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Essays in Philosophy

Volume 23, Issue 1/2, January/July 2022
Analytic Philosophy and the Islamic Tradition

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Displaying: 1-12 of 12 documents


introduction

1. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Billy Dunaway, Jon McGinnis

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essays

2. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Joshua Kelleher

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In this paper, I defend an unconventional mereological framework involving the doctrine of divine simplicity, to surmount a significant yet neglected dilemma resulting from that long-standing view of God as absolutely, and uniquely, simple. This framework establishes God as literally a part of everything—an “omni-part.” Although consequential for the many prominent religious traditions featuring divine simplicity, my analysis focuses on potential implications for an important formative issue in medieval Islamic philosophy. This problem of principality, with regards to metaphysical primacy and importance, derives from Ibn Sīnā’s celebrated distinction between essence and existence, and involves determining which is genuinely, objectively, real. Instead of supporting the historically dominant opposing viewpoints advancing either the principality of existence or of essence (aṣālat al-wujūd/al-māhiyya), I claim that God as omni-part aids renewed defence of the majority rejected view which upholds the combined principality of existence and essence together. Additionally, my proposal reinforces various theological desiderata including divine omnipresence and God’s necessity across possible worlds, while also supporting new perspectives on Ibn ‘Arabi’s influential notion of waḥdat al-wūjūd, understood as the absolute unity of being.
3. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Asha Lancaster-Thomas

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In Abrahamic theism scripture is essential to belief-forming, yet scripture as an epistemic evidence source is plagued with difficulties. In the following article, I argue for a specific reductionist model of scriptural proposition justification utilising an account of scripture as testimony. I contend that for an individual to be justified in a belief sourced from a scriptural proposition, she must appeal to external evidence to “prop up her epistemic bar.” Accordingly, I consider some potential “epistemic bar-proppers.”
4. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Alireza Mazarian

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What can we learn about the existence of non-physical entities (or a particular non-physical entity) from close inquiry into special kinds of experiences? Contemporary analytic philosophy has sometimes studied mystic experiences as evidence for the existence of such entities (for example, see: Broad 1939; Swinburne 2004; Plantinga 1981; Alston 1991). The article is organized as follows: first, I discuss several distinctions that seem to me to play substantive roles in philosophizing about such experiences. I will then offer and criticize two arguments that support the significance of the experiences. The arguments do not show whether a non-physical entity does or does not exist; they highlight a philosophical (and not theological) framework that can be beneficial to a variety of different approaches. Based on a heuristic strategy, the arguments will focus on the possibility/impossibility of objective representation of non-physical entities. They invite the reader (opponent, proponent, or neutral) to reflect on deeper philosophical grounds necessary for evaluating any positive or negative claims about the significance/insignificance of such experiences. The first argument rests on contemporary theories and assumptions. The second argument will use notions that drive from Classic Arabic-Persian Philosophy.
5. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Billy Dunaway

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Philosophers and theologians have traditionally been impressed with arguments which purport to show that predicates such as ‘wise,’ ‘good,’ and ‘powerful’ cannot, when applied to God, mean what they ordinarily mean when applied to everyday creatures. Theological predications, according to these arguments, cannot be univocal with ordinary predications. Philosophers in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions presented accounts of how non-univocal theological predications could be true of God. These are commonly known as analogical and apophatic accounts of the divine predicates. In this paper, I argue that representatives from each tradition also took epistemological constraints on an account of theological predication seriously. That is, they took it to be important to show not only how a predicate could be true of God, but also how we could know that it is true. Epistemological constraints of this kind, I argue, are non-trivial, since many accounts of the truth of theological predications entail that it is impossible or difficult to know them. Moreover, epistemological constraints are also important for ongoing discussions of theological predication, as they are violated by several contemporary accounts in the literature.

book reviews

6. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Ian Olasov

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7. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Yuiza T. Martínez-Rivera

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8. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Beba Cibralic

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9. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Michael Tofte

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10. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Kathryn Mattingly Flynn

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11. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
Jacob N. Caton

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12. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 23 > Issue: 1/2
James Murray

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