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Displaying: 1-10 of 10 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Lars Bergström Putnam on the Fact-Value Dichotomy
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In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
János Kis Behind the Veil of Ignorance
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The paper examines consensual contractarianism John Rawls proposed in his A Theory of Justice, and develops the following criticism. The veil of ignorance device requires but cannot secure the neutrality of the primary goods. In the Rawlsian ‘original position’ of contract, the only relevant information the hypothetical choosers are allowed to have is that they all prefer to have some ‘primary goods’ rather than not to have any, and that they prefer to have more rather than less of the primary goods. This stipulation entails that the ‘primary goods’ are neutral with regard to the diverging preferences of the choosers. In other words, for the Rawlsian contract to yield acceptable results, neutrality of the primary goods must hold. It cannot, however. Hence Rawls’ account of a consensual contract is untenable. The paper suggests that the difficulty is not rooted in the particular features of the Rawlsian theory but in the very idea of a consensual contract.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Raphael Cohen-Almagor Non-Voluntary and Involuntary Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Dutch Perspectives
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During the summer of 1999, twenty-eight interviews with some of the leading authorities on the euthanasia policy were conducted in the Netherlands. They were asked about cases of non-voluntary (when patients are incompetent) and involuntary euthanasia (when patients are competent and made no request to die). This study reports the main findings, showing that most respondents are quite complacent with regard to breaches of the guideline that speaks ofthe patient’s consent as prerequisite to performance of euthanasia.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Sergio Cremaschi Two Views of Natural Law and the Shaping of Economic Science
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In this paper I argue that differences between the ‘new moral science’ of the seventeenth century and scholastic natural law theory originated primarily from the skeptical challenge the former had to face. Pufendorf’s project of a scientia practica universalis is the paramount expression of an anti-skeptical moral science, a ‘science’ that is both explanatory and normative, but also anti-dogmatic insofar as it tries to base its laws on those basic phenomena of human life which, supposedly, are immune to skeptical doubt. The main scholastic legacy to the new moral science is the dichotomy between an ‘intellectualist’ and a ‘voluntarist’ view of natural law (or between lex immanens and lex imposita). Voluntarism lies at the basis of both theological views, such as Calvinism, and political views, such as those of Hobbes and Locke. The need to counterbalance the undesirable implications of extreme voluntarism may account for much of the developments in ethics and politics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Scottish natural jurisprudence, which tried to find a middle way between skepticism and extreme voluntarism, is less secular and more empirical than received wisdom admits. There emerged, as one of its ‘accidental’ outcomes, a systematic, self-contained and empirical economic theory from the search for an empirically based normative theory of social life. The basic assumption of such a theory, namely, the notion of societal laws as embedded in trans-individual mechanisms, derives from the voluntarist view of natural law as ‘imposed’ law.Later discussions of social issues in terms of ‘economic’ and ‘ethical’ reasons originated partly from a misreading ofthe Scottish natural jurisprudential framework of economic theory. Starting with this reconstruction, I try to shed some light on recent discussions about the role of ethics in economics.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Danilo Šuster Embedded Conditionals as the Essence of Causality?
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Counterfactual analysis of causation between particular events, combined with standard semantics for counterfactual conditionals, cannot express the idea that the cause is sufficient for the effect. Several authors have suggested that a more complex pattern of nested counterfactual conditionals is a better candidate for expressing the idea of causal connection. The most systematic account is developed by Kadri Vihvelin. She argues that a complex pattern of causal dependence, expressed by embedded conditionals, covers all the cases of causation and still yields an account of causal asymmetry. But the new account relies heavily on the use of backtracking conditionals, and no criterion is given for their evaluation. I will try to show that Vihvelin’s proposal is not superior to the standard account because it overlooks the disadvantages of a liberal theory of causal relata.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
John Collins Horwich’s Sting: Constitution and Composition
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Horwich (1998) seeks to undermine the familiar truth-theoretic approach to meaning, as championed by Davidson. Horwich’s criticism has two chief parts: (i) the Davidsonian approach commits a common constitution fallacy under which the form of the explanans (in this case, truth theoretic clauses and theorems) is constrained to respect the form of the explanandum (in this case, ‘meaning facts’) and (ii) that compositionality can be explained independently of a concept of truth, and so the putative central plank of Davidson’s argument is removed. This paper seeks to show that these claims are premised upon a systematic misreading of the Davidsonian approach. First, the very idea of a constitution fallacy has no application to the truth-theoretic approach, for meaning is simply not analysed under it. Second,compositionality is properly understood to be a general, independent constraint on theories of meaning, not a consequence of any particular approach. Moreover, I shall show that Horwich’s format for explaining compositionality independently of truth fails to meet certain elementary constraints.
book reviews
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević Sameness and Substance Renewed
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8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević New Essays on the A Priori
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9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Matej Sušnik Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism
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10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 2 > Issue: 2
Ana Maršanić Poredak slobode: Politička misao Johna Stuarta Milla: (The Order of Freedom: The Political Thought of John Stuart Mill)
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