the nature of historical reality, historical knowledge and historical agent. The historical epistemology represents a special philosophical discourse, the purpose of which is constructing historical knowledge for cultural assimilation of the new historical reality at the intersection of science and society. A distinction is proposed between the position of a historian of science and a historical epistemologist in terms of the essence of historical event and historical fact. The historical epistemology reveals its boundaries and a position within modern epistemological approaches. On the one hand, it is the substantialist interpretation of the historical event, which loses its a priori status only by socio-epistemological explanation. On the other hand, a figure of the historical agent (hero and author) keeping the status of a theoretical fiction in historical epistemology, acquires the adequate meaning in the existential philosophy of science.

The article deals with the forms of epistemic injustice associated with the scentization of expertise, its locking in a separate scientific discipline. Counter-expertise is directed against deprivation of the right to speak out about one's own interests which is the most common form of epistemic injustice. But the most radical form is related to the comprehension of other’s phenomenal experience as a derivative of the parameters measured by expert. In this regard, the concept of embodiment can play a crucial role both in preventing epistemic injustice and in overcoming the crisis of expertise.

The article substantiates the possibility of interpreting expertise as a research communicative practice, in contrast to the expert “comparison with the sample”. Inside the so-called examinations, a counter-examination is institutionally integrated. The communication of expert and counter-expert position, which is a phenomenological personality choice, can take a form of personal institutionalized communication, and can be mediated by mediators and media texts. The results of examination and counter-interaction are determined by many factors, among which the coincidence (mismatch) of the images of the future. Communication between a layman and an expert about science-dimensional situations can be considered in prism of various optics – linguistic, sociological, socio-political, psychological optics, fixing a number of several paradoxes (equality, limited choice, excess / deficit).

It is argued that epistemic injustice as a problem of expertise is related not only to its scientization, closure, and the inability of institutionalized experts to hear the voice of representatives of the marginal communities, as stated in the article by S.Y. Shevchenko, but also to systemic communicative dysfunction in the relations of scientists, experts, representatives of marginal communities and state authorities. It is supposed that dashing about of dysfunctionality of interactions is the mistrust of social actors to each other which generates mutual forms of both hermeneutical, and testimonial injustice in M. Fricker sense. Unilateral view of marginalized communities is criticized. It should be taken into account that due to the rapid specialization in scientific production of knowledge, the boundary between the expert and the profane is radically shifted from the space of external social relations to the internal mental space of each of the experts.

The term “counter-expertise” has recently become a part of the STS theoretical tools, although main topics covered by this term have been the STS subjects for several decades. These themes concern the norms and practices of laypeople participation in assessing the quality of their living conditions. This assessing often clashes with official expertise. First of all, the problem of counterexpertise is considered in the context of the democratization of science, a participatory turn and activism. In this article, using the vocabulary of B. Latour's actor-network theory, I try to demonstrate the way counter-experts use, open and close the so-called “black boxes” of science. The counter-experts’ attitude about scientific facts is a matter of principle, for it actualizes the problem of demarcation of counter-expertise from various kinds of grassroots initiatives, which are usually interpreted as unscientific and socially destructive.

There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. This gave rise to a set of theories introducing additional conditions of knowledge which could exclude veritic luck. In this paper the author critically discusses main modifications of the tripartite concept of knowledge aimed at making it independent on veritic luck, and show that they are unable to solve this problem. He agrees with those who think that the very thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with veritic luck is wrong. But he disagrees that all kinds of veritic luck are compatible with knowledge: the author supposes that good veritic luck is compatible with knowledge only when it compensates some negative effect of antecedent bad epistemic luck. According to this view original Gettier examples are not cases of knowledge whereas broken-clocks case and fake-barns case are. This account allows treating many classic cases of dependence of knowledge on luck as cases of knowledge-acquirement, but in the same time it excludes the inclusion into the class of knowledge such intuitively irrelevant outcomes as lucky guess and wishful thinking.

According to Alfred Tarski’s classical definition, logical consequence is necessary and formal. This paper focuses on the question: In what sense (if any) is material consequence a logical relation? For Tarski, material consequence has no modal force. Treating all terms (of a language with a fixed domain) as logical, he reduces logical consequence to material consequence. Thus, Tarskian material consequence seems to be a logical oxymoron designed to emphasize the importance of the distinction between logical and extra-logical terms for the definition of logical consequence. Historically, however, there have been different approaches to material consequences. This paper attempts to provide an investigation into the parallels between Tarski’s dichotomy of formal and material consequence and the modern

The thesis of this paper is that our understanding of life, as reflected in the biological and medical sciences but also in our everyday transactions, has been hampered by an inappropriate metaphysics. The metaphysics that has dominated Western philosophy, and that currently shapes most understanding of life and the life sciences, sees the world as composed of things and their properties. While these things appear to undergo all kinds of changes, it has often been supposed that this amounts to no more than a change in the spatial relations of their unchanging parts.From antiquity, however, there has been a rival to this view, the process ontology, associated in antiquity with the fragmentary surviving writings of Heraclitus. In the last century it has been especially associated with the work of the British metaphysician and logician, Alfred North Whitehead. For process ontology, what most fundamentally exists is change, or process. What we are tempted to think of as constant things are in reality merely temporary stabilities in this constant flux of change, eddies in the flux of process.My main claim in this paper will be that a metaphysics of this latter kind is the only kind adequate to making sense of the living world. After explaining in more detail, the differences between these ontological views, I shall illustrate the advantages of a process ontology with reference to the category of organism. Finally I shall explore some further implications of a process ontology for biology and for philosophy.

An article by T. Rockmore, published in the journal “Epistemology and Philosophy of Science” in 2009 (Vol. XXII. No. 4, pp. 14‒29), claim that naturalism is by its nature an example of anti-Kantianism, for it treats philosophy as a continuation science and recognizes science as a legitimate source of knowledge, does not allow a priori, relies on an a posteriori approach, empiricism in the pre-Kantian sense, and insists on the possibility of revising the knowledge acquired. This article has a goal to show that T. Rockmore point of view should be revised due to the progress of modern cognitive research and, first of all, neuroscience, in which all the features of the naturalistic approach are implemented and in which the “Kantian program” of brain research is developed. In the context of this program, the existence on the ontological level (i.e., in the brain) of certain neural structures that make it possible and play a crucial role in the cognitive activity of a person is recognized. Those concepts that Kant treated as components of cognitive activity in modern neuroscience acquired ontological status in the form of the activity of certain neural structures, which turn out to be prerequisites and components of this activity. We claim that in the context of the Kantian research program in neuroscience, the metaphor “Kantian brain” naturally entered the vocabulary of neuroscientists, and certain specific operations and functions of the brain began to be associated with individual elements of Kant's ideas. It is in this context attempts are made to comprehend the mechanisms of the brain in the “stimulus – activity” mode, when an external effect leads to the excitation of certain neural structures. The brain is capable to anticipate the long-term results of certain actions of the subject. In the case of foresight, the brain generates “internal” models and uses for their correction external data that constantly provided from reality across the subject. At the same time, some kind of self-correcting mechanisms implements, which from a formal point of view described by the Bayes theorem, using a priori evaluations of upcoming events and changes in these evaluations as result of experience. Thus, naturalism and Kantianism understood in the context of the progress of modern science, despite T. Rockmore idea, are completely compatible.

The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. We provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be conceptions within this definition. Thus, the article interprets conception as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.

The article is devoted to the analysis of some specific characteristics of the language of normal science described by Thomas Kuhn. We would like to draw attention to two problems associated with some features of the concept of paradigms. The first problem relates to the question, how scientists belonging to one paradigm record the position of a group of scientists adhering to another paradigm. Precisely, the article examines how the problem of “synchronous fragmentation of knowledge” is solved in the language of science. The second issue concerns the age of “normal” knowledge and the question, how the anomalous content of knowledge can appear and accumulate, and what is the status of scientists developing the “anomalous” knowledge. We reveal some possible parameters by which we can determine the early stage of the functioning of normal science, the periods of its heyday and decline. In this article, we try to find an approach to these problems by examining the natural language of scientists, using techniques of content analysis, as well as complex linguistic analysis, including discursive, semantic and pragmatic components. Linguistic analysis can’t finally solve the problems of philosophical analysis of scientific knowledge, in particular, the state of the paradigm concept by Thomas Kuhn. But it helps us to identify the boundaries of paradigms, as well as the state of normal knowledge. The problem of fragmentation of knowledge by paradigms, as well as the problem of “aging” of knowledge inside a “normal science” are not directly expressed by scientists. But they can be recorded by analysis of everyday language, which often becomes entangled with the language of science. The high rate of words that semantically indicate the “obvious” knowledge in scientific texts points to a “good” state of the paradigm. And vice versa, the words denoting “improbable” indirectly indicate its crisis state or express an attitude to the knowledge belonging to a different paradigm. The analysis of the data shows that the alleged complete replacement of Kuhn's concept of a paradigm by the concept of “trading zones” by Peter Galison does not appear to be accomplished. Just as the concept of scientific paradigm did not completely replace the falsificationalism, the Galison’s “trading zones” do not fully reflect the real state of affairs in science. Therefore, the Kuhnian paradigms are recorded at the lexical level in the communication of scientists.

The following paper considers the immanent principles of digital media evolution. The features of the evolutional route of digital objects are conditioned by glitches, errors and bugs, which appear in media functioning, what in its turn gives birth to the new forms, structures and configurations of digital reality. The glitches are considered not only as a kind of digital mutations, but also as a sign of activity of media. Decisions elaborated from the programs’ failures enlarge the resolution capacity of new technologies. The paper provides an analysis of certain errors and glitches, which engineers, programmers, game designers faced with during their work with digital environment. The theoretical framework includes Henri Bergson’s theory of creative evolution, Gram Harman’s object-oriented philosophy, media philosophical approach to the problem of the activity of object proposed by Valery Savchuk and the theory of self-organisation and autopoiesis of the social systems worked out by Niklas Luhmann. The analysis of digital objects activity demonstrates two levels of functioning. The first one, fictional level, reveals mainly (but not only) in the computer games and concerns the content of media, when we gain a habit to interact with digital objects/characters as if they are real. The second level, operational, realises in the digital environment in general and concerns the form of media. On this level, glitches and bugs have crucial meaning, because they might evoke the changes in the digital world organisation, starting from the local decisions for the certain program (e.g. the elaboration of the new ways in solving locomotional tasks in simulations, which might be later use in other projects) and ending with the replacement of practices and representations typical for the human of digital era. The paper shows that it is possible to talk about digital evolution not in terms of the history of technological inventions, but in terms of the changes in digital objects caused by the inner logic of media, independently from the human will and expectations.

Two conceptions of the contemporary philosophy of science are taken under consideration: scientific realism and constructive empiricism. Scientific realism presupposes 1) the conception of truth as the correspondence of knowledge to reality, 2) the real existence of entities postulated by a theory. The constructive empiricism puts forward the idea of empirical adequacy: science aims to give us the theories which are empirically adequate and acceptance of the theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate. To compare methodological resources of these two positions in the philosophy of science the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is involved. As a methodological realization of scientific realism the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics is taken under consideration. K.Popper’s version

The book by Max Tegmark draws attention to the dangers and benefits that await humanity as a result of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies development. Cosmologist and astrophysicist Tegmark, realizing the impossibility to predict the AI development, offers exciting scenarios of civilization development options for tens, thousands, millions and billions of years. The analysis of the opposite scenarios is aimed at the idea formation that the consequences of creating a general AI, superior to the human level, will be more significant than from all other achievements of civilization. Tegmark is one of the founders and leaders of the “Beneficial AGI” movement, he presents the results of the discussion of the issues he raises with leading experts in the field of AI. Tegmark concludes his book with a call to optimism: “My book urge you to think about what future you would like, and not what future scares you, this way we can find goals for which it’s worth working”.

Modern science leaves the specific nature of temporality unclear, despite the generally accepted notions of the unity and diversity of the forms of time. In contrast to the nature of space, the history of the development of views on the nature of time is neither evolutionary nor revolutionary. As a result, the focal point of the person biological and cognitive unity is regarded only as an auxiliary tool for constructing a computable world. Considering that the activity of consciousness was and remains the condition for the synthesis of Time, the way out of the current situation is in a constructive transition from the ontological claims of science to the study of epistemology of temporality, from the question “what is time” to the question “why is it possible to move”. Using the example of little-known data from the Armenian history of science about Esai Krymetsy, 15th century medieval astronomist, authors reconstruct the primary cognitive mechanisms of secularization and desacralization of the nature of time.

The article discusses the problem of parallelism of epistemic and moral virtues. The author presents the problem along with other methodological obstacles in virtue epistemology. The importance of the problem of parallelism becomes evident when we turn to the criteria of intellectual (epistemic) evaluation and to the framework of possible intellectual ethos. This problem is discussed in the paper by the example of definitions of master virtue and wisdom proposed by A.R. Karimov.

The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. The author considers virtue epistemology as a new way of performing normativity.

The article examines the problem of interpreting normal and revolutionary science in the concept of Thomas Kuhn. It is shown that the “normal science” is the central concept of the Kuhn’s history of science, designed in accordance with the normative definition of science adopted by him. Such a story serves an internal purpose – to justify the special epistemical status of expert knowledge. But there is also an external goal – to establish professional science as an institution with special epistemological status and social function, which is situated in a center of intellectual power and property. Historians are those who are forced to constantly rewrite history – either following the methodology of “rational reconstruction” or responding to the challenges of their time. To be a “conservative” or a “revolutionary” in the history of science is a choice made not only for philosophical reasons, but also under the influence of the general socio-cultural situation of the epoch.