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Dialogue and Universalism

Volume 18, Issue 1/3, 2008
Jan Srzednicki—Beyond Philosophical Paradigms

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Displaying: 1-20 of 25 documents


1. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Małgorzata Czarnocka Editorial — Jan Srzednicki—Beyond Philosophical Paradigms
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jan srzednicki on his life
2. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jan Srzednicki Debris of a Longish Life
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jan srzednicki’s current investigations
3. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jan Srzednicki The Concept of Ma vs the Idea of ‘Everything’: To Ma or Not to Ma, That Is the Question
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Whereas at the roots of the Western way of thinking, in particular, at the roots of philosophy and epistemology lies a notion of the one/over/many, in Asiatic cultures, it is an idea of one/and/many, represented by Japanese (Chinese) Ma. In the paper it is argued that Japanese Ma is not only broader than epistemological reality (the world) but also more basic. To overcome Wittgenstein’s skepticism we have to return to a noncognitive idea of the ontic presence. Our thinking and cognition is deeply rooted in the imperceptible and indiscernible ontic flexibility and generality which is not conceptual or linguistic. This essay presents another interesting aspect of my metaphysical project showing that we cannot infer cognition either from the object level or from a meta-level.
4. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jan Srzednicki Bona Fide of Articulate Thought
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The question of [metaphysical logic] is how cogitatio is possible in the first place (Überhaupt – Kant) as it constitutes reaction to the real (whatever that may be) by the Ego (a subject possessed of cognitive potential). Is that reaction dependable?Ego can only react to the World. All systems of thought/cognition come from this only impact of reality.The question is its own reliability and legitimacy. The first can deliver reliably something quite illegitimate (the whole art of propaganda (advertising) is based on this simple fact).The ability to cognize/think, at least at the level of [modern Ego] assumes the technique/capacity’s independence from that come from [categorical truisms]. To manipulate this is to think/cognize. Possible just when, the (shape of) the real resonates with Ego’s cognitive sensitivity. This needs to be shown to obtain.(Assuming per impossibile that the contrary obtains at the [archetypal] beginning our thinking could not find an adequate basis so it could not occur—which supposition is absurd.)
a recollection from australia
5. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Frances Freeman On Jan Srzednicki. A Recollection
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the metaphysics of cognition
6. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Alina Motycka Preface
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7. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Grażyna Żurkowska Why the Metaphysics of Cognition? Introduction to Discussion
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Jan Srzednicki’s metaphysical conception of epistemology lies in radical opposition to the whole epistemological tradition. The main problem of his new epistemology is to find a non-linguistic (non-cognitive) idea of reference to an ontological presence.Srzednicki finds the prototype of such a completely new, non-linguistic perspective in Brentano’s Doppelurteile. Brentano’s idea cannot be mechanically adopted, however, because on the whole it still remains within the traditional theory. To avoid the problemsrevealed by Wittgenstein we need a more sophisticated strategy. Srzednicki achieves this goal by scripting the epistemological scenario for two dimensions: theoretical and pre-theoretical. The first one represents the logical space of observer, the second one, the theoretically discernible logical requirements of cognition (called cognitive potential, pre-Ego or arche of the possibility of cognition).Srzednicki’s idea was born in the space of three theoretical challenges: Brentano’s, Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s. He begins where each of these three theorists broke off, which is to say, entangling his endeavors at he end in dilemmas which cannot be resolved by means available from his perspectives.
8. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Tadeusz Buksiński How Can Existence Be Cognized?
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The paper tries to show that the theory of Srzednicki and Żurkowska can be viewed as an new and interesting solution of the classical problem: Can we cognize the objective reality? The theory discussed here conquer the cognitive skepticism on the condition, that there is not a impassable gap between the pre-ego experiencing without the notions and the subject cognizing by using the notions.
9. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Józef Dębowski Global, Fundamental… and Rational? On Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective
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I analyze only few elements of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. I especially appreciate the thesis of transcendentalism and of demanding of the depersonalization of epistemology. In my opinion, the trial of founding cognition on non-cognitive factors is an irrelevant. It leads to irrationalism, as in the case of praxism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, or cognitive sociology. In this lies a critical difficulty of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. The main difficulty was acceptance the narrow, analytical idea of knowledge. It implicates the acceptance of a field of evidence (intuition, experience) as a noncognitive one. Another problem with “new epistemology” is propositionalism, and idea that all cognition is external to its object.
10. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Włodzimierz Zięba Metaphysics as an Inevitable Dimension of Cognition
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The article concerns the metaphysical dimension of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemology. It is claimed that the metaphysical perspective of cognitive “normatives” (e. g. norm, form and presence) does not remove paradoxes of self-reference. It is especially difficult to separate the ontic and the cognitive dimensions.
11. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Maciej Chlewicki What the Skeptic Doubts
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The paper offers a critical analysis of the skeptic’s conviction that his doubts about the truth of thought on existence of the world outside the mind are not equivalent to real the doubts about existence of the world alone, but they are only a theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge. The main case of this criticism is based on the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy, precisely, on his theory of truth.
12. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Zbigniew Król Some Remarks on Cognition. On the Basis of Epistemology After Wittgenstein. Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective byGrażyna Żurkowska
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Some problems concerning transcendental epistemic arguments are raised on the basis of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemological conception presented in the bookEpistemology after Wittgenstein. Jan Srzednicki’s New Epistemological Perspective by Grażyna Żurkowska. The problem of the cognition immediacy is briefly discussed. The great philosophical importance of many other relevant topics is indicated, i.e. the internal similarity of Jan Srzednicki’s philosophical challenge to the project of Heideggerian hermeneutics or the problem of mutual relations between language and cognition.
13. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Alina Motycka How Is Epistemology Possible?
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This article presents J. Srzednicki’s epistemological conception and confronts it generally with contemporary versions of epistemological relativism.
14. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Maciej Soin Epistemology after Wittgenstein
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Following Grażyna Żurkowska’s work presenting Jan Srzednicki’s views on Wittgenstein’s philosophy (Epistemologia po Wittgensteinie. Nowa perspektywa epistemologiczna Jana Srzednickiego, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2006) [Epistemology after Wittgenstein. A New Epistemological Perspective by Jan Srzednicki], the author of this paper ponders the effect of Wittgenstein’s conception upon the domain of epistemology. According to Srzednicki, such an effect is in having posed a skeptical challenge which opened a new epistemological perspective. The author is critical toward this approach and argues that the most genuine intention behind Wittgenstein’s investigations was to draw attention to the diversity of such our concepts as cognition, knowledge, truth, etc. Such diversity is not a challenge but a fact which needs to be accounted for in epistemological studies.
15. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Rafał Patryn An Aspect of Philosophy of Law in Wittgenstein’s Theory of the Meaning
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Wittgenstein’s philosophy endeavored to define the role of language as communicative. Language became an original “code” of multifarious meanings and designations but it is also a code which entails emotions and different sorts of internal and external reactions of an individual. The mechanism of penalty and the notion of penalty have invariably raised emotions and meaningful reactions. The analysis focuses on a short derivation of the notion of penalty. It considers its functions, basic tasks and external impact—a short word revealing so many actions and social behaviors.
16. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Zdzisław Cackowski Comments to the Book on the Epistemology of Jan Srzednicki Written by Grażyna Żurkowska
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The paper investigates Jan Srzednicki’s epistemological conception with its main Kantian problem on the very possibility of cognition. Investigating Srzednicki’s conception the paper refers to its interpretation elaborated by Grażyna Żurkowska.
17. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Krzysztof Kościuszko Are Conditions of Knowledge Free From Knowledge?
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In the comments presented below, I consider critically to Srzednicki’s epistemological realism, and his modernistic and anti-dialectical fundamentalism
18. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Andrzej Kapusta Srzednicki in Phenomenological Perspective
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In the article the author tries to find some similarities and differences between phenomenological tradition and Srzednicki’s project of the new epistemology. He mostly refers to the thought of a French philosopher, Merleau-Ponty. Especially representative to the arguments is his late turn to metaphysical perspective presented in the work, Visible and Invisible, where he made an attempt to express a kind of logic which may reveal the world and ourselves in its mutual interconnections.
19. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Anita Benisławska, Marek Kołata Does Skepticism Lead to Dogmatism?
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The article juxtaposes Jan Srzednicki’s conception of cognition with Jean Piaget’s psychology of cognition. Human’s (child’s) cognition is syncretic. Various cognitive data are confused, systematized, dogmatized or become chaotic, and mistakes appear. These mistakes can be overcome thanks to analytical, intuitive or logical perspectives. Cognition moves from the sphere of “children’s dogmatism” to the world of “mature skepticism”. The syncretic cognition can be overcome thanks to various cognitive procedures, e.g., analytical, logical or intuitive. The intuitive cognition is primary and synthetic—it is present in the acts of analytical cognition. Syncretism may lead to dogmatism if it is uncritical or to skepticism if it is connected with logical procedures. It is explained to a different extent both by Piaget’s epistemology of development and also by epistemology of Srzednicki’s logical gap.
20. Dialogue and Universalism: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1/3
Jerzy Bobryk Epistemology After Wittgenstein or a General Theory of Action
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The term “transcendental” means something which is a necessary and a priori condition of knowledge. In other words, “the transcendental” refers to all presuppositions of a knower who is ready for knowing. These presuppositions are sometimes called “epistemic assumptions”. The paper presents author’s interpretation of the knowledge necessary conditions. The theoretical background for this interpretation is Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of actions and products, and John Searle’s theory of human action.