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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 25
林火旺
Huo-Wang Lin
Can religious minorities reject the state-sponsored education?
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自由主義的政治理想是在承認多元和差異的前提下,如何建 構一個穩定的社會,所以自由社會是一個包容多元的社會,但是 自由主義民主政治所能包容的差異是否有其限度?為了建構一 個穩定包容的自由社會,自由主義政府必須進行公民教育,以培 養自由社會公民其有容忍差異的基本德行,因此適度的公民教育 似乎是維持社會穩定和諧的必要工作。然而由於公民教育的對象 是自由社會所有的成員,這對一些不以“容忍"為主要德行的少 數社群和宗教團體而言,自由主義的公民教育會危及其信仰的存 績和社群的發展,在自由主義容忍原則之下,這些宗教上的少 數,可否拒絕政府的公民教育?本文針對這個問題的各種解答提 出討論和評估,最後引進史賓勒的“部分公民"概念處理這個實 踐上的問題。
The political ideal of liberalism is to construct a stable society on the assumption that there are different and contradicting views about a good life. Presumably a liberal society tolerates and even celebrates differences and diversity. But is there a limit on liberal toleration? It seems obvious that in order to accomplish a stable and tolerating society, liberal state has to ensure all of its members acquire some virtues (especially toleration) necessary for the health and proper operation of the society. Therefore, itseems civic education for all members is inevitable. However, within a liberal society there are illiberal (religious) minorities who neither celebrate toleration, nor do they favor diversity. As a matter of fact, any form of civic education sponsored by the liberal state will undermine their ways of life and threaten their survival. Can they, therefore, refuse the kind of civic education imposed on them by the state? Various answers to this question are examined and evaluated in this article, and Jeff Spinner's idea of “partial citizen" is introduced as an adequate solution to this practical Issue.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2002 >
Issue: 25
蔡信安
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
On Virtue and Principle in Mencius
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孟子哲學是以「善」為目的, r 德行」為行為動力來源, r 原 貝」 是行為抉擇時的手上的參考原則, 依效益主義者的思維模式 的哲學o這種哲學是可以應用在人生的各個層面,從政治領袖到 販夫走卒都需要的。他認為最主要的,就是培養「德行」 '就一 切可以促成。最主要的德行是,仁、義、l禮、智。在這四種之中,仁與義 是道德德行,禮與智是輔助性的增強性德行。它們相對應產生的 原則,是行為抉擇時的參考原則,雖然它們其有客觀有效性,但 不是不可被凌駕的。這是一種「道德客觀主義」 '不是「道德絕 對主義」。取捨的原則是依「效益原則J '以「善」為目的去做的。 「善」不是指某一個個物,而是具有「可欲J性」的性質之事 物。孟子用「可欲」來詮釋人類追求的對象之性質,指出它在整 個行為抉擇過程中,德行與原則都是工具,唯有「善」才是目的。這種「善」應該指的是存在於這一個宇宙內,是人人都會了解而 且喜愛的、也跟人息息相關的存在。這是一種實在論的自然主義 的倫理學。
Virtue and principle are two important subjects in Mencius's ethics. This paper deals with them from viewpoint of ethics of virtue and of principle. The author indicates that Mencius' four virtues, i.e. hearts of compassion, of shame, of courtesy and modesty, and of right and wrong are universal human endowments and essential to human life. There are four “principles" derived from them. That is , “jin" , “yi" , li" and “ chu." The first two are essential ethical virtues while the others enabling ones. The author contends that Menciusian ethics is consequentialistic. Mencius believes his principles have universal and objective validity. But they are overridable. Moral agent has to choose a correct principle in the particular moral or political context by the principle of utility. This is a kind of utilitarian moral reasoning that is ignored by most of interpreters.Moreover, Mencius is a naturalistic and realistic moral philosopher. “The good" is defined by “that is desired." But he conceives that good is a kind of property in thing itself being perceived by human being. In fact, what the good is is not an issue in his philosophy. But it is important to moral reasoning since it is dependent up the principle of utility.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2002 >
Issue: 25
孫效智
Hsiao-Chih Sun
Judeo-Christian Ethics and the Autonomy of Motivation
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一般人多半認為,宗教信仰能提升道德動機,強化道德意 識。然而,宗教批判者卻抱持不同的想法。他們認為,宗教徒行 善往往是為了追求功德或進天堂,這不但不是真正的道德動機,還會使得動機慘染了雜質,而不再真有道德的純淨性。宗教信仰 究竟會提昇抑或扭曲道德的動機?這正是本文所欲探討的主題。本文的論述主要是以西方宗教信仰及宗教批判者之間的對 話為場域。實則,類似的對話以不同方式也可見於宋明以來各種 儒釋或儒道的辯論。首先先解釋動機「自律」與「他律」概念,作為進一步討論的基礎。接下來將從宗教批判者的角度以及西方 宗教的義理,來指出猶太基督宗教信仰在某些意義上的「他律」 性。第三部分將探討宗教對動機自律的肯定與強調,儘管宗教倫 理因著利己主義而有他律的色彩。最後一部份是整合性的反省。關鍵的問題是:在宗教倫理中,利己與利他、自律與他律是否能夠統整?
While it is generally reckoned that religious beliefs can reinforce or purify our intentions in moral respect, some religious critics believe the opposite. According to them, religious people do good deeds not just for the sake of the good but also, if not more so, for the reward they may have in the future. Associated with the idea of deserts, religion seems to encourage heteronomous rather than autonomous motivations behind good actions. Whether this criticism is justifiable in the Judeo-Christian context is the main issue of this article. The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, the ideas of autonomy and heteronomy are introduced as a basis for further discussions. Secondly, the opinions and arguments of significant religious critics are presented and examined as we tackle with the question whether or not and to what extent Judeo-Christian religion is heteronomous. In the following part, it is shown that Judeo-Christian religion has a long tradition of respecting motivational autonomy even though it affirms the idea of deserts in the eschatological sense of paradise or hell in afterlife. The last partof the article deals with the possibility of integrating selfand other-regarding interests, or, integrating motivational autonomy and heteronomy, in thedomain of religious ethics.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2002 >
Issue: 25
趙之振
Chi-Chun Chiu
On Blind Realism
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阿梅達( Robert Almeder) 的盲目實在論主要有三點主張:放棄真理符應說,我們仍然可以知道外在世界之存在;我們具有關於世界的正確信念;但我們卻無法指出哪些信念是正確的。本文之目的,便是要檢視阿氏為其盲目實在論所提出的論證。一方面,我們試圖指出:阿的論證。一方面,我們試圖指出:阿證'是基於對裴爾士( Pe i rc e )的誤解;而且論證本身也是站不住腳的。另一方面,阿氏對第二點主張的論證是不足的,而且即使他對它的證明是成立的,也與他的第三點主張不相容o因此,盲目實在論是不成立的。
The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the following main theses of Almeder's blind realism: (TI) Even if we abandon the correspondence theory of truth, we would still know that there is an external world. (T2) At any time, some of our presently completely authorized beliefs about the external world must correctly describe the external world. (T3) We cannot justifiably pick out which of our presently completely authorized beliefs do correctly describe the external world. I try to show that Almeder's argument for T1 is based upon his misunderstanding of Peirce's well-known Harvard experiment and it also fails to support T1. Moreover, T2 is not well elaborated and, even worse, incoherent with T3.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2002 >
Issue: 25
Jih-Ching Ho
何志青
推演論,概念論,及社會實踐論
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How do our minds grasp the world? The nlajor task in explaining the relation between mind and the world is to indicate how facts, experiences, and judgments stand in justificatory relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation between mind and world: inferentialism, conceptualism, and social pragmatism. These three theories differ from the traditional foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in that they no longer attempt any analysis of the epistemic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic practices. In this paper, I will first examine the debate between inferentialism and conceptualism, a debate involving Sellars, Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom. I will show that both inferentialism and conceptualism have difficulties in giving a complete account of empirical justification and that their difficulties can be remedied only by resorting to some social pragmatisnl notions such as the social development of conceptual capacities and the social recognition of cognitive performance.
我們的心智如何掌握世界?最近之相關哲學論述的主要關 懷是要指出事實、經驗和判斷之間具有某種證成之關係。本論文 檢視三個經驗證成之理論:推演論、概念論及社會踐行論。此三 理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及可靠論,在於它們不企圖對 知識論概念(如「知識」和「理據J )提供抽象之分析;這些新 興理論深受維根斯坦之影響,強調知識概念與「語言踐行」之密 切關連。本文首先說明推演論與概念論之間的論爭,釐清其主要 論證和反駁,最後展述社會踐行論,並指出其對推演論與概念論 之修正及補強。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 25
Francisco Calvo Garzon
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Gareth Evans produced a powerfulline of argument against Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evans argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories a la Quine are an easy prey for Evans' considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans' criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy" and the friend ofconnectionism, I shall contend that the Quinean has nothing to fear from a classical reading of Evans' considerations.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2002 >
Issue: 25
陸敬忠
Jing-Jong Luh
The Principle of Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics--The Historicality of Understanding and the Hermeneutical Circle
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本文主旨在於對高達美哲學詮釋學理論核心部分跟根本原 理、亦即其基本預設或基設一此有理解之歷史性,特別是由其 發展底第一個理論核心要素一「詮釋學循環」一進行文本的 詮釋及系統內在性義理初探。〈真理與方法〉論述底中心部分, 即第二部分後半部〈一種詮釋經驗底理論之諸基本特質) ,為高 達美哲學詮釋學底理論構思核心。高達美首先由海德格式「理解 之循環」發展出其自身的「詮釋學循環」為其哲學詮釋學的首要 理論核心要素及其主導思路。本文對此進行闌釋之結構如下:壹﹒哲學詮釋學底首要基設一理解之歷史性:海德格底「事 實性詮釋學」及高達美之基設性攝納;先綜觀高達美攝納海德格 式此有理解底歷史性為其哲學詮釋學首要基設之義理性脈絡。貳﹒詮釋學循環之為理解前結構:高達美對海德格式理解循 環底哲學詮釋學性轉化;基於海德格所揭示此有理解的歷史性之 為哲學詮釋學首要基設,高達美導入以此為本之詮釋性循環,作 為理解底「前結構J '並對海德格式理解循環作轉化性發展:此 循環不再以此有在其存有中理解自身之存在性深層結構為主,而 是在精神科學層面上平實化為日常生活中及學術性的文典理 解。雖然在高達美之論述中潛藏若干理論性問題,他在文典理解 之具體經驗脈絡下所描述的不斷在理解中發生的詮釋性循環,不但指出由閱讀、理解文典者底「前設想」至對實理性意義之滲入 而導致迴向先設想並修正底類循環過程,更提示出由歷史性出發 之主導思路:先讓人意識到理解者底前結構,以梅被理解者之實 質事理呈顯自身。參幢以詮釋學循環為出發點之哲學詮釋學闡證思路;基此發 展其哲學詮釋學理論基本特徵'亦即描述文本理會經驗之為詮釋 學性基本現象底理論性語言及其闡證思路。
The goal of this essay is to give a textual interpretation and a comprehensive system-inherent analysis of the basic principle of the theoretical core from Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, that is, to explore the historicity of understanding of “Dasein ", especially the first crucial element of this hermeneutical theory, the hermeneutical circle. The central part of Truth and Method, “Rudiments of a Theory of Hermeneutical Experience", is the core of the theoretical exposition of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. He begins this part by transforming his fIrst theoretical element, the “hermeneutical circle", from Heidegger's “circle of understanding", and then develops this to the basic thought pattern of his hermeneutical thinking. This essay examines the following main points from this part of Truth and Method:1. The primary ground-presupposition of the philosophical hermeneutics; that is the historicality of understanding, Heidegger's “hermeneutics of facticity" and Gadamers presuppositional absorption of it. First, this essay looks over the system-inherent context of Gadamer's ontological adoption of Heidegger's historicity of understanding of Dasein as the first presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics.2. The “hermeneutical circle" as the “forest ructure" of understanding, i.e., Gadamer's philosophical-hermeneutical transformation of Heidegger's “circle of understanding". On the basis of Heidegger's historicity of understanding as the primary Presupposition of philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer introduces the “circle of understanding" from Heidegger's Being and Time, and transforms it to his own theory of a “hermeneutical circle" as the “forestructure" of understanding. This circle concentrates no longer on the existential depth-structure of the Dasein's understanding of itself in its Being, but first picks out the understanding of text in the ordinary “lifeworld" or academic activity on the horizon of human science as a central theme. Although there are some implied theoretical problems in Gadamer's exposition, he describes the ever-present hermeneutical circle in the phenomenon of understanding as the concrete context of experience of “text-reading" . He points out the quasi-circular process that starts from the fore-projection of the text-reader to the penetration into the meaning of matter-of-factness in text, and leads to this new understanding, which finally repulses the fore-projection and corrects it. With this, he discloses the orienting pattern of his philosophical hermeneutics: first the awareness of the forestrucuture of understanding, and then the revelation of the matter-of-factness of the subject of understanding itself.3. The hermeneutical circle as the starting point of the exposition of philosophical hermeneutics. From this Gadamer develops the essential features of his hermeneutical thought, i.e. the description of the experience of “text-understanding" as the theoretical language and approach for the fundamental phenomenon of hermeneutics.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 25
Chung-Chi Yu
游涼祺
舒茲論純粹我們關條
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An inquiry into the “pure we-relationship" in Schutz is attempted. In his early major work The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz regards the “pure we-relationship" as the ultimate foundation of the social world. Because of the confusion with “concrete we-relationship," its meaning remains misunderstood among many interpreters. While this concept is rooted in “Thou-orientation" and is regarded as formal concept without any content, Schutz is criticized for having taken up an idealistic and egocentric position in his social theory. I find it is deficient to defend Schutz by reference to the lifeworld theory that he develops in late thought. Instead , I suggest that we might save him from such criticism by introducing the “mutual tuning-in relationship."
本文旨在探討舒茲的「純粹我們關係」概念,本文的出發點 在於認識到此概念往往被當作「具體我們關係」而導致其涵義未 能被適切的理解。本文指出,舒茲將「純粹我們關係」奠定在「對 你態度」之上,並視之為「極限概念J '亦即將它當作無任何具 體內容的抽象概念,而且主張它是任何社會關係的最終基礎。此 一論述導致理念化與自我中心化的批評。本文指出,舒茲此一觀 點在晚期的生活世界論述中依然保留,並試著指出此一概念所導 致的批評或許可以藉由「相互準備投入關係」來加以化解。
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