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Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 12, Issue 1, 2015

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Displaying: 1-4 of 4 documents


articles

1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Vlastimil Vohánka

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I discuss Josef Seifert, a realist phenomenologist, and David Oderberg, an Aristotelian. Both endorse essences, understood as objective quiddities. Both argue that no (a posteriori) law of nature is strongly (metaphysically) necessary: i.e. true in every possible world. But they disagree about weak necessity of laws: Seifert argues that no law is true in every possible world in which its referring expressions are non-empty, while Oderberg argues that some (indeed, any) is. I restate, relate, and review reasons of both authors for each of those theses. Seifert’s reasons include God’s ability to do miracles, conceivability of counterinstances to laws, and many others. Oderberg’s reasons include dependence of laws on particulars, depiction of laws as truths about properties necessarily connected with essences, and explanation of persistent regularities by means of that necessary connection. I argue that no reason of either Seifert or Oderberg is convincing, as its stands. But I also argue that given God and his ability to do miracles, the idea of “meaningful” but non-necessary connection between essences — an idea endorsed but insuffi ciently utilized by Seifert — is a better essentialist explanation of persistent regularities. This explanation implies that no law is necessary, be it weakly or strongly.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Hanke

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Martin Le Maistre’s Tractatus consequentiarum presents an analysis of self-reference based upon the principle that sentential meaning is closed under entailment. A semantics based on such principle off ers a conservative treatment of self-referential sentences compatible with the principle of bivalence and classical rules of inference. Le Maistre’s crucial arguments are formally reconstructed in the framework recently defended by Stephen Read and Catarina Dutilh Novaes as part of an analysis of Bradwardinian semantics.

reviews

3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Michael Sullivan

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4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Peter Forrest

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