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Displaying: 1-10 of 56 documents


1. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 9
Andrew B. Gustafson Dating, the Ethics of Competition, and Heath’s Market Failures Approach
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In “The Responsibilities and Role of Business in Relation to Society,” Nien-hê Hsieh challenges Joseph Heath’s “market failure” or Paretian approach to business ethics by arguing for a “Back to Basics” approach. Here, I argue that two basics of Hsieh’s three-basics vision are flawed, because a. ordinary morality is in fact not sufficient for the adversarial realm of the market, and b. the ideal of a Pareto-optimal market economy with perfect competition does in fact provide an adequate basis for normative rules against market failures.
2. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 8
Gil Hersch The Irrelevance of Unsuccessful Traders
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Alasdair MacIntyre argues that moral virtues are antithetical to what is required of those who trade in financial markets to succeed. MacIntyre focuses on four virtues and argues that successful traders possess none of them: (i) self-knowledge, (ii) courage, (iii) taking a long-term perspective, and (iv) tying one’s own good with some set of common goods. By contrast, I argue that (i)–(iii) are, in fact, traits of successful traders, regardless of their normative assessment. The last trait – caring about the common good – is often counterproductive in most for-profit ventures, including trading, and so singling out traders is inappropriate.
3. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 7
John Hasnas Corporations and Voting: A Response to Kenneth Silver
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In his thoughtful Commentary on my article, “Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency,” Kenneth Silver incorrectly asserts that I endorse (i) Robert Dahl’s Principle of Affected Interests and (ii) social contract theory. To the extent that Silver’s criticism of my argument is based on the claim that I appeal to either theory as the ground for my claim that corporate moral agency entails a corporate right to vote, it is misguided. I rely only on the Rawlsian equal participation principle that invests those subject to the law with the right to vote. To the extent Silver’s criticism is directed to that assertion, it is on point.
4. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 6
Jason Brennan, Peter M. Jaworski Come On, Come On, Love Me for the Money: A Critique of Sparks on Brennan and Jaworski
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Jacob Sparks critiques our recent work on commodification by arguing that purchasing love indicates one has defective preferences. We argue A) it is possible to purchase these things without having defective preferences, B) Sparks has not shown that acting such defective preferences is morally wrong, C) that Sparks’ misunderstands the Brennan–Jaworski Thesis, and so has not produced a counterexample to it, and finally D) that when we examine the processes by which love is gifted, it is unclear whether these processes should be preferred.
5. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 5
Eric M. Peterson From Intellectual Courage to Moral Courage
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Comer and Schwartz argue that the business ethics course should aim to cultivate moral courage within our students. Essential to their argument is the use of fictional exemplars of moral courage to motivate our students. I argue that the classroom, even when supplemented by good fiction, is not the right context by which to practice moral courage—the habituation of moral courage requires a context of risk. I suggest a virtue that can be practiced in the classroom—intellectual courage. By aiming at this virtue, we will also get the virtue of moral courage.
6. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 4
Kenneth Silver Do I Think Corporations Should Be Able to Vote Now?
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Many proponents of corporate agency take corporations to be responsible for their conduct, but few take them to merit rights over and above the rights of their members. Hasnas (2016) argues that, given a widely-held view of liberal political theory, corporate agency entails that corporations should have the right to vote. In response, I show that there are problems in appealing to liberal political theory, and that the view of voting Hasnas actually endorses need not be accepted. Should it be, however, the implications go far beyond the right to vote.
7. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 3
Abraham Singer Rawls Well That Ends Well: A Response to Welch and Ly
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Welch and Ly register three objections to my argument that the Rawlsian paradigm offers no resources for formulating a normative theory of corporate governance. In this brief response, I note that while I agree with the first of these objection, I don’t think it poses any serious trouble to my argument; the other two objections, on the other hand, I am less convinced by. I then offer two alternative strategies for bringing Rawls to bear on business ethics, which don’t involve trying to apply his principles of justice to the corporation. Finally, I conclude with a reflection on why people are so insistent on talking about Rawls in the first place.
8. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 2
Jacob Sparks Can’t Buy Approval: A Response to Taylor
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James Stacey Taylor claims that my argument in “Can’t Buy Me Love” is both incomplete and doomed to fail. I grant some of Taylor’s points, but remind him that semiotic objections to the commodification of certain goods are strongest when we think not about individual market transactions, but about what it means for a society to support the market in question.
9. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 6 > Issue: 1
Matthew Caulfield The Expressive Functions of Pay
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Jeffrey Moriarty argues that unequal pay for employees who do the same work is not necessarily wrong, but can be wrong if it is discriminatory or deceptive. Moriarty does this in part by stressing that pay should be considered primarily as a price for labor and therefore that our views on price discrimination and unequal pay should mirror each other. In this critique, I argue that Moriarty fails to adequately account for the expressive functions of pay. A pluralist view of pay reveals otherwise overlooked normative concerns regarding pay and cautions against adopting too strong of an analytical connection between price discrimination and unequal pay.
10. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 5 > Issue: 8
Jacqueline Boaks, Michael P. Levine How Much Aristotle Is in Levine and Boaks’s Leadership Theory?: Response to Schäfer and Hühn
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While accepting and welcoming our main thesis and project, Schäfer and Hühn’s Commentary on our paper focuses on two main criticisms, both of which seem to us mistaken. The first of these is that our paper falsely argues “that the existing definitions of leadership out there fall short in describing the role of ethics in leadership.” The second seems to be a belief that (i) we claim to be offering an entirely new definition of leadership and misrepresenting its nature because (ii) in the view of Schäfer and Hühn this supposedly new definition “is essentially un-Aristotelian.”