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Displaying: 1-8 of 8 documents


articles
1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Jiri Benovsky Are We Causally Redundant?: Eliminativism and the no-Self View
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Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Michael T. Stuart Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science
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What role does the imagination play in scientific progress? After examining several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagination does is help to increase scientific understanding, which is itself indispensable for scientific progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental justification of the role of imagination in this process.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin Bayesianism and the Idea of Scientific Rationality
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Bayesianism has been dubbed as the most adequate and successful theory of scientific rationality. Its success mainly lies in its ability to combine two mutually exclusive elements involved in the process of theory-selection in science, viz.: the subjective and objective elements. My aim in this paper is to explain and evaluate Bayesianism’s account of scientific rationality by contrasting it with two other accounts.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Nino Kadić The Grounding Problem for Panpsychism and the Identity Theory of Powers
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In this paper, I address the grounding problem for contemporary Russellian panpsychism, or the question of how consciousness as an intrinsic nature is connected to dispositions or powers of objects. I claim that Russellian panpsychists cannot offer an adequate solution to the grounding problem and that they should reject the claim that consciousness, as an intrinsic nature, grounds the powers of objects. Instead, I argue that they should favour the identity theory of powers, where categorical and dispositional properties are identified. I maintain that the identity theory serves as a better ontological basis for panpsychism since it avoids the grounding problem. Apart from that, I also argue that identity theory panpsychism is a position more parsimonious than Russellian panpsychism since it introduces fewer entities while successfully avoiding the grounding problem. Based on these considerations, I conclude that identity theory panpsychism is an option worth considering.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Adam Świeżyński A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Miracle as a “Supernatural Event”
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The notion of the supernaturality of an event may be understood in various ways. Most frequently ‘supernatural’ means ‘separated from nature’, i.e. different from nature. Thus, what is meant here is the difference in ontological character. The definitions of miracle, present in literature, emphasize the fact that we may talk about a miracle only when the phenomenon takes place beyond the natural order or stands in opposition to it. The description of a miracle as a ‘supernatural event’ contains in itself the reference to that which is natural. The supernaturality of an event means that it surpasses (transcends) naturality. Additionally, this transcendence contains a kind of opposition to that which is natural. However, the miracle as a supernatural event takes place within the scope of that which is natural, although it takes place in a different way from natural events. It seems that this supernaturality may involve two things: (1) the course of the miraculous event; (2) the cause of the miraculous event. We should consider each of them separately and specify what we understand by the supernatural course of the event and by the supernatural cause of the event. If we could prove that we can talk about supernatural events at least in one of the two signaled aspects of supernaturality, then we would be able to define the miraculous event as a supernatural one. The analyses proposed in the paper allow us to formulate the following statement concerning the miraculous event, which is, to a great extent, a critical correction of the traditional way of understanding it: the miracle may be correctly understood as a supernatural event, only when this supernaturality concerns the personal cause of the event and not its course.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Alexandru Volacu Maximization, Slotean Satisficing, and Theories of Sufficientarian Justice
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In this paper I seek to assess the responses provided by several theories of sufficientarian justice in cases where individuals hold different conceptions of rationality. Towards this purpose, I build two test cases and study the normative prescriptions which various sufficiency views offer in each of them. I maintain that resource sufficientarianism does not provide a normatively plausible response to the first case, since its distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of personal good and that subjective-threshold welfare sufficientarianism as well as objective-threshold welfare sufficientarianism committed to the headcount claim do not provide normatively plausible responses to the second case, since their distributive prescriptions would violate the principle of equal importance. I then claim that an objective-threshold welfare sufficientarian view committed to prioritarianism under the threshold offers the normatively plausible response to both cases and therefore resists the challenge raised by scenarios that involve differential conceptions of rationality.
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
José Luis Bermúdez Self-deception and Selectivity: Reply to Jurjako
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Marko Jurjako’s article “Self-deception and the selectivity problem” (Jurjako 2013) offers a very interesting discussion of intentionalist approaches to self-deception and in particular the selectivity objection to anti-intentionalism raised in Bermúdez 1997 and 2000. This note responds to Jurjako’s claim that intentionalist models of self-deception face their own version of the selectivity problem, offering an account of how intentions are formed that can explain the selectivity of self-deception, even in the “common or garden” cases that Jurjako emphasizes.
book discussion
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 1
Rudi Kotnik Possible Uses of Tennant’s Methodology in Secondary Education
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The paper addresses the issue whether Tennant’s textbook Introducing Philosophy, a demanding textbook based on the methodology of Analytical philosophy, can be useful for high school teachers not trained in Analytical methodology. The pedagogical background is presented through a conceptual framework of problematization, conceptualisation and argumentation, and I follow Tennant’s methodology through these three principles. The issue which I discuss is how Tennant’s methodology can help teachers to foster the three analytical abilities in students. I will show how his presentation of topics as content demonstrate his methodology and how particular examples can be used by teachers in secondary education, as well as in introductory university courses in philosophy. If teachers pay attention to this methodology within the content, they can apply it to other topics.