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1. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Johanna Oksala

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The article analyzes the experience of climate anxiety. The investigation is phenomenological in the sense that I will attempt to show that contemporary climate anxiety has a distinctive structure and philosophical meaning, which make it different from both psychological anxiety and existential anxiety, as commonly understood. I will also draw out the consequences of my phenomenological analysis for climate politics. My contention is that forms of prefigurative climate politics can respond to the profound disorientation and apathy regarding our future and help us face down the hyperbolic nihilism shadowing us.
2. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Chad Córdova

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This essay rereads the Kantian sublime both as an epitome of humanism and as a lesson for posthumanist thought. First, I unfold “On the Dynamically Sublime” as a failed dialectic in which “reason” seeks to sublate the power of “nature.” But Kant’s sublime is irreducible to the “Analytic,” I argue: it exemplifies a quasi-dialectical relation between human and nonhuman that recurs across the third Critique and defines its humanist teleology as a whole. Rereading Kant against that telos, and heeding the natural-historical concerns animating his project, I uncover paths towards a posthumanist or “natural-historical” sublime of “nature” as anarchic phusis.
3. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
J. Michael Scoville

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Multiple concepts of nature are at play in environmental theory and practice. One that has gripped several theorists is the idea of nature as referring to that which is independent of humans and human activity. This concept has been subject to forceful criticism, notably in the recent work of Steven Vogel. After clarifying problematic and promising ways of charac­terizing independent nature, I engage Vogel’s critique. While the critique is compelling in certain respects, I argue that it fails to appreciate what I take to be an important motivating concern of those drawn to the concept of independent nature, or something like it. I offer a characterization of that concern—a worry about problematic instrumentalization of the nonhuman world—and suggest why this concern, and the idea of independent nature which helps to make it intelligible, should continue to inform environmental theory and practice. In offering a qualified defense of the concept of independent nature, and of its value, I assume that such a concept is only one possible tool in a multi-pronged approach to environmental theorizing, deliberation, action, and policy.
4. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Jared L. Talley

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We are in places. Some places beckon us, some are to be avoided, and some are banal. However, this emplacement urges reflection. In this essay I consider the role of place in environmental experiences, beginning with analysis of the concepts of place and space that motivate the development of four environmental imaginaries (extractive, wilderness, managed, and reciprocal). Ultimately, through a discussion of fences, I aim to show how place-meanings are materially inscribed on the landscape while evidencing the value of place-based analysis to understanding the ways these landscapes are shaped by and serve to shape experience.
5. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Robert Booth

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Despite thinking that an appropriately nonanthropocentric approach to the more-than-human world requires understanding phenomena to be ontologically basic, Karen Barad engages with phenomenology only fleetingly. Here, I suggest that Barad ought to take Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology more seriously for two reasons. First, Barad’s objections to his prospects for a suitably nonanthropocentric phenomenology rely upon a misdirected charge of representationalism. Second, Merleau-Ponty offers theoretical and methodological tools corrective to our tendencies toward metaphysical and behavioral colonialism which align with Barad’s project, yet, insofar as her agential realism remains committed to a very strong metaphysical naturalism, appear unavailable to her.

book reviews

6. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Joshua Jones

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7. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Alessio Gerola

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8. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
TT Wright

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9. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Tom Greaves

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10. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Fraser Gray

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11. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 20 > Issue: 2
Forrest Clingerman

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