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Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 1

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Displaying: 1-18 of 18 documents


1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík

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2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík

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articles

3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák

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Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák

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The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence of God. However, this seems to be wrong.
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík

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The doctrine put forth by G. Frege and now almost universally accepted, according to which a predicate expressing a relative notion has to be supplemented by two (or more) subjects, in order for a statement to arise, appears to be a source of certain difficulties. In the paper, the author defends the view that this doctrine goes against our natural understanding of language, and shows that as soon as an attempt to determine the extension of such “relative” predicates is made, a contradiction in the doctrine is laid bare.
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Jiří Polívka

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In Ordinatio I, 39 Scotus distinguishes two ways in which the distinction between sensus compostionis and sensus divisionis can be made: According to the first way the „composition and division“ relates to two different (sensus divisionis) or one and the same (sensus compositionis) instants of time; according to the other the distinction is made between an assertion of compossibility of the contradictory predicates in one and the same instant of time (sensus compositionis) and an assertion of actuality of the one and possibility of the other of the contradictory predicates in one and the very same instant of time (sensus divisionis). The author presents a formal logical analysis of all these various senses of modal propositions and shows how Scotus strictly separated modality from temporality, and contingency from mutability.
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Michal Chabada

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The problem of the intuition of the individual as such, i. e. of its individuality (the „principle of individuation“) gave rise to many controversies. The problem becomes especially urgent in the light of the Christian revelation, since Christianity in the first place relates to the singular and individual (and therefore contingent), whereas the universal assumes only a secondary rôle. John Duns Scotus deals with this theologico-philosophical problem and sets out to defend intellective intuition of the individual as a whole. He distinguishes three kinds within this type of cognition: perfect intuitive intellective cognition which is possible only in patria, direct but imperfect (i. e. not penetrating the principle of individuation) intuitive intellective cognition which relates to contingent truths and spiritual acts, and, finally, imperfect and indirect intuitive intellective cognition, i. e. acts of recalling the past intuitive cognitions. In these three examples the fundamental Scotus’s arguments are exhibited and the extent to which Scotus transgresses the limits of Aristotelian epistemology is made clear.
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Daniel Heider

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The article examines the first fruit of Leibniz´s philosophical endeavour, which is his baccalaureate thesis Disputatio metaphysica de Principio Individui, on thebackground of the comparison with Suárez´s conception of individual unity in his Disputationes Metaphysicae. Despite Suárez´s more differentiated attitude to the issue of individuation in general, the author is convinced that one can find strong parallels between both authors, namely the following: purely ontological treatment of the problem of the principle of individuation; search for a single principle which is common both to material and nonmmaterial substances; nominalist tendency, which is apparent not only in the positive statements of the two authors, but also in their criticisms of rival solutions in general, and theScotist conception in particular. The similarities are not limited only to the principle of individuation or to the problem of individual unity in general but they also extend to the problem of the distinction between essence and existence, the conception of transcendental unity and its relation to ens, or to the problem of reification of hylemorphic components of material substances.

translations

9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
M. J. Loux

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10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Anthony Kenny

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discussions

11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík

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12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Petr Dvořák

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13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Lukáš Novák

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editions

14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík, Joannis Caramuel Lobkowitz

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reviews

15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Pavel Materna

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16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Tomáš Nejeschleba

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17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Miroslav Kuric

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18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1/2
Stanislav Sousedík

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