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1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Snježana Prijić-Samaržija Preface
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2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Louis Pojman The Moral Case for Institutional Cosmopolitanism
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In this paper I consider both moral and non-moral reasons for world government, what has been called ‘institutional cosmopolitanism’. I first describe several non-moral forces leading to the need for a central international governing body, and then I offer three Moral Arguments for Cosmopolitanism. The main arguments are The Moral Point of View: The Principle of Humanity and the Moral Equality of Persons. I then argue that the case for moral cosmopolitanism together with the non-moral forces leading to globalism support a case for institutional cosmopolitanism.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Mylan Engel, Jr. Taking Hunger Seriously
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An argument is advanced to show that affluent and moderately affluent people, like you and me, are morally obligated: (O1) To provide modest financial support for famine relief organizations and/or other humanitanan organizations working to reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering and death in the world, and (O2) To refrain from squandering food that could be fed to humans in situations of food scarcity. Unlike other ethical arguments for the obligation to assist the world’s absolutely poor, my argument is not predicated on any highly contentious ethical theory that you likely reject. Rather, it is predicated on your beliefs. The argument shows that the things you currently believe already commit you to the obligatoriness of helping to reduce malnutrition and famine-related diseases by sending a nominal percentage of your income to famine relief organizations and by not squandering food that could be fed to them. Consistency with your own beliefs implies that to do any less is to be profoundly immoral.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Nathan Nobis Ayer and Stevenson’s Epistemological Emotivisms
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Ayer and Stevenson advocated ethical emotivisms, non-cognitivist understandings of the meanings of moral terms and functions of moral judgments. I argue that their reasons for ethical emotivisms suggestanalogous epistemological emotivisms. Epistemological emotivism importantly undercuts any epistemic support Ayer and Stevenson offered for ethical emotivism. This is because if epistemic emotivism is true, all epistemic judgments are neither true nor false so it is neither true nor false that anyone should accept ethical emotivism or is justified in believing it. Thus, their perspectives are epistemologically self-undermining and, truthfully, should be rejected. Unlike Ayer and Stevenson, Gibbard explicitly endorses ethical and epistemological emotivism, or expressivism; I criticize his views in detail elsewhere.
articles
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Igor Primorac Patriotism: Mundane and Ethical
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In the first part of the paper I demarcate patriotism from nationalism and layout a typology of patriotism, distinguishing its types or facets in terms of the object of patriotic loyalty, reasons for it, its motive, strength, dominant vicarious feeling, and moral import. Under the last heading, I distinguish between mundane patriotism, which seeks to promote the worldly interests of the patria -- its political stability and power, economic strength, cultural vibrancy, etc. -- and a distinctively ethical type of patriotism, which is concerned with the country’s moral identity and integrity. While mundane patriotism is devoid of positive moral significance, the distinctively ethical type of patriotism is, under certain fairly common circumstances, a stance we ought to adopt. In the second part, I offer several arguments for this claim, and assess their weight and scope.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Gabriele Usberti On the Notion of Justification
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Suppose we are prepared to conceive the meaning of a sentence as a classification criterion which enables us to establish whether something is or is not a justification to believe that sentence. Which properties of the intuitive notion of justification are, from this point of view, essential for believing a sentence? And how might a theoretical notion of justification for a sentence be defined? In Sections 2-5 some properties are suggested as essential, in particular Intentionality (a justification is always a justification for a sentence), Defeasibility (a justification for a sentence A can cease to be a justification for A as new information is received), and Epistemic transparency (a justification for A is not a justification for A unless it is recognized as such by an idealized knowing subject). In Section 6 a sketch of definition is proposed, according to which a justification for a sentence A is a cognitive state in which the subject has at his disposal a certain amount of information, and the hypothesis that A is the best explanation of that information. Section 7 shows how the notion defined escapes a crucial objection to defeasible justifications recently stated by P. Casalegno.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Christopher Cowley Moral Necessity and the Personal
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I claim that the dominant moral-realist understanding of action and moral responsibility cannot provide a comprehensive account of morality since it neglects the irreducibly personal component of the individual’s moral experience. This is not to embrace non-cognitivism, however; indeed, I challenge the whole realist framework of most contemporary moral philosophy. To this end I explore the phenomenon of moral necessity, exemplified by Luther’s declaration that he “has to” continue his protests against the church. I am careful to distinguish this kind of necessity from physical or psychological necessity, from means-end necessity and from the Categorical Imperative, and I suggest that it is far more widespread and far more complex than the realist or non-cognitivist would allow. Thesedeclarations are personal in that they do not entail any necessary universalisability of the judgement; however, their personal nature does not mean that they must collapse into the merely personal realm of whim and preference. Instead, Luther can be said to experience a legitimately objective demand that he behave thus and so, even though others would not experience such a demand in a relevantly similar situation. This irreducible heterogeneity of the moral, I suggest, lies at the heart of the intractability of many moral arguments. My argument can be derived as broadly Wittgensteinian (without being exegetical), and draws on the work of Peter Winch and Bernard Williams.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Jesse Norman Revisiting the ‘Graphical/Linguistic’ Debate
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We seem to have strong intuitions that many visual representations -- such as descriptions, depictions and diagrams -- can be classified into different types. But how should we understand the differences between these representational types? On a standard view, the answer is assumed to lie in the presence or absence of a single property. I argue first that this assumption is undermotivated, and offer a particular two-property analysis, which can be used both to differentiate the various types and to understand better what factors affect changes in classification. This in turn can also be used to capture a core idea of perspicuity, and to ground an argument for the general perspicuity of diagrams as a representational type. Finally, I suggest that two complementary and independently plausible theories bearing on the nature of diagrammatic representation can be located within the suggested two-property approach.
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Neil Levy Epistemic Akrasia and the Subsumption of Evidence: A Reconsideration
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According to one influential view, advanced by Jonathan Adler, David Owens and Susan Hurley, epistemic akrasia is impossible because when we form a full belief, any apparent evidence against that belief loses its power over us. Thus theoretical reasoning is quite unlike practical reasoning, in that in the latter our desires continue to exert a pull, even when they are outweighed by countervailing considerations. I call this argument against the possibility of epistemic akrasia the subsumption view. The subsumption view accurately reflects the nature of reasoning in a range of everyday cases. But, as I show, it is quite false with regard to controversial questions, like philosophical disputes. In these, evidence against our best judgments continues to exert a hold on us. Thus, the claimed disanalogy between practical and theoretical reasoning fails.
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
José Montoya The Sense of Mill’s Early Criticism of Bentham
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The article deals with Mill’s criticism of some important traits of Bentham’s ethical and political philosophy. This criticism, formulated at the time of Bentham’s death or not much later, throws some doubt on the meaning and unity of the utilitarian moral enterprise, and shows how these two utilitarian thinkers disagree on some important points of ethical theory.
book reviews
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Nenad Miščević The Roots of Reason: Philosophical Essays on Rationality, Evolution, and Probability
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12. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Elvio Baccarini Il limite e il ribelle: Etica, naturalismo, darwinismo: (The Limit and the Rebel: Ethics, Naturalism, Darwinism)
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13. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 1
Corrado Del Bò L’etica e la buona morte: Ethics and Good Death
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