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Displaying: 1-10 of 17 documents

1. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Andrew J. Jaeger Back to the Primitive: From Substantial Capacities to Prime Matter
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We often predicate capacities of substances in such a way so as to modify the way that they exist (e.g., the barbell has the capacity to bend). However, sometimes a capacity is not for the modification of a substance but for the existence of one. Moreover, we have reason to think that these capacities are just as real as other capacities. If that’s right, then the question arises: if these capacities (for the existence of substances) are real features in the world, what they are real features of? Part I argues that they can’t be capacities of substances, and so they must be capacities of some part of substances. Part II argues that they can’t be capacities of the substance’s integral/substantial parts. Part III argues that a possessor of such capacities would have to be a lot like prime matter in not being characterized by substantial forms.
2. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Daniel D. De Haan Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts
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This paper aims to establish some of the taxonomical groundwork required for developing a robust philosophy of perception on the basis of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power (vis cogitativa). The formal object of the cogitative power will be divided into aspectual, actional, and affectional percepts. Accordingly, the paper contends that there is an internal sense power capable of a non-conceptual and pre-linguistic perceptual estimation of what some particular is, what could be done with respect to it, and what is to be done with respect to it. The argument begins with a synopsis of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. It then presents an extensive taxonomical analysis of three different kinds of cogitative percepts. This analysis is followed by a short exegetical defense of the threefold division of percepts. Finally, the essay concludes with a comparison of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power with recent work in the philosophy of perception.
3. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Anthony D. Traylor Vorhandenheit and Heidegger’s Predicament over Being-In-Itself
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For a number of years now, commentators have tried to make sense of Heidegger’s claim in § 43 of Being and Time that being is dependent on Dasein by interpreting this to mean that, for Heidegger, being is equivalent to Dasein’s “understanding” of being or the act of rendering beings “accessible.” I argue that such idealist readings fail and that a more plausible alternative is available. My interpretation centers on a phenomenological retrieval of the notion of Vorhandenheit or presence-at-hand as the unspoken presupposition of both Heidegger’s account of the being of entities independent of Dasein and that of the being of Dasein itself. I enlist key passages from Heidegger’s early lecture courses in support of my reading of Heidegger as not only a realist when it comes to beings but being as well.
4. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Roger Teichmann The Voluntary and the Involuntary: Themes from Anscombe
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More light is thrown on the voluntary/involuntary distinction by considerations concerning actual or possible reasons than by ones concerning possible-doing-otherwise (or possible prevention), or by ones concerning causal powers, of the agent or of mental states. An example of Anscombe’s of the “physiologically involuntary” shows how being voluntary under a description can be a matter, not of anything true at the time, but of the background circumstances, whose relevance can be seen in answers given by the agent to various “Why?” questions. The notion of possible prevention is relevant because of the way in which answers to “Why didn’t you prevent/stop that?” can reflect on a person’s general orientation of will. The sense in which someone’s actions themselves embody a weighing of practical reasons is discussed; as is the force and function of “It didn’t occur to me” as an explanation of not-doing (including not-preventing).
5. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Dries Deweer Mounier and Landsberg on the Person as Citizen: The Political Theory of the Early Esprit Movement
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This article sheds light on the political theory of the Esprit movement and its main theoreticians of the period 1931–1950, Emmanuel Mounier and Paul-Ludwig Landsberg. The Esprit movement saw the need for a personalist democracy, which is defined as a political system which fosters the individual human being’s ability to discover and realize their personal vocation. The sustainability of this type of democracy is not only dependent on a constitution based on checks and balances, but especially on a vigilant and active citizenry that rein in institutional political power. The personalists of Esprit remind us that politics concerns everyone. Mounier and Landsberg may have focused on the dark side of politics—the power play, oppression and pretence of democracy—but recognized that politics was necessary to build and safeguard a framework that centers on the development of human persons.
discussion: lonergan and hegel
6. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Robert E. Wood Discussion: Lonergan and Hegel: Introduction
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7. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Mark D. Morelli Lonergan’s Reading of Hegel
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Lonergan is commonly read, sometimes favorably and sometimes unfavorably, through a Thomist lens. But the evidence suggests that Lonergan was interested in Hegel before he undertook his studies of Aquinas and that his interest in Hegel persisted throughout his intellectual career. Lonergan regarded Hegel’s absolute idealism as “the halfway house” on the way to his own critical realist position. His effort to establish his critical realism was informed and guided by a struggle with Hegel’s absolute idealist response to Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Lonergan scholars who hope to understand adequately Lonergan’s critical realist position would do well to give more serious attention to his early and perduring relationship to Hegel.
8. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Michael Baur Lonergan and Hegel on Some Aspects of Knowing
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Twentieth-century Canadian philosopher Bernard J. F. Lonergan and nineteenth-century German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel regarded themselves as Aristotelian thinkers. As Aristotelians, both affirmed that human knowing is essentially a matter of knowing by identity: in the act of knowing, the knower and the known are formally identical. In spite of their common Aristotelian background and their common commitment to the idea that human knowing is knowing by identity, Lonergan and Hegel also differed on a number of crucial points. This essay discusses some key similarities and differences between Lonergan and Hegel on the issue knowing, in the hope that such a discussion might uncover a few possible avenues for further philosophical dialogue about these two important thinkers.
9. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Martin J. De Nys Hegel and Lonergan on God (With a Nod to Kierkegaard)
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Hegel and Lonergan both make important contributions to the contemporary task of developing philosophical considerations of God within the context of a philosophy of religion. Hegel maintains that philosophy must both present knowledge of God as God is in godself, and present an account of God’s involvement with the human community. One accomplishes this two-sided task, Hegel believes, through the philosophical appropriation of the religious representation. If this appropriation is rightly understood, there is little in it to which Longern should object, and a great deal that he might endorse, given his own views about the relation between philosophy of religion and philosophy of God. At the same time, Lonergan would rightly object to what at times seems at least to be Hegel’s annulment of religious mystery, and the claim Hegel sometimes seems to make that the cognitive achievements of philosophy result in a sublation of the existential concerns of religion. Lonergan argues for positions that make possible important corrections of these problems.
10. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 88 > Issue: 3
Robert E. Wood The Notion of Being in Hegel and in Lonergan
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The notion of Being is central to Hegel as the beginning of the System and to Lonergan as what first arises in the mind. They both ask: how must the cosmos and human society be structured so that rational existence and flourishing are possible? Hegel claims to show the necessarily interlocking set of conditions. Logos-logic underpins the realms of Nature and Spirit that together limn the space of free individual existents. For Lonergan the notion of Being orients us toward the Whole of the proportionate universe, and toward the Transcendent Cause. Inquiry moves from things present to us in sensation to ever broader explanatory modes of things in relation to one another. Through insight, ways of construing the Whole are formed and reformed. Things, scientific systems, and social systems are not static but are on the move in the universe that has the form of emergent probability.