>> Go to Current Issue

Croatian Journal of Philosophy

Volume 17, Issue 2, 2017
On Pejoratives

Already a subscriber? Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-10 of 12 documents

1. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Dunja Jutronić, Nenad Miščević, Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
on pejoratives
2. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Robin Jeshion, Loaded Words and Expressive Words: Assessing Two Semantic Frameworks for Slurs
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I assess the relative merits of two semantic frameworks for slurring terms. Each aims to distinguish slurs from their neutral counterparts via their semantics. On one, recently developed by Kent Bach, that which differentiates the slurring term from its neutral counterpart is encoded as a ‘loaded’ descriptive content. Whereas the neutral counterpart ‘NC’ references a group, the slur has as its content “NC, and therefore contemptible”. On the other, a version of hybrid expressivism, the semantically encoded aspect of a slurring term that distinguishes it from its neutral counterpart is, rather, expressed. A speaker who uses the slurring term references the group referenced by the neutral counterpart and, in addition, expresses her contempt for the target. On this view, while the speaker’s attitude may be evaluated for appropriateness, the expressivist component of slurring terms is truth-conditionally irrelevant. The reference to the group, and only the reference to the group, contributes to truth conditions. I’ll argue that hybrid expressivism offers a more parsimonious analysis of slurs’ projective behavior than loaded descriptivism and that its truth conditional semantics is not inferior to the possible accounts available for loaded descriptivism. I also meet Bach’s important objection that hybrid expressivism cannot account for uses of slurring terms in indirect quotation and attitude attributions.
3. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević, Precis of the Theoretical Part of A Word Which Bears a Sword
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Pejoratives are negative terms for alleged social kinds: ethnic, gender, racial, and other. They manage to refer the way kind-terms do, relatively independently of false elements contained in their senses. This proposal, presented in the book, is called the Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term theory, or NHSKT theory, for short. The theory treats the content of pejoratives as unitary, in analogy with unitary thick concepts: both neutral-cum-negative properties (vices) ascribed and negative prescriptions voiced are part of the semantics preferably with some truth-conditional impact, and even the expression of attitudes is part of the semantic potential, although not necessarily the truth conditional one. Pejoratives are thus directly analogue to laudatives, and in matters of reference close to non-evaluative, e.g. superstitious social kind terms (names of zodiacal signs, or terms like “magician”). A pejorative sentence typically expresses more than one proposition and pragmatic context selects the relevant one. Some propositions expressed can be non-offensive and true, other, more typical, are offensive and false. Pejoratives are typically face attacking devices, although they might have other relevant uses. The Negative Hybrid Social Kind Term proposal thus fits quite well with leading theories of (im-)politeness, which can offer a fine account of their typical pragmatics.
4. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Julija Perhat, Pejoratives and Testimonial Injustice: Precis
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Testimonial injustice is a hot topic in social epistemology. My own work is concerned with pejoratives (in particular, gender pejoratives for women), so in this paper I wish to connect them with such injustice. So, my present topic is testimonial injustice perpetrated by the serious use of pejoratives, in particular, gender pejoratives. It combines two strands: on the one hand, the work on testimonial injustice; and here I shall rely on Miranda Fricker’s work, and on the other hand, my own central area of interest, (gender) pejoratives.
5. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Katherine Ritchie, Social Identity, Indexicality, and the Appropriation of Slurs
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Slurs are expressions that can be used to demean and dehumanize targets based on their membership in racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation groups. Almost all treatments of slurs posit that they have derogatory content of some sort. Such views—which I call content-based—must explain why in cases of appropriation slurs fail to express their standard derogatory contents. A popular strategy is to take appropriated slurs to be ambiguous; they have both a derogatory content and a positive appropriated content. However, if appropriated slurs are ambiguous, why can only members in the target group use them to express a non-offensive/positive meaning? Here, I develop and motivate an answer that could be adopted by any content-based theorist. I argue that appropriated contents of slurs include a plural fi rst-person pronoun. I show how the semantics of pronouns like ‘we’ can be put to use to explain why only some can use a slur to express its appropriated content. Moreover, I argue that the picture I develop is motivated by the process of appropriation and helps to explain how it achieves its aims of promoting group solidarity and positive group identity.
6. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Bianca Cepollaro, Let’s Not Worry about the Reclamation Worry
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I discuss the Reclamation Worry (RW), raised by Anderson and Lepore 2013 and addressed by Ritchie (2017) concerning the appropriation of slurs. I argue that Ritchie’s way to solve the RW is not adequate and I show why such an apparent worry is not actually problematic and should not lead us to postulate a rich complex semantics for reclaimed slurs. To this end, after illustrating the phenomenon of appropriation of slurs, I introduce the Reclamation Worry (section 2). In section 3, I argue that Richie’s complex proposal is not needed to explain the phenomenon. To show that, I compare the case of reclaimed and non-reclaimed slurs to the case of polysemic personal pronouns featuring, among others, in many Romance languages. In section 4 I introduce the notion of ‘authoritativeness’ that I take to be crucial to account for reclamation. In section 5, I focus on particular cases (the “outsider” cases) that support my claims and speak against the parsimony of the indexical account. Finally, I conclude with a methodological remark about the ways in which the debate on appropriation has developed in the literature (section 6).
7. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Nikola Kompa, The Myth of Embodied Metaphor
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
According to a traditionally infl uential idea metaphors have mostly ornamental value. Current research, on the other hand, stresses the cognitive purposes metaphors serve. According to the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor (CTM, for short), e.g., expressions are commonly used metaphorically in order to conceptualize abstract and mental phenomena. More specifically, proponents of CTM claim that abstract terms are understood by means of metaphors and that metaphor comprehension, in turn, is embodied. In this paper, I will argue that CTM fails on both counts.
8. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Guido Melchior, Baseless Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is a commonly held view in contemporary epistemology that for having knowledge it is necessary to have an appropriately based belief, although numerous different views exist about when a belief’s base is appropriate. Broadly speaking, they all share the view that one can only have knowledge if the belief’s base is in some sense truth-related or tracking the truth. Baseless knowledge can then be defined as knowledge where the belief is acquired and sustained in a way that does not track the truth. I will argue that rejecting baseless knowledge leads to controversial consequences. The problem increases if we consider contrasting persons who know because of appropriate belief forming processes but who fail to possess further epistemic virtues such as understanding. I will not argue which belief bases constitute a sufficient condition for knowledge. Rather I will stress the point that the common assumption that an appropriate basing relation constitutes a necessary condition for knowledge has controversial consequences.
9. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
Adelin Costin Dumitru, On the Moral Irrelevance of a Global Basic Structure: Prospects for a Satisficing Sufficientarian Theory of Global Justice
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Many important criticisms to the possibility of global justice are advanced following one or another operationalization of the Rawlsian concept of a basic structure. The purpose of this paper is twofold: i) to show that the existence of a global basic structure is irrelevant from the standpoint of justice; ii) to set the stage for a cosmopolitan theory of global justice that employs satisficing sufficientarianism as a distributive principle. One of the main contentions is that the institutional-interactional cut in the recent literature should be transcended. That is, the site of justice should be extended to incorporate both the efficiency of discharging one’s duties through a just institutional scheme and the moral value of promoting a good state of affairs through one’s own efforts. In order to avoid the overdemandingness objection, however, the selected principles of justice ought to belong to the sufficientarian family. Towards the end of the paper I sketch one such theory, satisficing sufficientarianism.
book reviews
10. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 2
David Grčki, Understanding “I”: Thought and Language
view |  rights & permissions | cited by