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1. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1

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2. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Carl S. Hughes

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This paper suggests an alternative reading of Practice in Christianity to Merold Westphal’s interpretation of the text as defining what he calls “religiousness C.” Attending closely to the rhetorical construction of Practice, and situating it in the context of Kierkegaard’s intensive reading of Luther late in his life, I argue that this text extends the Postscript’s meditation on inwardness and writing to one of the central theological constructs of Lutheranism, the distinction between law and gospel. On my reading, Practice both defends the primacy of faith and grace within Christianity, and refuses their commodification into directly communicable results. At the end of this paper, I consider Kierkegaard’s seeming retraction, in 1855, of two rhetorical features of Practice that my reading emphasizes. Iconclude that this gesture in fact intensifies Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the law/gospel paradigm, and speaks to the impossibility of any direct, comprehensive, and final account of authentic Christian life.
3. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Jerry H. Gill

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It is well known that the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is the role of the body in all human experience and knowing, including even in the use of speech. Thus it is appropriate that his philosophy of language revolves around the notion of gesture. This essay explores the ramifications of this understanding of language in relation to the “speech” of deaf people through “American Sign Language,” which represents language as gesture par excellence.
4. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Jason T. Eberl

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Thomas Aquinas argues that matter is informed by a rational soul to compose a human person. But a person may survive her body’s death since a rational soul is able to exist and function without matter. This leads to the typical characterization of Aquinas as a dualist. Thomistic dualism, however, is distinct from both Platonic dualism and various accounts of substance dualism offered by philosophers such as Richard Swinburne. For both Plato and Swinburne, a person is identical to an immaterial soul that is contingently related to a human body. For Aquinas, a human person is composed of her soul and the matter it informs, but is not identical to either metaphysical component. I explicate Thomistic dualism while critically analyzing Swinburne’s account. I conclude that Aquinas’s account has theresources to address a central issue that arises for substance dualism.
5. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Richard White

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Schopenhauer was one of the first Western philosophers to appreciate the significance of Indian philosophy. He comments on “the admirable agreement” between his own thought and the teachings of Buddhism, and he praises the wisdom of the Upanishads as among the most profound productions of the human mind. But how accurate is his grasp of Indian philosophy? In this essay I focus on three significant points of comparison: compassion, the illusory nature of the individual, and the value of life. To what extent are these themes shared by Schopenhauer and Indian philosophy? To what extent is Schopenhauer’s account at odds with prevailing Indian views? Schopenhauer’s philosophy raises significant questions concerning the limits of cross-cultural appropriation and encounter.
6. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Ryan Drake

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A survey of commentaries on Aristotle’s Poetics over the past century reflects a long-standing assumption that pleasure, rather than understanding, is to be seen as the real aim of tragedy, despite weak textual evidence to this end. This paper seeks to rehabilitatethe role of understanding in tragedy’s effect, as Aristotle sees it, to an equal status with that of its affective counterpart. Through an analysis of the essential inducement of wonder on the part of the viewer and its connection with the organic unity of the plot—what Aristotle calls the “soul” of tragedy—I argue that the telos of tragedy in the Poetics is intended to accommodate both pleasure and incipient philosophical activity without necessarily privileging either.
7. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Hugh Williams

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This paper attempts to show that Charles Taylor’s persuasive and expansive phenomenology, developed primarily in his Sources of the Self, ultimately depends upon an ontology of the human person that remains undeveloped, as he often admits. His fundamentalphilosophical claims stand finally as postulates of practical reason, which nevertheless depend upon a dialogical practice that is grounded in the dialogical nature of the human person. This phenomenological and ethical approach raises persistent epistemological and metaphysical questions. What Taylor does not admit, and what this paper will propose in his stead, is that a more systematic metaphysics in the existential Thomist tradition can help support philosophically both his explicit and implicit ontological claims regarding the nature of the human person.

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8. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Christopher W. Gowans

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9. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Allan Hazlett

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10. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Kevin M. Staley

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11. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Siobhan Nash Marshall

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12. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

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13. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1
Greg Lynch

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14. International Philosophical Quarterly: Volume > 50 > Issue: 1

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