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Displaying: 1-10 of 29 documents


presidential address
1. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
William Desmond It Is “Nothing”—Wording the Release of Forgiveness
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presentation of the aquinas medal
2. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Thérèse-Anne Druart Introduction of the Aquinas Medalist Professor David B. Burrell, C.S.C.
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aquinas medalist’s address
3. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
David Burrell, C.S.C. Postmodern Aquinas: With Attention to Aquinas’s Relation to Scotus: Language or Logic
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plenary sessions
4. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
John Milbank The Ethics of Honour and the Possibility of Promise
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5. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Cyril O’Regan Forgiveness and the Forms of the Impossible
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6. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Richard Kearney Forgiveness at the Limit: Impossible or Possible?
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session 1
7. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Bernard G. Prusak What Kant Reconstructed Brings to Aquinas Reconstructed; Or, Why and How the New Natural Law Needs to Be Extended
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The thesis of this paper is that the new natural law has reason to try to integrate Kant’s ethics, not reject it. My argument breaks into two parts. First I provide a critical account of the new natural law, taking as my exemplar of this theory Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis’s 1987 article “Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends.” My criticism in the end is that the new natural law is vulnerable to much the same criticism that Boyle has made of Alan Donagan’s Kantian ethics. For the new natural law, the trouble will be specifying the basic goods. Here “compromise, intuition, or decision” appears inescapable. The second part of the paper briefly outlines what “Kant reconstructed” has to bring. The Kant that I advocate is not exactly Donagan’s; but my Kant shares with Donagan’s a patience for more than one reasonable position on disputed moral questions.
8. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
John F. X. Knasas Aquinas: The Desire to Love and the Religion Possibility
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Among Thomists the standard practice is to show the openness of human nature to beatitude from the speculative side. The intellectual desire to know the richness of the notion of being, the ratio entis, becomes the desire to know the creator who as esse subsistens embodies the intelligible heart of being. I want to try the same strategy but from the practical side. I believe that more people experience a desire to love than a desire to know. Few have noticed that Aquinas’s first practical principle “Good ought to be done” is, as I will explain, a call to be respectful and solicitous of ourselves and others as intellectors of being. Hence, fidelity to this principle illustrates a connection between being and love so that the greater is the concentration of being, then the greater is the concentration of love. A subsistent instance of being should be a subsistent instance of love. In his metaphysics Aquinas attains the creator as subsistent being. Hence, contact with that instance would strengthen in an unparalleled way the human’s fidelity to the first practical principle. Does this contact in fact occur? That philosophical question raises the religious possibility. In its parade of saints, Christianity provides tantalizing evidence that that contact is realized.
session 2
9. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Gaëlle Fiasse Forgiveness and the Refusal of Injustice
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This paper focuses on the act of forgiveness understood as an act which involves the recognition of injustice. Its goal is to answer to Arendt, who equates the realm of forgiveness with the possibility of punishment, to Derrida, who limits forgiveness to the unforgivable actions in order to highlight its unconditionality, and to Jankélévitch, who insists that the culprit’s repentance is an indispensable condition to forgiveness. By contrasting forgiveness, retaliation, and resignation, I emphasize that forgiveness implies attributing blame for injustice, but I distinguish this from the sphere of punishment. Secondly, by showing how self-esteem is necessary for the victim and the offender, I underline the significance of the culprit’s avowal. These two elements lead to the distinction between inner forgiveness, which entails a superabundant act and an element of unconditionality, and integral forgiveness, which requires the culprit’s repentance in order to be exchanged by two people.
10. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association: Volume > 82
Karen D. Hoffman Forgiveness without Apology: Defending Unconditional Forgiveness
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In the following paper, I argue that, although there are conditions that the injured person must satisfy in order to be properly said to have forgiven a wrongdoer, it is a mistake to believe that there are conditions that the wrongdoer must satisfy in order for it to be morally permissible to forgive her. Against arguments that a wrongdoer should only be forgiven if she has met specific conditions, I maintain that unconditional forgiveness may be a morally appropriate response to being wronged.After discussing what it means to forgive someone and examining two attempts to defend unconditional forgiveness (by appealing to respect for persons and to human solidarity), I appeal to Søren Kierkegaard’s Works of Love to argue for a different reason to forgive unconditionally: because one loves the wrongdoer and wants to convey that love, perhaps in the hope that doing so will inspire repentance and apology.