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Studia Neoaristotelica

A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism

Volume 12

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Displaying: 1-15 of 15 documents


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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Martin Cajthaml

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The aim of the article is to compare and critically evaluate Kant’s, Aristotle’s, and von Hildebrand’s approach to the question of the moral accountability of emotions. Notoriously, Kant, in his practical philosophy, leaves hardly any place for the moral value of emotions. The only emotion that he acknowledges to possess a moral value is “Achtung für’s Gesetz”. According to Aristotle, emotions can be object of praise and blame in so far as they are formed by good or bad habits (moral virtues and vices). Von Hildebrand, not objecting to this approach of Aristotle, off ers a fi ne phenomenological analysis of how a “morally conscious” person modifi es emotions while experiencing them by either “sanctioning” or “disavowing” them. This analysis implies that emotions can be morally good or bad in still diff erent sense than the one considered by Aristotle.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
David Peroutka

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According to compatibilism it is possible that an election or volition of A is truly free even if the elector cannot want – ceteris paribus – the opposite alternative (non-A). The version of compatibilism propounded in the paper is “rational” in so much as the admitted unidirectional determining factors of volition are not physical causes but rather rational reasons. We may posit this compatibilism only in case of volitions that we assess to be morally good (since moral obligation to decide diff erently implies real possibility of such diff erent volition, according to “Kantian” dictum). Particularly interesting – within the ethical sphere – is the case of moral commitment, because it constitutes a kind of necessity (obligation). Such a moral necessity (when appropriately cognized by a moral agent) may imply a certain necessity of a corresponding choice. The theory of rational compatibilism allows us to unite moral necessity and human freedom.
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Miroslav Hanke

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The so-called “Trinitarian paralogisms” are apparently legitimate instances of syllogistic inference-schemes with premises and conclusions containing expressions of the language of the Trinity doctrine, which fail to be truth- or acceptability-preserving. The logical problem of the Trinity splits into two levels of analysis. First, the technical aspects of Trinitarian paralogisms are analysed in terms of logical innovations in theories of “suppositio” and “distributio”. Second, the philosophical aspect of Trinitarian paralogisms translates into the question of formality as general applicability of logic. The sixteenth century tradition (represented by Trutfetter, Luther, and Vives) can be reconstructed as a reaction to the fourteenth century nominalist logical analysis. As opposed to post-medieval scholasticism developing the medieval approach, humanism and reformation criticise scholastic logic in terms of diff erent specifi c anthropological theories.
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Lukáš Novák Orcid-ID

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The teachings of Francisco Suárez tend to have the queer quality of being at once transparent and unintelligible. An example of this is his theory of relations. It is clear that, according to Suárez, a categorical relation is both really and modally identical to its foundation; on the other hand, however, the relative denomination does not apply to the foundation unless the terminus of the relation actually exists. One may ask, then: given that the foundation exists but the terminus does not, is the relation actually there, or not? Suárez does not seem to have a clear answer to this query.

call for papers

5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3

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article

6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
W. Matthews Grant, Mark K. Spencer

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Are all God’s activities identical to God? If not, which are identical to God and which not? Although it is seldom noticed, the texts of Aquinas (at least on the surface) suggest conflicting answers to these questions, giving rise to a diversity of opinion among interpreters of Aquinas. In this paper, we draw attention to this conflict and offer what we believe to be the strongest textual and speculative support for and against each of the main answers to these questions.

translation

7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Sonia Kamińska

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8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Kazimierz Twardowski

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9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Kazimierz Twardowski

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review article

10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
William F. Vallicella

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review

11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Michael W. Tkacz

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articles

12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Vlastimil Vohánka

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I discuss Josef Seifert, a realist phenomenologist, and David Oderberg, an Aristotelian. Both endorse essences, understood as objective quiddities. Both argue that no (a posteriori) law of nature is strongly (metaphysically) necessary: i.e. true in every possible world. But they disagree about weak necessity of laws: Seifert argues that no law is true in every possible world in which its referring expressions are non-empty, while Oderberg argues that some (indeed, any) is. I restate, relate, and review reasons of both authors for each of those theses. Seifert’s reasons include God’s ability to do miracles, conceivability of counterinstances to laws, and many others. Oderberg’s reasons include dependence of laws on particulars, depiction of laws as truths about properties necessarily connected with essences, and explanation of persistent regularities by means of that necessary connection. I argue that no reason of either Seifert or Oderberg is convincing, as its stands. But I also argue that given God and his ability to do miracles, the idea of “meaningful” but non-necessary connection between essences — an idea endorsed but insuffi ciently utilized by Seifert — is a better essentialist explanation of persistent regularities. This explanation implies that no law is necessary, be it weakly or strongly.
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Miroslav Hanke

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Martin Le Maistre’s Tractatus consequentiarum presents an analysis of self-reference based upon the principle that sentential meaning is closed under entailment. A semantics based on such principle off ers a conservative treatment of self-referential sentences compatible with the principle of bivalence and classical rules of inference. Le Maistre’s crucial arguments are formally reconstructed in the framework recently defended by Stephen Read and Catarina Dutilh Novaes as part of an analysis of Bradwardinian semantics.

reviews

14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Michael Sullivan

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15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Peter Forrest

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