Already a subscriber? - Login here
Not yet a subscriber? - Subscribe here

Browse by:



Displaying: 1-10 of 27 documents


presidential address
1. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
James F. Ross Together with the Body I Love
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Philosophical difficulties with Augustine’s dualism, and with the scholastic “separated souls” account of the gap between personal death and supernatural resurrection, suggest that we consider two other options, each with its own attractions: (i) that the General Resurrection is immediate upon one’s death, despite initial awkwardness with common piety, and (ii) that there is a “natural metamorphosis” of bodily continuity after death and before resurrection.
presentation of the aquinas medal
2. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Dominic J. Balestra Presentation of the Aquinas Medal
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
aquinas medalist's address
3. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Richard J. Blackwell The Human Genome and the Mind-Body Problem
view |  rights & permissions | cited by
plenary sessions
4. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Edwin M. Curley The Immortality of the Soul in Descartes and Spinoza
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I examine the thought of Descartes and Spinoza regarding the immortality of the soul. I conclude that Descartes’s argument(s) for the immortality of the soul—or at least the argument(s) that one can construct based on Descartes’s texts—are disappointing, and that Spinoza’s thought on the soul and its relation to the body leaves little room for the traditional doctrine of personal immortality.
5. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Marilyn McCord Adams Ockham on the Soul: Elusive Proof, Dialectical Persuasions
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I argue that Ockham’s seemingly pessimistic epistemological assessments of what we can know about the human soul and its relation to the body reflect a sound appreciation of what is involved in the theoretical development of philosophy and natural science. In order to make my argument, I first undermine the idea that demonstration was a norm that scholastic disputation regularly expected to achieve; and second, I examine Ockham’s treatment of three major topics in psychology (thus illustrating how alternative intellectual standards were in play in scholastic disputation).
6. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Alfred J. Freddoso Good News, Your Soul Hasn’t Died Quite Yet
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
In this paper, I observe that Hobbesian physicalism on the one side, and Cartesian dualism on the other, have had a widespread cultural influence on the way we regard ourselves and on the way we behave toward one another. I argue that what we now need is a conceptual space within which we might forge a metaphysical alternative, an alternative that will give us some hope of overcoming the deleterious intellectual, moral, and social consequences of both physicalism and dualism.
session 1
7. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Mark Amorose Aristotle’s Immortal Intellect
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Recent scholarship understands Aristotle to hold that the human intellect is in part corruptible and in part immortal. The main textual support claimed for this understanding is De Anima III.5, where Aristotle, it is said, presents his doctrine of an immortal active intellect and a mortal passive intellect. In this paper I show that Aristotle distinguishes at III.5 not an active and a passive intellect, but an agent and a potential intellect, both immortal. I further show that the mortal passive intellect mentioned at the end of III.5 is an analogous use of the term intellect, and refers to imagination, the act of a corruptible bodily organ, here called intellect only because it supplies the images from which intellect abstracts concepts.
8. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Carl N. Still Do We Know All after Death? Thomas Aquinas on the Disembodied Soul’s Knowledge
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper examines Aquinas’s epistemological treatment of the disembodied soul in order to reveal (1) its relationship to the person it once was, and (2) the nature and extent of its self-knowledge. I argue first that disembodiment entails not only loss of personhood, but severe restriction of one’s concept of self. Consequently, individual self-consciousness is minimized. By contrast, I argue that the soul’s knowledge of its nature is likely to be realized more perfectly in the separated state, not so much because of freedom from the body as the infusion of pure intelligibles. Thus, the roles of these two types of self-knowledge (particular and universal) are reversed from the case of the embodied soul, where self-consciousness is an effortless concomitant to thought and self-knowledge requires a painstaking labor. I conclude by wondering whether the cognition enjoyed in the separated state has some utility for the soul’s future, re-embodied existence.
session 2
9. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Bernardo J. Cantens A Solution to the Problem of Personal Identity in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
This paper presents a solution to the problem of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics. I argue that Professor Gracia’s solution to the problem of personal identity, existence, and Professor Stump’s solution, form or the human soul, are not only compatible but also necessarily interdependent on one another. This argument rests on (1) the special nature of the human soul, and (2) the metaphysical claim that for Thomas the human soul and existence are inseparable. First, I refine the problem of personal identity and briefly clarify some important distinctions. Second, I present Gracia’s arguments for the principle of existence (esse) being the criterion of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics. Third, I explain Stump’s arguments for form being the principle of personal identity over time in Thomas’s metaphysics, and show how Stump’s solution can answer some of the objections that Gracia presents. Finally, I argue that, according to Thomas, the soul of an individual human person and that person’s existence embrace one another with the strength of self-identity, and that it is correct and not inconsistent to say that both the human soul and existence are the cause and principle of personal identity over time in the metaphysics of Thomas.
10. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 75
Silas Langley Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity
abstract | view |  rights & permissions | cited by
Aquinas’s understanding of bodily resurrection can take two different directions. Either continuity of the soul alone is sufficient to reconstitute the same body as the pre-mortem body at the resurrection, or continuity of the matter of the pre-mortem body is also required. After arguing that Aquinas’s account of personal identity over time requires sameness of soul and sameness of body, I suggest that Aquinas’s two possible views on bodily resurrection are consistent with this account of personal identity and are both plausible views for Aquinas to take. I then defend the possibility of the view that requires material continuity against certain objections which come from within Aquinas’s own philosophies of form, matter, and the elements. But the result is that Aquinas cannot consistently hold that material continuity hinges on the preservation of numerically the same material elements as the pre-mortem body.