Already a subscriber? Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 15 documents


articles
1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Caery Evangelist Aquinas on Being and Essence As Proper Objects of the Intellect
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This article investigates a tension among Aquinas’s basic claims about what constitutes the proper object of the human intellect. Aquinas asserts that the mindhas only one proper object, yet he repeatedly endorses two different candidates for this role: the being of a thing (ens) and a thing’s essence (essentia). One might assume the tension disappears if ens signifies the essence of a thing. Alternatively, the tension seems to dissolve if each operation of the intellect (apprehension and judgment) takes its own object (essence and ens respectively). Although each approach effectively hides the tension from immediate sight, neither genuinely resolves it. This is because neither sufficiently accounts for the features of simplicity and priority Aquinas claims our “first conception of being” must have. Alternatively, I suggest how we might mitigate this tension by treating the intellect itself as having its own proper object (ens) and apprehension as having another (essence).
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Christopher Stephen Lutz Alasdair MacIntyre’s Tradition-Constituted Enquiry: An Alternative to Relativism and Fideism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This essay examines relativist and fideist challenges to Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory of rationality by reading some of MacIntyre’s more recent works in thecontext of his earlier work in the philosophy of religion, Marxism, and the philosophy of the social sciences.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Gert-Jan van der Heiden Announcement, Attestation, and Equivocity: Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic Ontology between Heidegger and Derrida
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics provides us with an important and original account of the meaning and the implications of the “ontological turn” that has taken place in hermeneutics since Heidegger’s work. By means of the pair ontologisation and hermeneutisation, which is borrowed from Jean Grondin, this paper examineshow Ricoeur rethinks the relation between being and language. Distancing itself from Nancy’s critique of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, this paper first shows thatRicoeur’s hermeneutic ontology should not be understood as a “secondary” form of hermeneutics. Rather, it provides us with a critical revision of Heidegger’s “primordial” hermeneutics that is centered on the notion of announcement. Secondly, it shows how, by this revision, Ricoeur does not only develop an alternative to Heidegger’s accounts of announcement and attestation, but also to Derrida’s account of equivocity.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Timothy Perrine Envy and Self-worth: Amending Aquinas’s Definition of Envy
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers an adept account of the vice of envy. Despite the virtues of his account, he nevertheless fails to provide an adequatedefinition of the vice. Instead, he offers two different definitions each of which fails to identify what is common to all cases of envy. Here I supplement Aquinas’saccount by providing what I take to be common to all cases of envy. I argue that what is common is a “perception of inferiority”—when a person perceives her ownself-worth to be inferior to another and thereby feels her own self-worth diminish. By incorporating perceptions of inferiority into the definition of envy, we obtain adefinition that retains the spirit of Aquinas’s thought, while improving upon its letter.
discussion: personal identity
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Christopher Tollefsen Some Questions for Philosophical Embryology
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
A philosophical embryology should have three concerns: first, it should describe the realities discovered by embryology and developmental biology ata higher level of generality than is achieved by those disciplines, and it should integrate this more general representation with philosophy’s other more generalconcepts. Second, it should answer philosophical questions raised by the study of embryological development if, as I believe, there are some. And third, it mustbe prepared to engage in a philosophical dialectic with those whose general representations work with a different set of concepts, or who answer philosophicalquestions differently, or who dispute the boundaries between the scientific and the philosophical. In this essay, I identify a number of questions that belong to thedomain I am identifying as “philosophical embryology,” and discuss the answers I think are indicated by sound philosophy and biology.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
David B. Hershenov Soulless Organisms?: Hylomorphism vs. Animalism
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
It is worthwhile comparing Hylomorphic and Animalistic accounts of personal identity since they both identify the human animal and the human person.The topics of comparison will be three: The first is accounting for our intuitions in cerebrum transplant and irreversible coma cases. Hylomorphism, unlike animalism, appears to capture “commonsense” beliefs here, preserves the maxim that identity matters, and does not run afoul of the Only x and y rule. The next topic of comparison reveals how the rival explanations of transplants and comas are both at odds with some compelling biological assumptions. The third issue deals with our practical concerns, most notably, the possibility of an afterlife. It turns out that the hylomorphic treatment of Purgatory raises the spectra of the “too many thinkers” problem and some considerable unfairness. Contrary to expectations, an animalist insistence on uninterrupted bodily continuity between this life and the next does not involve deceptive body snatching.
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Michael Gorman Personhood, Potentiality, and Normativity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
The lives of persons are valuable, but are all humans persons? Some humans—the immature, the damaged, and the defective—are not capable, here and now, of engaging in the rational activities characteristic of persons, and for this reason, one might call their personhood into question. A standard way of defendingit is by appeal to potentiality: we know they are persons because we know they have the potentiality to engage in rational activities. In this paper I develop acomplementary strategy based on normativity. We know that the humans in question are persons because we know that lacking the here-and-now ability to engage in rational activities is—for them, unlike for tulips or kittens—a falling-short of some norm. Their personhood, in other words, is established on the basis of their being subject to the norm of having those here-and-now capacities.
book reviews
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Romanus Cessario, O.P., Justin Marie Brophy, O.P. Good and Evil Actions: A Journey Through St. Thomas Aquinas
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
Helen Tattam Phenomenology: An Introduction
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 85 > Issue: 3
James D. Madden The Agnostic Inquirer: Revelation from a Philosophical Standpoint
view |  rights & permissions | cited by