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Displaying: 1-11 of 11 documents


1. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Michael McGann

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While supporters argue that exemptions are needed to equalize opportunities, critics claim they are unwarranted in principle and discriminatory in practice: equal treatment requires only facial neutrality whereas exemptions treat citizens unequally insofar as individuals with idiosyncratic commitments similarly burdened by general rules are rarely given an exemption.The upshot of this critique is that the burdens of cultural and religious commitments ought to be treated as expensive tastes. I argue that religious and cultural commitments cannot be reduced to expensive tastes that can be revised in the face of resource expectations and that, for this reason, opportunities are not equal when minorities must choose between adherence to such commitments and availing of valuable opportunities, when members of more dominant communities need not. I also explain why treating religious and cultural commitments in this way does not entail the adoption of a primordial view of culture that puts these commitments beyond revision and choice.

2. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Adam Kadlac

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There is a puzzle about how we might sensibly love someone as the particular person she is despite changes in that person’s characteristics that are sometimes radical. In light of this puzzle, I argue that our most intimate relationships are centered around historical relational properties that serve two important functions. On the one hand, they render individuals irreplaceable to us. On the other, they constitute individuals as the particular persons they are. If this account is plausible, then to love another because she is the person she is is not to love her because of her characteristics. Rather, it is to love her in light of a unique history that cannot be shared with anyone else and has made her who she is.

3. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
James Gledhill

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Political realists like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss reject political moralism, where ideal ethical theory comes first, then applied principles, and politics is reduced to a kind of applied ethics. While the models of political moralism that Williams criticizes are endorsed by G.A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin respectively, I argue that this realist case against John Rawls cannot be sustained. In explicating and defending Rawls’s realistically utopian conception of ideal theory I defend a Kantian conception of theory where it is by abstracting from immediate realities that theory is fit to guide practice by providing a framework for political judgment.

4. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Peeter Selg

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The article sets out to initiate a dialogue between two normative conceptions of democratic society, overwhelmingly depicted as irreconcilable by the partisans of each position: the political liberalism of John Rawls and the radical democracy of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The paper argues that both approaches share the same underlying ethos in envisioning society (called the “the ethos of contingency” in the paper) informing Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of radical democracy and hegemony, as well as Rawls's view of justice as fairness conceived in terms of reciprocity with its accompanying idea of public reason and reflective equilibrium.

5. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Claudio López-Guerra

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This article advances three claims. The first is that the standard instrumentalist case for minimal age and sanity requirements for voting is weak and inconclusive in such a way that the evaluation of such requirements should be made exclusively on the basis of procedural fairness considerations. The second claim is that fairness requires the inclusion of all and only those persons who have the franchise capacity: the minimum necessary cognitive and moral powers to experience the benefits of enfranchisement. The third and final claim is that current age and sanity prerequisites for voting in most places fail to comply with the demands of fairness and ought to be revised.

6. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Nicholas John Munn

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This article examines the setting of the ages of criminal and participatory responsibility, noting that criminal responsibility is attributed significantly earlier than is participatory responsibility. I claim that the requirements for participatory responsibility are less onerous than those for criminal responsibility, and question the system that denies youth participatory responsibility. I suggest two methods of resolving this difficulty. First, lowering the voting age to enfranchise the capable youth who are currently excluded. Second, modeling criminal responsibility on the Australian doctrine of doli incapax, which gives provisional immunity from the prosecution to youth between ten and fourteen years of age.

book reviews

7. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Benjamin Hale

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8. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Christopher F. Zurn

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9. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Robert Noggle

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10. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Serena Olsaretti

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11. Social Theory and Practice: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1

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