Already a subscriber? Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Displaying: 1-10 of 43 documents


1. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 5 > Issue: 4
William Kline, Exploitation and Just Price Theory
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Schleper, Blome, and Wuttke attempt to use just price theory to define exploitation. According to the authors, a competitive market equilibrium defines a just price. When certain asymmetries in bargaining power exist, trading at any lower price constitutes unethical exploitation. I argue that a competitive market equilibrium does not provide a price that could be considered just by their own standards, and thus fails to ground a theory of exploitation.
2. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Jeffery Smith, Why Justice Matters for Business Ethics
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In a recent critique of the so-called “market failures approach” (MFA) to business ethics Abraham Singer maintains that business firms have ethical responsibilities to voluntarily restrain their profit-seeking activities in accordance with the demands of justice. While I ultimately share Singer’s intuition that the MFA has overlooked the importance of justice in business ethics, I argue that he has not presented a fully adequate case to explain why justice-related responsibilities should be assigned to business firms. I conclude by offering a brief – and supportive – alternative to his position.
3. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Theodora Welch, Minh Ly, Rawls on the Justice of Corporate Governance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Abraham Singer argues that Rawlsian theories of justice cannot apply to corporate governance and business ethics. On Singer’s view, Rawls regards business corporations as voluntary associations outside of the basic structure, which is the only site where justice applies. In this comment, we show the importance of Rawlsian theory to central questions of corporate governance. The corporation should be considered part of the basic structure, because it is part of society’s system of productive social cooperation. Rawls' proposal for a property-owning democracy also raises crucial corporate governance issues concerning the proper owners of the firm, and the separation of ownership and control.
4. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Abe J. Zakhem, Kierkegaard and Leadership Theory, a Radical Reappraisal
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Storsletten and Jakobsen (2015) try to integrate the instrumental, responsible, and spiritual positions in leadership studies with Kierkegaard’s aesthetic, ethical, and religious modes of existence. Their combination of leadership theory and Kierkegaardian thought, however, seems deeply problematic. In particular, the instrumental-aesthetic and responsible-ethical connections appear weak or at least significantly underdeveloped, and the spiritual-religious connection seems logically inconsistent.
5. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 10
David Silver, Competition, Value Creation and the Self-Understanding of Business
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In defense of his Market Failures Approach to business ethics Joseph Heath relies on an understanding of business as essentially oriented towards competition and profit maximization. In these remarks I defend an alternative understanding of business that is centered on the creation of valuable goods and services. It is preferable because it: (a) creates less pressure to take advantage of vulnerable stakeholders, (b) can readily recognize “beyond compliance” norms that do not relate to efficiency, (c) provides a more meaningful framework for people who work in and with corporations, (d) may mitigate negative moral impacts outside the market, and (e) better captures the range of what actually counts as business activity.
6. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 9
Jason Brennan, Peter Jaworski, I’ll Pay You Ten Bucks Not to Murder Me
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
James Stacey Taylor offers three interpretations of our thesis, and argues that only one of them goes through. His point is to clarify our view rather than critique our position. In this brief response, we argue that, upon further clarification, we could endorse at least one of the other interpretations, though as Taylor notes, we don’t need to for our book’s thesis to go through.
7. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 8
Jeffrey Moriarty, The Demands of Stakeholder Theory for Corporate Governance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Aimee Barbeau advances a thoughtful critique of my article, “The Connection Between Stakeholder Theory and Stakeholder Democracy: An Excavation and Defense.” Although Barbeau does much to push forward the debate about corporate governance, she does it without undermining my thesis. For what Barbeau has shown is not that stakeholder theorists should not endorse stakeholder boards of directors, but that they should also endorse other ways for stakeholders to participate in decision-making processes within firms.
8. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 7
James Stacey Taylor, What Limits Should Markets be Without?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In Markets Without Limits Brennan and Jaworski defend the view that there are “no legitimate worries about what we buy, trade, and sell.” But rather than being a unified defense of this position Brennan and Jaworski unwittingly offer three distinct pro-commodification views—two of which are subject to counterexamples. This Commentary will clarify what should be the thesis of their volume and identify the conditions that any counterexample to this must meet.
9. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 6
Aimee E. Barbeau, Deliberative Democracy and Corporate Governance
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Jeffrey Moriarty argues for a return to a robust notion of stakeholder theory involving direct procedural voting by stakeholders. He asserts that such voting offers the best possible chance of restraining firm behavior and taking into account all stakeholder interests. I argue, however, that Moriarty proceeds with an overly narrow conception of democracy, ignoring problems that arise from procedural voting. Specifically, paradoxes in voting procedures, the tyranny of the majority, and the inefficacy of representation advantage well-organized and moneyed interests. A stakeholder democracy may in fact undermine the very interests that Moriarty seeks to promote.
10. Business Ethics Journal Review: Volume > 4 > Issue: 5
Christian R. Thauer, The Choice for CSR: Strategic Rationale versus Values?
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In a recent Commentary, Hamish van der Ven criticizes my strategic rationale-based approach to why firms decide to adopt and implement CSR standards. He argues that my approach is analytically flawed; rather than strategic rationale, values motivate firms in favor of CSR. In this response, I explain why I disagree with his criticism and approach. I maintain that strategic rationale, not values, drive firms’ decision-making for CSR.