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1. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4

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2. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Roger Fjellstrom

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I critique Peter Singer’s view that equality across species is a natural extension of equality. Singer presents one minor and two major arguments. The first major argument is that equality across species is implied by the traditional principle of equality. The second is that it follows from a conception that is behind the principle of equality, namely the moral “point of view of the universe.” The minor argument is a theory of the altruistic character and expanding circles of ethics.
3. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Peter Lucas

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Andrew Light and Eric Katz commend environmental pragmatism as a framework of choice for a more pluralistic, and (consequently) more practically effective environmental ethics. There is however a prima facie conflict between the promotion of pluralism and the promotion of pragmatism. I consider two different routes by which Light has attempted to resolve this conflict. Light’s first strategy involves distinguishing philosophical from metaphilosophical forms of pragmatism, locating its “metatheoretically pluralist” potential in the latter. I argue that the distinction collapses, leaving the conflict unresolved. Light’s second strategy involves interpreting metatheoretical pluralism as a form of practical compatibilism. I argue that metatheoretical pluralism, thus interpreted, holds no remedy for the perceived practical ineffectiveness of the field. Not only would it fail to qualify as a viable form of pluralism, but its widespread adoption would actively undermine the real work of environmental ethics: that of fostering a senseof the special significance of enlightened and principled action in defense of environmentalist ideals, in the face of the consequentialism which dominates global environmental decision making.

discussion papers

4. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Kenneth B. Peter

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Thomas Jefferson’s argument against long-term debt and his theory of usufruct are used to show why each generation is obligated to protect the independence of future generations. This argument forms the theory of “Jeffersonian generational independence.” The theory has wide implications for the environmental movement because most environmental problems result in limitations on the liberty of future generations. I compare and defend Jeffersonian generational independence from two alternatives including the investment theory raised by James Madison and the problem of generational interdependence raised by John Passmore or Edmund Burke. When the obligation to protect the independence of future generations is taken seriously, liberalism can no longer reasonably be used to defend environmental exploitation, since such exploitation amounts to an attack on the liberty and independence which form its core values.
5. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Peter S. Wenz

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Some anthropocentrists, such as Bryan Norton, claim that intergenerational anthropocentrism provides the best rationale for protecting biodiversity. Some nonanthropocentrists, such as J. Baird Callicott and Eric Katz, disagree. In the present paper, I analyze different varieties of anthropocentrism, argue for adopting what is here called multicultural anthropocentrism, and then advance the following thesis of environmental synergism: combining multicultural anthropocentrism with nonanthropocentrism enables synergists to argue more cogently and effectively than either anthropocentrists or previous nonanthropocentrists for policies that both protect biodiversity and maximize long-term welfare for human beings as a group.
6. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Susanne E. Foster

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There are three potential problems with using virtue theory to develop an environmental ethic. First, Aristotelian virtue theory is ratiocentric. Later philosophers have objected that Aristotle’s preference for reason creates a distorted picture of the human good. Overvaluing reason might well bias virtue theory against the value of non-rational beings. Second, virtue theory is egocentric. Hence, it is suited to developing a conception of the good life, but it is not suited to considering obligations to others. Third, virtue theory is notoriously bad at providing rules and procedures for resolving ethical questions about particular circumstances. But environmentalists need procedures for determining which of several conflicting values is most important. Virtue theory is not action guiding. I respond to each of these problems. I show that virtue theory is uniquely suited to answering ethical questions about nonhuman animals and the environment.

book reviews

7. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
David Boonin

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8. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Ronald P. Morrison

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9. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
Gary Backhaus

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10. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4
John Lemons

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index

11. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4

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referees

12. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 4

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13. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Bart Gruzalski

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Vinay Lal raises doubts about Gandhi’s status as an environmentalist but argues that Gandhi had “a profoundly ecological view of life.” I take issue with Lal’s claims and, to set the record straight, describe Gandhi’s contributions to environmental though and action. When we look at the aims of contemporary environmental spokespersons and activists, Gandhian themes are dominant. Gandhian biocentrism and Gandhi’s recommendation not to harm even nonsentient life unnecessarily are familiar in contemporary environmental thinking. Gandhian non-violence is both a technique of environmental activists and, for some, one of the constituents of the world for which they struggle. Gandhi emphasized simple living, an important theme for many who are concerned about looming ecological crises. Taking a broader perspective, Gandhi criticized what we today call globalization and encouraged, in its place, the decentralization of economic activities. Gandhi’s emphasis on decentralization and local economic self-reliance led to the Chipko movement in India. Gandhi’s emphasis on small-scale economies, on self-reliant communities, and on appropriate technology paved the way for the “small is beautiful” approach. Gandhi’s recommendation that we live in self-reliant rural communities, if implemented, would significantly decrease that consumption which is causing climate change and straining the capacity of the planet.
14. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Yuriko Saito

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In recent decades, designers, architects, and landscape architects concerned with their contribution to today’s ecological problems started formulating a new way of designing and creating artifacts. Called “ecological design” and promoted as a corrective alternative to conventional practice, its basic tenet is to draw from nature a guidance for design, rather than imposing our design on nature. This newapproach signifies a welcome change, first by calling attention to the ecological implications of artifacts, a subject matter generally neglected in environmental ethics, and, second, by providing useful, specific suggestions regarding the ecologically responsible way of designing artifacts. However, the conceptual basis and resultant implications of ecological design deserve and need critical analyses. I argue that the basic premise of ecological design—that nature should act as the authority—is problematic by examining analogous strategies from social, political, moral, and aesthetic realms, as well as by exploring its specific application in the promotion of “native” plants in gardens. I end with another issue often neglected in the practice of ecological design: our aesthetic response to the created objects.
15. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Neil A. Manson

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In part one, I identify the core logical structure of the precautionary principle and distinguish it from the various key concepts that appear in the many different formulations of the principle. I survey these concepts and suggest a program of further conceptual analysis. In part two, I examine a particular version of the precautionary principle dubbed “the catastrophe principle” and criticize it in light of its similarities to the principle at work in Pascal’s Wager. I conclude with some suggestions for advocates of the precautionary principle who wish their formulation to avoid the pitfalls confronting the catastrophe principle.

discussion papers

16. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
J. Douglas Rabb

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I critique the oppressive society in which Michael A. Fox’s Deep Vegetarianism was written and which Fox too attempts to criticize and change. Fox proves himself to be among a handful of Western philosophers open-minded enough to acknowledge and attempt to learn from North American indigenous values and world views. For this reason, he should be commended. In defending his thesis that a vegetarian life style is morally preferable, he draws upon indigenous thought, feminist philosophy, and antidomination theories, arguing that speciesism, racism, and sexism can all be traced back to the same mind-set of oppression, domination and exploitation. Unfortunately, identifying the oppressive mind-set is not ipso facto escaping it. I show that Fox in his explication and use of indigenous thought actually perpetuates the very oppression and exploitation he argues against.
17. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Eric Moore

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I argue that the equal rights views of Tom Regan and Evelyn B. Pluhar must be rejected because they have unacceptable consequences. My objection is similar to one made in the literature by Mary Anne Warren, but I develop it in more detail and defend it from several plausible responses that an equal rights theorist might make. I formulate a theory, a moderate form of perfectionism, that makes a valuedistinction between moral agents and moral patients according to which although both have rights, these rights are not equal. This theory avoids the unacceptable consequences of the equal rights view and is immune to the marginal cases arguments that typical full-personhood theories succumb to. This moderate perfectionism generates an obligation for people to be vegetarians (in most cases) and to severely curtail animal experimentation.

book reviews

18. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Donald A. Brown

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19. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Lise Sedrez

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20. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 24 > Issue: 3
Jennifer Baker

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