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Displaying: 1-15 of 15 documents


articles
1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Stan R. Tyvoll Anselm’s Definition of Free Will: A Hierarchical Interpretation
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Anselm defines free will as “the ability to keep uprightness of will for the sake of uprightness itself ” rather than as the ability to sin or not sin. I fulfill two objectives pertaining to his definition. First, I show that his definition should be interpreted as a hierarchical account of free will, one that emphasizes the idea that an agent’s will is free if she is able to have the will she wants to have. The interpretationis based on Anselm’s hierarchical account of the structure of the will. Secondly, I show that Anselm’s theory of ultimate responsibility, when added to the hierarchical interpretation of his definition, provides an answer to one of the primary objections to the hierarchical approach to free will.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Merold Westphal Aquinas and Onto-theology
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For Heidegger, onto-theology is the use of abstract, impersonal categories under the principle of sufficient reason that has one goal and two results. The goal is to make God fully intelligible to human understanding. The results are the disappearance of mystery from our understanding of God and the loss of any religious significance for the “God” that results. I argue that Aquinas is not guilty of onto-theology because his use of abstract, impersonal categories is subsumed (aufgehoben, teleologically suspended) in his use of personal categories and because his doctrine of analogy retains mystery in our understanding of God.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
John Milbank The Thomistic Telescope: Truth and Identity
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The following essay explores the way in which notions of truth are linked to those of secure identity and hence to certain mathematical issues, from Plato and Aristotle onward. It argues that this recognition underlies traditional resorts to notions of form or eidos as securing both particular and general identity—at once the integrity of things and the link among things. I contend that nominalism rightly saw that there were certain problems with this notion in terms of the strict application of the logical law of identity and the recognition of the “artificial” character of human understanding. However, I also argue that the most extreme fulfillment of the nominalist program after Frege itself ran foul of the law of identity because of the paradoxes of set theory. In the face of this double impasse I press for a re-configured Thomistic realism, taking account of the insights of Nicholas of Cusa that would abandon the ultimacy of the law of identity as paradoxically the only way to save identity and so truth, and would admit that the passage to the recognition of universals lies through the human creative construction of universals. Realism can still be saved here because in the Divine Son or Logos, in whom human reason participates, divine ideas are at once made and seen.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
James McEvoy The Theory of Friendship in Erasmus and Thomas More
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The foundation of humanist friendship and its purpose lay in the sharing of the Christian faith accompanied by the love of classical letters. The ideas of Erasmus concerning friendship are best developed in his Adagia, and thus in relationship to the ancient proverbs on the subject. The approval given by him to the classical, humanistic ideal of noble, virtuous, equal, and lasting friendship contrasts with Thomas More’s traditional conception of friendship which derived directly from Christian sources. More held that the experience of friendship is a partial anticipation of the secure friendship of heaven, where we may hope that all will “be merry together”—not just our friends in this life but our enemies too.
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Vincent Colapietro Tradition, Dialectic, and Ideology: Contemporary Conflicts in Historical Perspective
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The task of philosophy is examined in reference to the actual circumstances of academic philosophy, principally in the United States. The author challenges the still prevalent tendency to conceive academic philosophy as an affair split into two camps—most often identified as analytic and Continental philosophy. Moreover, he proposes a distinctive understanding of the dialectical approach to philosophical query, one attuned to the traditional character of the relevant alternatives and also to the ideological dimension of contemporary disputes, but not one necessarily undertaken for sake of resolving disagreements or achieving consensus. The very goals animating the process of working through substantive, methodological, and other differences (in a word, animating dialectic) are themselves critical foci of an ongoing process open not only to question but also alteration: the aims of query are being continuously transformed or redefined in course of this undertaking. In proposing this understanding of dialectic, he draws heavily on the examples of Richard J. Bernstein, John McCumber, and especially John E. Smith. Finally, the author offers an example of how such an approach can be effectively eliminated, even by an individual who in almost every other respect is an exemplary philosopher. If (as John Courtney Murray, S.J., asserts) civility “dies with the death of dialogue,” philosophy can live only by the continual renewal of genuine dialogueacross diverse traditions.
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Michael J. Brogan Science of Being, Science of Faith: Philosophy and Theology According to Heidegger
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This essay is a critical investigation of Heidegger’s insistence on the absolute difference between philosophy, defined as fundamental ontology, and theology, understood as the “ontic” “science of faith.” Focusing primarily on two important works from 1927, “Phenomenology and Theology” and Being and Time, I argue that the distinction between the two disciplines begins to blur in light of the circular character of hermeneutical understanding as Heidegger himself describes it. Ontology, he concedes, has ontic roots in the authentic self-understanding of Dasein. I maintain that this understanding involves an interpretive decision that, lacking the pure phenomenological rationality Heidegger attributes to it, looks much like the faith he would banish from philosophy.
review article
7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Dermot Moran Adventures of the Reduction: Jacques Taminiaux’s Metamorphoses of Phenomenological Reduction
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In his illuminating Aquinas Lecture Jacques Taminiaux offers a bold interpretation of certain contemporary European philosophers in terms of the way in which they react to and transform Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. He highlights issues relating to embodiment, personhood, and value. Taminiaux sketches Husserl’s emerging conception of the reduction and criticizes certain Cartesian assumptions that Husserl retains even after the reduction, and specifically the assumption that directly experienced mental acts and states are not given in adumbrations but present themselves as they are. Heidegger too does not escape a certain Cartesian dualism with his privileging of the individual authentic self over and against the inauthentic das Man. Taminiaux portrayspost-Heideggerian philosophy (specifi cally Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas) as responding to failures or dualisms haunting Husserl’s reduction. Taminiaux is right to insist on the importance of the reduction in Husserl and also, despite appearances, in Heidegger, but it is not clear that the meditations of Arendt, Jonas, and Levinas can really be seen as responding to failures in the reduction. Furthermore, Taminiaux downplays the centrality of Husserl’s commitment to transcendental idealism and his representation of the epochē and reduction as ways of breaking through the natural attitude to reach the transcendental attitude of the non-participating spectator.
book reviews
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Siobhan Nash-Marshall Personalist Papers
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9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
James McGuirk Ambiguity in the Western Mind
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10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Glenn Chicoine Husserl and Stein
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11. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Philipp W. Roseman Philosophie Hat Geschichte, Vol. 2: Theorie der Philosophiehistorie
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12. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Joseph W. Koterski Faithful Reason: Essays Catholic and Philosophical
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13. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Lance Byron Richey The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus
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14. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
John F.X. Knasas The Sacred Monster of Thomas: an Introduction to the Life and Legacy of Reginal Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.
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books received
15. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 80 > Issue: 2
Books Received
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