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Essays in Philosophy

Volume 11, Issue 2, July 2010
Ordinary Language Philosophy: A Reappraisal

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editor’s introduction
1. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Anthony Coleman, Ivan Welty

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essays
2. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Sally Parker Ryan

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3. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Alberto Voltolini

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There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism.
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4. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Jeff Johnson

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5. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Constantine Sandis

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6. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Jonathan Trigg

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It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it is only nonsensical if our ordinary ways of talking are – naively – taken to be sacrosanct. The aim of the paper is to show that the ordinary language philosopher has a reply here that the scientistic philosopher is not in a position to ignore. Namely, that the only way to resist mereological objections is to adopt conceptions of personhood that are inimical to naturalistic accounts of mentality.
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book reviews
7. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Aaron Bunch

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8. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Roger Chao

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9. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Michael Louis Corrado

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10. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Simon D’Alfonso

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11. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Peter H. Denton

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12. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Kile Jones

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13. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 11 > Issue: 2
Maximiliano E. Korstanje

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