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Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volume 30, Issue Supplement, 2000
Moral Epistemology Naturalized

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Displaying: 1-13 of 13 documents


1. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Richmond Campbell, Bruce Hunter Introduction
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moral naturalism and normativity
2. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
David Copp Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective
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3. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Margaret Urban Walker Naturalizing, Normativity, and Using What ‘We’ Know in Ethics
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4. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Louise Antony Naturalized Epistemology, Morality, and the Real World
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5. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Susan Babbitt Moral Naturalism and the Normative Question
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6. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Lorraine Code Statements of Fact: Whose? Where? When?
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biology and moral discourse
7. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Catherine Wilson The Biological Basis and Ideational Superstructure of Morality
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8. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Michael Stingl All the Monkeys Aren’t in the Zoo: Evolutionary Ethics and the Possibility of Moral Knowledge
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9. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Andy Clark Word and Action: Reconciling Rules and Know-How in Moral Cognition
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Recent work in cognitive science highlights the importance of exemplar-based know-how in supporting human expertise. Influenced by this model, certain accounts of moral knowledge now stress exemplar-based, non-sentential know-how at the expense of rule-and-principle based accounts. I shall argue, however, that moral thought and reason cannot be understood by reference to either of these roles alone. Moral cognition -- like other forms of ‘advanced’ cognition -- depends crucially on the subtle interplay and interaction of multiple factors and forces and especially (or so I argue) between the use of linguistic tools and formulations and more biologically basic forms of thought and reason.
10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Paul Churchland Rules, Know-How, and the Future of Moral Cognition
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11. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Andy Clark Making Moral Space: A Reply to Churchland
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12. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Notes on Contributors
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13. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 30 > Issue: Supplement
Index
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