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1. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Walter Brogan Letter from the Editor
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2. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Phil Hopkins Weaving the Fish Basket: Heraclitus on Riddles and the Relation of Word and World
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Heraclitus stands in opposition to the general systematic tendency of philosophy in that he insisted that the contents of philosophy are such as to requireexpositional strategies whose goal it is to do something with and to the reader rather than merely say something. For him, the questions of philosophy and, indeed, the matters of the world such questions take up are not best approached by means of discursive propositions. His view of the relation of the structures of reality to the structures of language requires procedures for understanding the world and talking about it that recognize and exploit the essentially riddle-like nature of both things and words.
3. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Dror Post Heraclitus’s Hope for the Unhoped
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The Concept “hope,” (Greek), appears in two of Heraclitus’s fragments. This essay offers an attentive reading of these fragments and examines the role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking. The essay is divided into two parts. The first part examines the meaning of the Greek notion for hope, (Greek), by looking into archaic and classical sources, particularly the myth about the origin of hope in Hesiod’s Works and Days. Based upon the renewed understanding of the concept, the second part of the essay examines Heraclitus’s use of the concept of hope and demonstrates the central role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking.
4. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
M. Ross Romero, S.J. Without the Least Tremor: Ritual Sacrifice as Background in the Phaedo
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Sacrifice haunts the Phaedo. In this article, I argue that the mise-en-scène of the death scene of the Phaedo, as well as other sacrificial elements in the background of the dialogue, creates a nexus that positively integrates the birth, philosophical practice, and death of Socrates into the ritualized rhythm of the life of the city of Athens. A close reading of the death scene presented as a synopsis with Walter Burkert’s well-known analysis of Greek sacrifice reveals convergences and divergences between the Phaedo and Greek sacrificial practice. Socrates appears as a willing victim who accepts the city’s sacrificial practice while remaining on his own terms.
5. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Kalliopi Nikolopoulou Plato and Hegel on an Old Quarrel
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This paper addresses the relationship of ancients to moderns by focusing on the “quarrel” between art and philosophy that has led to two articulations of the endof art—one in antiquity, another in modernity: Plato, who expelled the poets from his city on account of art’s irrationality, and Hegel, for whom art was no more the necessary vehicle for truth. Following Giorgio Agamben’s cue in The Man Without Content, I opt for a symptomatic reading of Plato’s condemnation of art, by foregrounding his ambivalence toward poetry. I conclude that, whereas Hegel found poetry wanting, Plato understood poetry’s truth to be tragically excessive.
6. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Alessandra Fussi Love of the Good, Love of the Whole: Diotima’s Response to Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium
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Diotima criticizes, but does not refute, Aristophanes’ thesis that love is desire for completeness. Her argument incorporates that thesis within a more complextheory: eros is desire for the permanent possession of the good, and hence also desire for immortality. Aristophanes cannot account for the aspirations entailed in the desire for fame or in the desire for knowledge. Such aspirations can be understood only with reference to the good. However, the paper shows how time plays a fundamental role in the original pursuit of wholeness at the center of Aristophanes’ myth of the two halves. Diotima appropriates his thesis when she describes the urge to leave behind something similar to what one has been. The desire for immortality is nothing but a desire for completeness pursued by mortal nature against the never-ending destruction of time.
7. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
James Risser Discourse, Dialectic, and the Art of Weaving
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This paper explores the way in which the art of weaving, as it is initially presented in Plato’s Statesman, serves to configure both the fundamental character ofdiscourse and the limit experience of discourse for Plato. The problem that arises in relation to this configuration pertains to the possible unity of discourse (and with it the acquisition of knowledge). In relation to the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and his reading of Plato, it is argued that the unity of discourse follows “the arithmos structure of the logos” with its distinctive dialectical character. It is concluded that this character expresses the finitude of knowing in which oppositions remain in tension.
8. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Russell Winslow On the Life of Thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima
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In “On the Life of thinking in Aristotle’s De Anima,” the author offers an interpretation of the tripartite structure of the unified soul in Aristotle’s text. The principleactivity that unities the nutritive, sensuously perceptive and noetically perceptive parts of the soul into a single, continuous entity is shown by our author to be genesis (or the sexual begetting of offspring). After establishing this observation, the paper provides the textual grounds to understand how both sensuous and noetic perception can be understood as a kind of embodied genesis. A further consequence of this argument will be an interpretation of “thinking,” of noetic perception, as a kind of open and passive reception of the primary forms of other beings. As such, Aristotle’s conception of thinking, qua nous, is a refreshing, if strange, contrast to the more common modern vision of “thinking” as the activity of an agent mentally seizing hold of beings in the service of the mastery of nature.
9. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Pascal Massie Between Past and Future: Aristotle and the Division of Time
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Time prevents being from forming a totality. Whenever there is time fragmentation and multiplicity occur. Yet, there also ought to be continuity since it is thesame being that was, is and will be. Because of time, being must be both identical and different. This is the key problem that Aristotle attempts to resolve in his discussion of time in Book IV of the Physics. This essay considers three privileged notions: limit, number and ecstasies on which Aristotle relies at crucial moments of his inquiry and shows (1) that limit, number, and ecstasies are actually three ways of approaching the same phenomenon, and (2) how they allow Aristotle to reconcile divisibility and indivisibility.
10. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Suzanne Stern-Gillet Dual Selfhood and Self-Perfection in the Enneads
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Plotinus’s theory of dual selfhood has ethical norms built into it, all of which derive from the ontological superiority of the higher (or undescended) soul in us overthe body-soul compound. The moral life, as it is presented in the Enneads, is a life of self-perfection, devoted to the care of the higher self. Such a conception of morality is prone to strike modern readers as either ‘egoistic’ or unduly austere. If there is no doubt that Plotinus’s ethics is exceptionally austere, it will be argued below that it is not ‘egoistic.’ To that effect, the following questions will be addressed: Are the virtues, civic as well as purificatory, mere means to Plotinus’s metaphysically conceived ethical goal? To what extent must the lower self abnegate itself so as to enable the higher self to ascend to Intellect and beyond? And if self-perfection lies at the centre of the Plotinian moral life, is there any conceptual room left in it for other-regarding norms of conduct? A close reading of selected passages from Plotinus’s tractate I.2[19] On Virtues and tractate VI.8[39] On Free Will and the Will of the One will, it is claimed, bring elements of answer to these questions.
11. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Danielle A. Layne Refutation and Double Ignorance in Proclus
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Regardless of the inconsistencies between Plato and his inheritors, the late neo-Platonist Proclus offers poignant answers to several contemporary debatesimbedded in Socratic scholarship. In the following, we will concentrate on Proclus’s interpretation of the Socratic elenchos and the provocative concept of double ignorance by clarifying their appearance in The Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and The Commentary on the Alcibiades I. In this endeavor we shall unpack how Proclus characterizes the elenchos as an authentic dialectic purifying its recipients from an evil caused by the conceit to knowledge, a condition which unfortunately almost all men suffer and require treatment.
symposium
12. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
John Sallis Speaking of the Earth: Figures of Transport in the Phaedo
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13. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Drew A. Hyland To the Verge: On the Work Of John Sallis
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14. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Sara Brill Politics and Exorbitant Platonism
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15. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Peter Warnek Plato’s Other (Socratic) Beginning
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16. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
Walter Brogan Generosity and Reserve: The Choric Space of the Good in Plato’s Philosophy
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17. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 2
John Sallis In the Open of the Question
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18. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Walter Brogan Letter from the Editor
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19. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Chiara Bottici Mythos and Logos: A Genealogical Approach
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The paper aims to put forward a critique of the common view of the birth of philosophy as the exit from myth. To this end, it proposes a genealogy of myth whichstarts from the observation that the two terms were originally used as synonymous. By analyzing the ways in which the two terms relate to each other in the thinking of Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle, the paper argues that up to the fourth century BC no opposition between mythos and logos was stated and that not even in Aristotle is there an identification of myth with false discourse. This, in the end, is the result of the fact that their views of truth and reality enabled a plurality of programmes of truth to coexist next to one another.
20. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Matthew S. Linck Double Vision: On the Sensible and the Intelligible
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This article argues that the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible in Plato’s dialogues (here with respect to the Republic) is not a dogmaticassertion or the foundation for a set of doctrines, but is rather the very starting point of philosophical activity. This starting point will be shown to be, in its most fundamental aspect, not something chosen by the philosopher, but rather the attribute that makes the philosopher who he is. Much of my argument will turn on a consideration of the divided line. In Part I, I situate the discussion of the divided line within both its global and immediate context in the Republic. As the divided line will serve as the focal point of my argument it is important to clarify its place in Socrates’ discussion with Glaucon and Adeimantus from the outset of my presentation. Part II consists of a brief analysis of the key passages devoted to the divided line. This analysis will culminate by highlighting the problematic nature of geometrical objects with respect to the schema of the line. I will argue that geometrical objects have no secure place on the line. This insecurity will call into question the apparent continuity between the sensible and the intelligible that the divided line suggests, and might call for a way to mediate or bridge the gap between the sensible and the intelligible. In Part III, I consider one such attempt in Proclus’s commentary on Euclid in order to show how such an attempt failson Platonic terms and thus cannot constitute the true core of Platonic philosophy. Part IV will argue that if rightly interpreted the divided line itself offers a solution to the problem and clarifies both the nature of philosophical activity and the status of the sensibility/intelligibility distinction within Platonic philosophy