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1. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Caleb Miller

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I propose a theory of moral obligation that is inspired by the way obligation has been understood in the Anabaptist tradition. I use the resources of the theory to explain and defend the appropriateness of the Anabaptist claim that Christian ethics is unique. I also use the theory to show that some of the standard objections to Christian pacifism, the most visibly distinctive feature of Anabaptist ethics, are misplaced when pacifism is understood as an application of the theory I defend. Finally, I suggest some theological and theoretical advantages this theory.
2. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Eric Reitan

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In this paper, I argue that the some of the most popular and influential formulations of the Argument from Evil (AE) assume a moral perspective that is essentially consequentialist, and would therefore be unacceptable to deontologists. Specifically, I examine formulations of the argument offered by William Rowe and Bruce Russell, both of whom explicitly assert that their formulation of AE is theoretically neutral with respect to consequentialism, and can be read in a way that is unobjectionable to deontologists. I argue that, in fact, this in not the case. Finally, I look at the implications of the consequentialist assumptions of AE for theodicies based on free will.
3. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Mark D. Linville

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The traditional doctrine of human dignity has fallen on hard times. It is said that that doctrine is “speciesist to the core” and “the moral effluvium of a discredited metaphysics.” Those of us who would defend the view that humans enjoy greater moral standing than nonhuman living things must answer the question, “What’s so special about humans?” In this paper, I argue that moral agency is a great-making property that confers special worth on its bearer.
4. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Nicholas Everitt

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In a number of places, Richard Swinburne has defended the logical possibility of perception without a body; and has inferred from this logical possibility that substance dualism is true. I challenge his defence of disembodied perception by arguing that a disembodied perceiver would not be able to distinguish between perceptions and hallucinations. I then claim that even if disembodied perception were possible, this could not be used to support substance dualism: such an inference would be either invalid or question-begging.
5. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Theodore Guleserian

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The traditional theistic philosopher is committed to hold that God has a perfect will essentially, and that this is better than having a free will. It will be argued that God, being omnipotent, would have the power to create creatures who also have a perfect will essentially. This creates a problem for the traditional theist in solving the problem of moral evil. The problem of actual moral evil will not then be solvable by reference to the value of our moral freedom, in accordance with the Free Will Defense. This favors the view that moral freedom is an excellence in both man and God.
6. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Charles J. Klein

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I present an argument which is related to the ontological argument which has a more plausible premise and a weaker conclusion. I assume two postulates concerning the meaning of ‘x creates y’. I then prove that the proposition possibly, something (non-vacuously) creates everything entails, in quantified S5, that there is a necessarily existing object with creative power - an object which creates all (and some) contingently existing objects in some possible world.

essay review

7. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John Hare

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book reviews

8. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John J. Davenport

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9. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
John Dupré

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10. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Dan D. Crawford

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11. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3
Robert Pasnau

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notes and news

12. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 17 > Issue: 3

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