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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents


debate with timothy williamson
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Timothy Williamson Anti-Exceptionalism about Philosophy
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I briefly rehearse the positive conception of philosophy in my book The Philosophy of Philosophy, as an introduction to the symposium on it that follows.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Nenad Miščević An Uncomfortable Armchair: Tim Williamson Against Apriorism
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The paper addresses Williamson’s original and challenging proposal for understanding of thought experiments (TEs). First, it puts it on the map of positions, describing it as “ordinarism”, the view that sees thinker’s reaction to the thought-experimental question as nothing extraordinary, let alone mysterious. Then, it passes to Williamson’s proposal to use counterfactuals in order to understand TEs, agrees with the main idea, but proposes a more structured view of capacities or “competences” active in the understanding and answering. Intuitions are important, and they are voice of competencies, at least in the good case. Finally, on the normative level, it argues for the view of justification as being structured, containing both a priori and a posteriori elements.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Majda Trobok Defending Analyticity: Remarks on Williamson’s The Philosophy of Philosophy
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In this paper I concentrate on three issues concerning Williamson’s book The Philosophy of Philosophy: the problem of analytic statements being first-order propositions, the issue concerning aposteriority and the concerns related to the semantic vs. metasemantic distinction.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Are Dispositions to Believe Constitutive for Understanding?
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T. Williamson argues against the thesis he recognizes as one of the inferentialist basic idea that he formulates as understanding/assent link, the claim that the assent to a sentence (believing a thought, at conceptual level) is constitutive for understanding it. This paper aims to show that appropriately articulated dispositional theory, could plausibly account for a weak version of inferentialism.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Timothy Williamson Replies to Trobok, Smokrović, and Miščević on the Philosophy of Philosophy
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I reply to critical discussions by Majda Trobok, Nenad Smokrović, and Nenad Miščević on theses and arguments from my book The Philosophy of Philosophy. I take issue with them on matters such as the following. Should philosophical questions apparently about the world be taken at face value, or are they implicitly metalinguistic or metaconceptual? Are there ‘epistemologically analytic’ sentences that one can understand only if one has a (possibly unmanifested) disposition to accept them? Can ‘philosophical intuitions’ be explained as the products of separable domain-specific competencies?
articles
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Dan López De Sa The Aposteriori Response-Dependence of the Colors
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The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important contrary views are critically discussed in the paper.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Anguel Stefanov The Conundrum of Time Travel
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Time travel is a theme that provokes scientific curiosity, as well as philosophical speculation. The problems it raises, however, are being tackled by science fiction only, and are still not resolved by science either theoretically, or practically. My aim here is, firstly, to present some curious facts about time travel and to have a look at the nature of different ontological constraints confronting time travel; secondly, to outline three cases for which time travel might be meaningfully contended; and thirdly, to defend the “unexpected” claim that human conscious presence in the world is the genuine-and-natural time travel.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Osamu Kiritani Naming and Necessity From a Functional Point of View
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The aim of this paper is to develop a new connection between naming and necessity. I argue that Kripke’s historical account of naming presupposes the functional necessity of naming. My argument appeals to the etiological notion of function, which can be thought to capture the necessity of functionality in historical terms. It is shown that the historical account of naming entails all conditions in an etiological defi nition of function.
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Iris Merkač Parsons’ Mathematical Intuition: a Brief Introduction
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The paper offers one of Parsons’ main themes in his book Mathematical Thought and Its Objects of 2008 (Cambridge University Press, New York): the role of intuition in our understanding of arithmetic. Our discussion does not cover all of the issues that have relevance for Parsons’ account of mathematical intuition, but we focus on the question: whether our knowledge that there is a model for arithmetic can reasonably be called intuitive. We focus on this question because we have some concerns about that.
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Noriaki Iwasa Moral Applicability of Agrippa’s Trilemma
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According to Agrippa’s trilemma, an attempt to justify something leads to either infinite regress, circularity, or dogmatism. This essay examines whether and to what extent the trilemma applies to ethics. There are various responses to the trilemma, such as foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism, infinitism, and German idealism. Examining those responses, the essay shows that the trilemma applies at least to rational justification of contentful moral beliefs. This means that rationalist ethics based on any contentful moral belief are rationally unjustifiable.
book review
11. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 13 > Issue: 1
Joško Žanić A User’s Guide to Thought and Meaning by Ray Jackendoff
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